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#### INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE ARAB REGION: TRENDS AND POLICIES\*

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### Introduction

From the 1960s until the 1990s, the Arab region could be considered to be divided into host and source countries of international migrants, with the distinction lying in the presence or absence of oil. On the one hand, the large oil-exporting states had an abundance of capital and a shortage of workforce, and consequently became labour importers—with the aggregated Gulf States and Libya forming the world's third largest receiver of immigration flows after North America and the European Union. On the other hand, the non-oil-exporting states suffered an imbalance between a deficit of capital and a surplus workforce and as a result became labour-exporters to Arab oil-producing countries and to other regions in the world. The only exceptions to this pattern were Algeria, and to some extent Iraq, which both received considerable income from their hydro-carbon exports but which have been largely unable to transform this oil income into full employment.

After three decades this relatively clear-cut and almost stable pattern of international migration in the Arab region has recently shown signs of change and the once straightforward distinction between sender and receiver states in the Arab region has started to blur. Oil-states still attract foreign manpower-particularly since oil prices soared again in the early 2000s—but for the first time they are also witnessing alarming levels of unemployment among their own national labour force, which they have responded to with increasingly restrictive policies on the admission and settlement of foreigners. Non-oil-states remain countries of departure for many of their nationals, but are themselves becoming new countries of destination or transit on the global routes of international migration. They too, respond to the new situation with restrictive abundance

#### 1 Levels and trends

#### 1.1 Definition & sources<sup>1</sup>

Numbers of migrants vary according to who is counted as well as to who does the counting. Not only is there no universal definition as to who, or what, constitutes a migrant, but the self-same definition will generate quite different figures depending upon whether migrants are recorded at origin or at destination.

#### 1.1.1 For eigners and born-abroad residents

Two criteria are used to define migrants, either separately or in combination. The criterion most widely employed is the 'country of citizenship': immigrants are then equated to foreign residents. In several Arab countries, a further distinction is made between 'Arab non-nationals' (citizens from another Arab country) and 'foreigners' (citizens from a non-Arab country). Another criterion is the 'country of birth', according to which immigrants are defined as born-abroad residents.

The difference between numbers of migrants resulting from these two criteria is the balance between the two following categories:

a) Those born abroad, but who are not foreign residents. This category consists of two groups:

- Naturalised migrants: foreigners born abroad who have acquired the nationality of their host country. For example, the statistical office of the Netherlands reports the following statistics for migrants of Moroccan origin on 1 January 2005: a) 168,400 first-generation migrants (i.e. born abroad) of Moroccan origin; and b) 91,558 Moroccan nationals. The difference (55,842) is essentially made up of Moroccan migrants who have acquired Dutch citizenship.
- Nationals born abroad who have migrated to their country of nationality, often, but mistakenly, treated as return migrants. For example, the 2004 population census of Tunisia records 78,388 born-abroad residents, but 35,192 foreign residents. The difference (43,196) includes a number of Tunisians born abroad who have migrated ('returned') to their parents' country, with naturalised migrants.

b) Foreigners, but not born abroad: those born in a given country as a child of foreign parents (usually immigrants). There number will vary according to law in the country of residence and be greater in countries where *jus sanguinis* prevails (like in all Arab countries) than in countries where it is accompanied by *jus soli* (most of Europe and North America)

In some cases, another category is also included in migration statistics: those who are neither foreigners nor born abroad, but citizens—either by birth or by later acquisition of citizenship—born in the country as a child of one or two immigrant parents. They are usually denominated 'second-generation migrants'. For example, in the Netherlands, 315,821 residents of Moroccan origin (1/1/2005) are broken down into: 168,400 first-generation migrants, and 147,421 second-generation migrants, the latter including

131,497 persons with both parents born in Morocco and 15,924 with one parent born in Morocco.

1.1.2 UNRWA Refugees and migrants

The vast majority of refugees registered with UNHCR offices in the world are foreigners

A paradoxical consequence is that the number of refugees increases with time (through natural increase), while the number of migrants among them decreases (as a result of mortality), as illustrated by the figures below:

Palestinian refugees recorded with UNRWA in Jordan

- July 2000: 1,570,192, of which an estimated 128,508 were born before 1948 (migrants)
- March 2005: 1,780,701, of which an estimated 110,103 were born before 1948
- Change 2000–2005: +210,509 Palestinian refugees, but –18,405 migrants.

The same applies to the Palestinian Territory where immigrants defined as persons born abroad are a minority among the 1,680,142 immigrants, all of them refugees, given by the UN database. According to the Palestinian population census of 1997, 231,766 residents were born-abroad, of which 83,639 born in the pre-1948 territory that would become Israel, and 148,127 in other countries. Since 1997, the former number has certainly decreased (by mortality) while the latter is unlikely to have increased, since return migration has remained under the *de facto* control of Israel.

Apart from the question of whether UNRWA refugees can be counted as migrants, there is also the issue of whether they are actual residents of their country of registration. Because registration is a voluntary act and there is an interest in declaring a birth, but not a death nor a departure, there are serious doubts as to the adequacy of UNRWA records to population counting (Lubbad 2006, Endersen and Ovensen 1994). In Lebanon for example, the number of Palestinians actually residing in the country was reported to be 198,528 in 1997 (ACS 1999), a figure much lower than the 376,472 Palestinian refugees recorded with the UNRWA in Lebanon in 2000.<sup>4</sup>

1.1.3 Where migrants are counted m000953 Tw 0n er aclaring2 0 -18290TT4 1201ha0/3Ttaryusf Palec0niic

compared with the former. The relative difference was found to vary between +31% for Algerians and +145% for Egyptians. In the EU, the aggregated difference amounts to +2.367 million migrants. This figure reflects a variety of situations, including dual citizens, former migrants who have now left the country, and irregular migrants. Table 4 shows in the example of Moroccans residing abroad that, whatever the country of residence, Moroccan consulates record more expatriates than national sources, with a relative difference varying from less than 50% (Germany, Italy, Spain) and more than 250% (Belgium, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Jordan, South Africa).

#### 1.1.4 Insufficient statistics

Two preliminary remarks will help us to interpret the results provided in Section II.

Firstly, in theory the same person should be counted as an emigrant in the country of origin and as an immigrant in the country of destination. However, immigrants are present while emigrants are not. Because we can only count those who are 'in', and not those who 'out' (at least by direct enumeration), most migration data are on immigrants, not on emigrants. As a consequence, emigration from a given country has to be reconstructed as the aggregated immigration originating from this country in all other countries of the world.

Secondly, migration is a movement and accordingly primary statistics should deal with flows. However, for a variety of reasons, only a few countries provide accurate data on flows of migrants, and most available data are on stocks. While flows are made of entries on one side, and exits on the other, stocks only reflect part of the picture: the net result of entries and exits over a period of time, i.e. cumulated numbers of net lifetime migrants.

As a result of the above remarks, immigration to Arab countries will be measured using data collected in these countries, while emigration originating from Arab countries will be estimated as stocks of immigrants in destination countries, i.e. in the rest of the world.

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country (consulates).

Data collected by institutions of the hor11 -11try should ideally meet four conditions in order to provide a reliable picture of emigration from Arab countries.

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ternational comparison and aggregation.

ecause mgration is a rapidly changing phenomenon, statistical sources need to 'ly updated. This condition is me only by 'population registers', a system of s recording of vital events radid indiviges abs inestidenc (Table 3: Comparison between numbers of migrants counted by their origin country in the Arab region and their destination countries in the European Union)

The number of Arab migrants in the Gulf and Libya remains a major unknown. These countries do not publish data on their foreign residents by detailed nationality and the only source remains consular records or survey data from origin countries. For the five Arab countries which release such data, we obtain an aggregated number of 2,502,791 emigrants in Arab countries (mainly the Gulf and Libya) (see Table 2). If the missing countries of origin were counted, in particular Yemen, Jordan, Sudan and Syria, a much higher number, perhaps twice this figure, would be found.

To the above numbers, computed from national statistics of major destination countries and consular records of countries of origin, one should add the 1.899 million refugees registered with UNHCR, most of them originating from Sudan, Somalia, Palestine and Iraq (see Table 5).

(Table 5: Refugee population by country of asylum / origin)

From what precedes, it emerges that Arab states might be origin countries to some 10–15 million first-generation emigrants today, representing some 3.3–4.9% of their aggregated population,<sup>7</sup> or just over a world average estimated at 3.2%.

The following features emerge from Tables 1 and 2, and a few other sources.

1.2.1 Most Arab emigrants are bound either for Europe or the Arab region

According to data provided by five origin countries, Europe is the single largest destination of first-generation Arab emigrants, and hosts 59% of all such emigrants worldwide (4,897,462 out of 8,347,869,; see Table 2). The Arab oil countries, i.e. the Gulf States and Libya, constitute the second largest destination, with the rest of the world, mainly North America, ranking far behind. This is a partial result, established on the basis of data from five countries which do not represent the others. Considering that most emigrants from the missing countries are bound for destinations outside Europe, mainly the Gulf States (Yemen, Syria, Jordan) and Libya (Sudan), the actual share bound for Europe is much lower.

Destination varies with origin. Migrants from the Maghreb are predominantly destined for Europe. According to data from destination countries (see Table 1), France is the largest single destination country for Arab first-generation emigrants (1,733,441 end-1999), followed by Spain (566,967 end-2005), Italy (347,156 in 2003), and Germany (222,807 in 2002). Morocco is the first country of origin of Arab immigrants into the EU (1,812,510 according to destination countries data (see Table 1), and 2,616,871 in 2004 according to Moroccan consular registers (see Table 2). Algeria ranks second (789,459; 991,796), Tunisia third (358,926; 695,765), and Egypt fourth (127,060; 436,000).

Migrants from the Mashreq are instead predominantly destined for the Arab oil countries and overseas. According to origin countries data (see Table 2), 1,912,279 out of 2,736,729 Egyptian emigrants resided in Arab countries in 2000 (among them 923,600 in

Table 6 illustrates their destination. The bulk of this 1.540 million increase is found in the EU (+1.337 million, i.e. 87%), with France ranking first (+434,000), followed by Spain (+358,086), and Italy (+207,250), i.e. the three European countries closest to Morocco. Not only is Moroccan migrant population growing at a high rate, but the pace is accelerating. Annual numbers of additional Moroccans registered in their consulates worldwide have grown as follows: +92,195 per year in 1993–97, +132,804 per year in 1997–2002, and +253,496 per year in 2002–2004.

On the destination side, the comparison between an 'old' destination country (the Netherlands), and a 'new' one (Spain) provides additional information. In the Netherlands over the period January 1996 to January 2005, the total population originating from MENA countries has increased by 199,337, from 529,566 in 1996 to 728,933 in 2005, i.e. an annual growth rate of 3.6%. Two thirds of the increase are due to second-generation dual citizens (i.e. non-migrants born in the Netherlands), but one third to additional first-generation migrants.<sup>9</sup> In Spain the number of Arab nationals has been multiplied by a record 4.6 during the last seven years, representing an annual rate of growth of 21.9%, with Morocco ranking average (see Table 7).

(Table 7: Nationals from selected Arab countries residing in Spain 31/12/1998-31/12/2005)

A combination of internal factors (demographic pressure at working ages, unemployment and low return to skills) and external factors (call for migrant workers in other parts of the world, particularly Europe), makes a continuation of migratory pressures a likely scenario in the coming years. However, it is not certain that pressure will transform into actual migration, since the destination countries of Arab migrants, whether within, or outside the Arab region, are now all tightening barriers to migration.

1.2.4 A majority of low-skilled migrant workers

Economic migrants from Mediterranean Arab countries in the West (Europe and North America aggregated) are predominantly semi-skilled or unskilled workers, as illustrated below by their distribution according to occupation (see Table 8):

- Legislators. senior officials and managers: 11.4%
- Professionals: 4.4%
- Technicians and associate professionals: 8.1%
- Clerks: 10.7%
- Service workers and shop and market sales workers: 18.0%
- Skilled agricultural and fishery workers: 6.3%

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(Table 8: Active population originating from Arab countries, according to country of origin, country of destination and occupation)

Two factors explain the diversity of the socioeconomic composition of the migrant populations in destination countries. First, the period of migration, insofar as the earlier the migrating cohort, the less skilled it tends to be. And secondly, the migration and labour-market policies in the destination count

play a critical role. For example, two contemporary flows of departure from the same country, i.e. Morocco, will have very different educational profiles according to whether they are bound for Spain or the USA. In the former case they will tend to have only an intermediate, or lower secondary level of education, while the majority of those heading for the USA will have a university degree.

Generally, the USA and Canada, which are 'new destinations' for migrants from the Maghreb, attract the majority of highly-skilled people. University graduates represent close to 60% of first-generation migrants originating from Mediterranean Arab countries in Canada and the USA, against 10% in the four European countries for which data are available (Austria, France, Germany, a

#### 1.3.1 A majority of immigrants bound for the Gulf

According to the UN database (2005 figures) 12.8 million non-nationals, including an unknown but probably smaller number of first-generation migrants,<sup>10</sup> now live in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, representing 36% of their 36 million inhabitants. Half of these immigrants are in Saudi Arabia, and the highest proportion of immigrants in the population is recorded in the United Arab Emirates where they account for 71% of all inhabitants. However, very few updated population statistics are released by GCC countries so that very little can be said about the most massive immigration into the Arab region, which makes GCC the third largest region of immigration in the world after North America and Europe. Given the shortage of accurate statistics, scholars have to rely on estimates that are recurrently produced, even though the exact nature of data collection, processing, adjustment and publication of these estimates is rarely clarified and thus cannot be validated.

Looking at the most recently published data, one can assume that trends in migration have not changed notably since the aftermath of the 1990–1991Gulf War, which had provoked considerable disruption among migrant communities in the Gulf region. The overall dependency in immigrant labour is still unchanged, as is the predominance of men, of low-skilled workers, and of non-Arabs, mostly Asians, among migrants.

In Saudi Arabia, the very same proportion of non-nationals was found at the two population censuses of 1992 and 2004, 27.4% and 27.1% respectively,<sup>11</sup> as well as the same proportion of women among immigrants (29.6% and 30.5% respectively) indicating that there has not been any significant feminisation of migration, contrary to previous expectations. Domestic work remains the single most important profession among women migrants in the GCC region (as in other countries of the Mashreq, such as Lebanon and Jordan (Jaber 2005, Jureidini 2002)).

The Saudi Labour Force Survey of 2002 found that the bulk of immigrant workers still have low levels of skills (54.1% with no education or only primary education, compared with 32.9% among Saudi workers), and particularly women immigrant workers (66.7% with no education or only primary education and only 9.6% with university education, compared with respectively 6.4% and 51.1% among Saudi working women).<sup>12</sup>

In all GCC countries Arabs are currently a minority of migrants: 38% in Saudi Arabia and 46% in Kuwait around 25% in Qatar and 10% in the UAE, and less than 10% in Oman, where non-Arabs account for 95.6% of the immigrant labour force in the private and public sectors combined, with Indians alone accounting for 60% (Girgis 2002, Shah 2004, Kapiszewski 2004, State of Oman 2004).

Outside the Gulf region, a few other countries host immigrant communities ranging in the hundreds of thousands. Libya has probably the largest of these communities but it provides no up-to-date population statistics. Jordan hosts a sizeable population of migrant workers, in particular from Egypt (124,566 at the last Jordanian population census in 1994, 226,850 according to Egyptian records in 2001), and Lebanon, together with Jordan and Egypt, receive increasing numbers of workers from Sri-Lanka, the Philippines and a few other Asian countries. More than 55,000 work permits are attributed each year in Lebanon to East-Asians, mostly women. Syria has a sizeable Palestinian refugee population (2.16% of its total population, i.e. an estimated 402,000 in

2005), but few other foreign residents, whose total number was estimated at 55,000 in 2005 (Sadeldine 2005).<sup>13</sup>

#### 1.3.2 The particular situation of the Palestinian Territory

Starting from the onset of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, and particularly since the Oslo Declaration of Principles and the Peace Process initiated in 1993, the Palestinian Territory has become a country of immigration for a significant number of Israeli citizens. The UN database gives a number of immigrants in Palestine equal to that of refugees (1,680,142 in 2005), which implicitly means that there are no immigrants other than Palestinian refugees (whose quality of 'immigrants' is a matter of debate, see Section 1.1).

However, there are other immigrants in the Palestinian Territory. Regarding the two criteria of 'country of citizenship' and 'country of birth', one should indeed count as immigrants the 422,000 Israelis settlers currently living in the West Bank—182,000 in East Jerusalem and 237,000 in the rest of the West Bank (Fargues 2005a, Table 2, p. 375), not including the 8,000 Israeli citizens who returned from the Gaza strip to Israel in 2005—because they are residing beyond the 'Green Line' which is the only internationally recognised border between Palestine and Israel.

#### 1.3.3 Rising illegal immigration

Figures provided in Table 10 do not entirely reflect the entire picture of immigration into Arab countries. Other flows, most of them unrecorded by official statistics, are nevertheless notorious. Sudanese refugees in Egypt (Roman 2006), Iraqi refugees in Jordan (Chatelard 2004) and Syrian temporary workers in Lebanon<sup>14</sup> have never been counted, but figures ranging in the hundreds of thousands have been put forward by several sources of the media or NGOs for each of these flows.

The GCC states, as all other major countries of immigration around the world, host unrecorded but probably large numbers of irregular migrants (Shah, 2005). They have usually entered legally but over-stayed illegally, either while on a pilgrimage (Saudi Arabia), or through a 'sub-contracting' process whereby sponsors recruit more worker mim

unemployment and labour surpluses, and puts pressure on administrative systems that are better adapted to deal with the emigration of nationals than with the immigration of aliens.

#### 2.1 Emigration policies

For decades development and employment have been top issues on the policy agendas of Arab countries. It is in this framework that emigration may be viewed by some governments as part of the solution, and not solely as part of the problem. The policy of Arab countries regarding current emigration, its level and composition, varies from disincentive to encouragement according to period and context (Fargues, 2004). Their policy varies much less regarding emigrants themselves, who most Arab governments regard as a resource that can be mobilised for national purposes.

#### 2.1.1 Emigration between laissez-faire and incitement

Apart from the GCC states (now themselves faced with significant levels of unemployment among their young nationals) Arab governments generally recognise that sending surplus manpower abroad may alleviate pressures on their domestic labour markets. As far back as the 1960s (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria), and 1970s (Egypt and Jordan), several of the Arab states actively facilitated the international mobility of their nationals. For some of them, emigration became part and parcel of national growth strategies enshrined in their development plans (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen). For others the emigration of citizens could not be openly viewed as a policy solution to unemployment.

In some Arab countries policies have been remarkably constant over time. Morocco is one of them. Its 1968 five-year plan already set as a target the largest possible number of emigrants in order to retain as few unemployed workers as possible on the national labour market, to draw a maximum of financial resources in the national economy through workers' remittances, and to raise the skills of the national labour force in anticipation of its return. Morocco stuck to the same policy line when European governments started to close the door to labour immigration in the mid-1970s. At the same time, the King of Morocco was recurrently affirming his unwillingness for the integration of Moroccan expatriates in host societies and the recognition the double nationality. Moroccan policy was perfectly coherent: emigration is an export activity, and if it is promoted, it is for the country's benefit.

Tunisia, after a short period when its government could incite its expatriates to return in the wake of the migration crisis with Europe started in 1974, has always shown a similar concern for channelling to the country emigrants savings and investments.

Yemen is another country where emigration has constantly been promoted in recent decades. Despite the forced return of more than half a million of its expatriates workers from Saudi Arabia during the 1990–1991 Gulf War, its government has continued to make emigration a goal. Its five-year plan 2000–2005 provides for the "cooperation with neighbouring countries to increase the share of Yemeni migrant workers in those countries, as well as explore new employment fields that correspond to improved skills of the Yemeni labour", and encourages "the private sector to establish and operate training centres, including those that train Yemenis wishing to emigrate on the

Algeria unilaterally decided to discontinue its labour migration agreement with France, encouraged its expatriates to return back home (which very few did), and denounced emigration as a form of post-colonial dependence. Indeed, Algeria receives considerable income from its oil and gas exports and the government does not view remittances as an important resource for development. However, it is faced with alarming levels of unemployment (on average 20–30% of the workforce from independence in 1962 until the time of writing) and thus tacitly views its expatriates staying abroad from a positive angle, as a means to contain the pressure on the domestic labour market, and consequently on the state.

Egypt, by contrast, has followed a totally different path with a strict limitation of emigration under President Nasser and until the war of 1973, followed by President Sadat's 'open door' policy which unlocked the borders of Egypt to the entry of foreign investors as well as to the emigration of millions of Egyptian workers. In 1996 its Ministry of Manpower and Emigration was assigned a goal of 'linking emigration policy with the national interests of the state in achieving economic and social development'.<sup>17</sup>

The positions taken by Arab governments vary according to the levels of skills involved in the emigration process. They are generally more willing to encourage the emigration of their low-skilled workers than of highly-skilled professionals, even though this preference does not reflect systematically current patterns of unemployment. As a matter of facts, unemployment now affects the entire hierarchy of skills, and in several Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon) the highest rates of unemployment are registered among the young and university-educated.

Whatever the actual level of employment of highly-skilled workers, Arab governments predominantly view their emigration as the loss of a scarce resource, rather than as an opportunity to enhance skills available to the country through additional experience gained abroad in case of return migration. It is widely acknowledged that the causes of the brain drain do not lie exclusively in wages differentials between origin and destination countries, but also stem from national institutional systems that hamper individual prospects for social mobility and professional advancement, and offer low rewards for skills. In some cases, political factors and particularly civil conflicts have a certain bearing on the decision of elites to leave their country of origin (e.g. Lebanon in the late 1970s and 1980s, Algeria in the 1990s, Syria, etc.). However important the emigration of highly-skilled workers has become (Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan) no specific public policies have been designed to tackle the issue.

Governments also have to accommodate public opinion and those parties that do not systematically approve of emigration. In Lebanon for example, part of the opposition has recurrently argued that high rates of emigration entail the risk of depopulation, and criticizes the government for emphasising the positive image of the country generated by its large and often influential diaspora (Kiwan, 2005).

In the framework of the Barcelona Process, eight Arab countries have signed association agreements with the European Union, which may have a bearing with migration. These agreements include provisions relating to the living and working conditions of legally settled migrant communities, to the prevention of illegal migration, and to the reduction of migratory pressures, but atio,7.4(m)8.

However, several Arab governments fear that the scheduled establishment of a free trade area in the Mediterranean in compliance with the association agreements, may have a disruptive effect on their domestic production, leading to substantial job losses and increasing migratory pressures. They also point out that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and the security-oriented and tightened migration policies of the European Union and its Member States may jeopardise their development potential. They suggest that *ad hoc* solutions be found to secure labour mobility and labour circulation, as they view both factors as a corollary to the transition process in which their countries are currently involved. Tunisia and Morocco asked the European Union to initiate a dialogue on visa facilitation in order to guarantee a modicum of circulation for specific categories of migrant workers. Both countries view visa facilitation and labour circulation as essential accompanying measures to development and economic liberalisation.<sup>18</sup>

#### 2.1.2 Diasporas as a mobilisable resource for countries of origin

Governments of Arab migrants' origin countries have all set up institutions—either ministries or specialised ministerial sections, as well as specialised agencies—to help institutionalise the links between emigrants, wherever they reside, and their country of origin. These institutions have developed policies along two lines: economic and cultural.

#### a) Economic line

Emigration, whether permanent or temporary, generates substantial financial remittances that help offset persisting trade balance deficits and inadequate welfare systems. It can also foster the acquisition of high levels of skill and influential positions. Arab governments are willing to channel the progressive economic ian6ys8a5.7(gloefi e5.5(h)0 1 TfTD0.008 presupposes continuous flows of emigration in order to maintain continuous flows of remittances.

#### b) Cultural line

Countries of origin do not view expatriate communities solely as a source of external financing. Institutions set up to manage relations between expatriates and their country of origin take into account the range of assets that these communities represent, not only financially, but also in terms of human, cultural and social resources.

Irrespective of whether or not they left their country with the intention of returning home, many Arab emigrants, particularly to the West, end up settling, marrying and having children in their host country. The transition from first-generation to second-generation immigrants is accompanied by a cultural transition within the family, as the first generation is educated in their country of origin and the second in the host country. In order to tackle this situation, in Arab countries state-institutions dealing with their expatriate communities have initiated programmes offering migrant populations the means to maintain—or revive—links with their culture of origin. They organise religious and linguistic activities in the host countries (courses of religion and Arabic language for second-generation migrants), or at home (holidays in countries of origin). Several of them view the training of imams in state-controlled institutions in their countries of origin as a guarantee against the self-appointment, within the immigrant populations, of elements that could undermine the maintenance of civic order and offer easy prey to extremist movements (Fargues, 2005b).

Apart from their economic and cultural role, institutions in the countries of origin may also intervene in other domains, notably:

#### 2.2.1 A predominantly protectionist approach

Arab countries (like many others) share a concern for keeping work as far as possible for their nationals. This is a relatively new situation for the large oil-exporting countries which had adopted a predominantly labour importing policy until the Gulf War of 1990– 91, and an entirely new situation for the non-oil Arab countries, which had long been exclusively exporters of labour and have suddenly been faced during the last decade with the unprecedented challenges of transit migrants on their labour markets.

a) Indigenisation of the workforce in the Gulf

Comparable policies of indigenisation have been developed by all GCC countries, with limited success. It is reported for example that in Oman during the four years 2001-2004 close to 50,000 nationals have left their jobs in private companies, because of low wages.<sup>22</sup>

It is not only in GCC states that immigrants are viewed as competitors of the local labour force on the labour market. Several other countries of the Mashreq have limited the access of foreigners to specific occupations in order to avoid competition with local manpower. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria have adopted this kind of limitation, while in 2005 Lebanon lifted an earlier decision banning Palestinian refugees from a whole list of professions.

#### b) Prevention of illegal immigration in Northern Africa

Most Arab countries have adopted restrictive policies and legal provisions regarding economic migration with a view to protecting the employment opportunities of their nationals in domestic labour markets. Few countries, however, possess the required instruments to deal with illegal transit migration. Two of them, Morocco in 2003 (Elmadmad, 2005) and Tunisia in 2004 (C

be treated in the same way as nationals of their host state, even if they are not naturalised. In this vision, integration includes the right to family reunification, access to work and equal treatment in the workplace, the promotion of 'civic citizenship' guaranteeing a number of rights and obligati governance, security, etc. – that work to the disadvantage of Arab countries and make Europe and North America desirable places for many would-be migrants. On the other side, immigration will be driven, in the Gulf by the resumption of soaring oil prices, and in the rest of the Arab region by tightened immigration policies and reinforced border controls pursued by major countries of immigration – in particular European Union member States and the Gulf States – that make their neighbours unwitting receivers of transit migrants. As a consequence, there is an unprecedented need for specific policies dealing with international migration.

The second fact is that migration creates a durable link between origin and destination countries. It has been shown elsewhere that the movement of persons, including migration, has become a key form of exchange between countries that are otherwise poorly linked by low levels of international trade, such as the Gulf States and the other Arab countries, or the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. If one judges from financial statistics, in many cases workers remittances come far before any single export of goods or services. Not only migration brings substantial financial transfers, but it fosters a range of human relations which persist for generations, since many migrants tend to settle in their destination country. That migrants are bridges between societies finds expression in the gap between statistics of origin and destination countries: it has been found that numbers of migrants counted by the former are systematically in excess compared with those counted by the latter. Among the various reasons which explain this

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The three expatriate communities from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are thought to exceed largely 1 million persons, while three others –from Egypt, Sudan, and the Philippines– might be just below this figure (Pakkiasamy 2004), that is above the 10% threshold. The detailed results of the census of 2004 will <sup>21</sup> www.saudinf.net.
<sup>22</sup> Khaleej Times, 29 March 2005.

# **TABLES**

					С	ountry of Ori	gin			
Country of Destination	Definition**	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Syria	Tunisia	Total
Austria	В	330	4721	291	382	515	118	583	1194	8134
Belgium	В	7221	793		1045	83631		815	3263	96768
Cyprus	А	19	2609	222	1386	33	182	1638	19	6108
Czech Rep.	В	366	130	134	191	105	72	315	196	1509
Denmark	В	456	637	652	5361	3226	0	1037	508	11877
Estonia	В	1	1		1	1				4
Finland	В	225	210	132	95	613	10	134	183	1602
France	С	685558	15974	933	33278	725782	468	10826	260622	1733441
Germany	В	17308	14477	10435	47827	79838		28679	24243	222807
Greece	В	267	7448	672	1277	526		5552	231	15973
Hungary	В	216	178	131	90	23		487	23	1148
Italy	В	15750	40879	2011	3333	223661	389	2505	58628	347156
Ireland										
Latvia	А	8	8	9	88	6		16		135
Lithuania	В	2	3	14	119					138
Luxembourg	В	103	27	2	36	252	1	1	138	560

Table 1: Emigrants from Mediterranean Arab countries in the EU member states and in some other countries, according to statistics of destination countries - Most recent data\*

Country of Destination			Country of Origin								
	Definition**	Algeria	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Morocco	Palestine	Syria	Tunisia	Total	
South Africa	С	19	42	14	12	55		2	4	148	
Switzerland	В	3127	1369	288	1982	1982	122	671	4876	14417	
USA	А	10880	113395	46795	105910	34680		54560	6330	372550	
Other Countries*		33652	185124	55107	247897	62944	8237	85763	16402	695126	
Total		847320	444145	78559	363357	1900848	108944	190640	385785	4319598	

\* This table contains only those countries which provide census data on foreign residents by detailed country of nationality / birth. Some of the world major countries of immigration, such Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries of the Gulf, could not be included by lack of accurate data.

\*\* Immigrants are defined as foreign born [A], non-nationals [B], or a combination of both criteria [C]

*Sources of data*: Algeria: Recensement de la Population 1998 ; Armenia: 2001 population census) ; Australia: 2001 Population Census ; Austria : Population census, 2001 ; Belgium: Office des étrangers, 2005 ; Canada : 2001, Statistics Canada ; Cyprus: Census of Population, 2002 ; Czech Republic: Ministry of the Interior, 2002 ; Denmark: Statistics Denmark, 2003 ; Estonia: Population census, 2000 ; Finland: Statistics Finland, 2003 ; France: Recensement de la population, INSEE, 1999 ; Germany: Central Register on Foreigners, 2002 ; Greece: Population Census, 2001 ; Hungary: Population Census, 2001 ; Iceland: Statistics Iceland, 2003 ; Iran: Statistical Centre of Iran, 2003 ; Ireland: nd ; Italy: Residence permits 31.08.2004 ; Japan: Japan Statistics Bureau, 2000 ; Jordan: Population and Housing Census 1994 ; Latvia: Population and Housing Census, 2000 ; Lithuania: Population and Housing Census 2001 ; Luxembourg: RP2001 ; Malta: nd ; Morocco: Direction Gén. Sûreté Générale, 2002 ; Netherlands: Netherlands statistics, 2004 ; New Zealand: Population census, 2001 ; Norway: Statistics Norway, 2005 ; Palestinian Territory: Israel, Central Bureau of Stat, end 2004 ;

Poland: nd ; Portugal: 2003 ; Romania: Census of Population, 2002 ; Slovakia: nd ; Slovenia: Population Census, 2000 ; South Africa: Statistics South Africa, 2003 ; Spain: Source Fuente de información: Dirección General de la Policía, 31.12.2005 ; Sweden: Statistics Sweden, 2003 ; Switzerland: Office fédéral de l'immigration, 2003 ; Tunisia : Recensement de la Population 2004 ; Turkey: Population Census of 2000 ; United Kingdom: 2001 Census ; United States: 2000, U.S. Census Bureau, Census.

*Source of the table*: Fargues, Ph. (Ed) Mediterranean Migration Report 2005, CARIM, European University Institute, Florence 2005, pp. 374-5

Country	Type of data	European Countries*	Arab Countries	Other Countries	Total	
Algeria 1995	А	991796	66398	14052	1072246	
Egypt 2000	В	436000	1912729	388000	2736729	
Lebanon 2001	В	157030	123966	325604	606600	
Morocco 2004	А	2616871	282772	189447	3089090	
Tunisia 2003	А	695765	116926	30513	843204	
Sub-total		4897462	2502791	947616	8347869	
Palestine 2002	С	295075	4180673	231723	4707471	
Total		5192537	6683464	1179339	13055340	

TABLE 2 : MIGRANTS FROM 6 Arab countries by group of countries of residence, according to statistics of origin countries

Type of data: A = consular records; B = survey on expatriates, C = PCBS estimates

Country $\setminus$ Year	by country of as	sylum	by country of origin		
Country (Tear	1994	2003	1994	2003	
Algeria	219.1	0.0	20.7	11.7	
Bahrain	0.0	0.3			
Djibouti	33.4	234.0	18.1	0.5	
Egypt (1)	7.2	0.0	0.5	5.7	
Iraq (2)	119.6	134.2	749.8	368.6	
Jordan	0.6	1.2			
Kuwait (3)	30.0	1.5			
Lebanon	1.4	2.5	15.7	24.9	
Libya	2.0	11.9			
Mauritania	82.2	0.5	68.0	30.5	
Morocco	0.3	2.1			
Palestinian Territory			82.6	427.9	
Qatar	0.0	0.0			
Saudi Arabia (4)	18.0	240.8			
Somalia	0.4	0.4	631.4	402.3	
Sudan	727.2	138.2	405.1	606.2	
Syria	40.3	3.7	7.1	20.3	
Tunisia	0.0	0.1			
United Arab Emirates	0.4	0.2			
Yemen	48.3	61.9			
Arab Countries	1,330.3	833.5	1,999.1	1,898.7	
World Total	15,733.7	9,680.3	15,733.7	9,680.3	

#### TABLE 5: Refugee population by country of asylum / origin

Source: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/statistics

1. The 2002-2003 figures include an estimated 70,000 Palestinian refugees residing in the country.

2. Figure for 2003 refers to end-2002.

3. Since 1995, 27,000 Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, previously assisted by UNHCR, are no

Country of registration	1993	2004	Annual rate of growth %
	E	Europe	
France	678917	1113176	4.50%
Spain	65847	423933	16.93%
Netherlands	164546	300332	5.47%
Italy	91699	298949	10.74%
Belgium	145363	293097	6.38%
Germany	85156	102000	1.64%
United Kingdom	25000	35000	3.06%
Switzerland	5517	11500	6.68%
Sweden	5500	10000	5.43%
Russia	-	8687	-
Denmark	4622	6300	2.82%
Norway	3400	6300	5.61%
Other	-	7597	-
Total Europe	1279558	2616871	6.50%
	Arab	Countries	
Libya	102413	120000	1.44%
Algeria	54576	79790	3.45%
Saudi Arabia	9000	27830	10.26%
Tunisia	20000	25637	2.26%
United Arab Emirates	2992	13040	13.38%
Other	7036	16475	7.73%
Total Arab Countries	196017	282772	3.33%
	Othe	r countries	
United States	25000	100000	12.60%
Canada	45000	77713	4.97%
Other	3722	11734	10.44%
Total other countries	73722	189447	8.58%
TOTAL	1549297	3089090	6.27%

Table 6:Moroccan population residing abroad according to consular records 1993-2004

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, 2005

Country of nationality	1998	2005	Change 1998-2005	Annual rate of growth %
Algeria	5,924	46,278	40,354	29.4
Egypt	799	2,501	1,702	16.3
Morocco	111,043	511,294	400,251	21.8
Tunisia	528	1,566	1,038	15.5
Jordan	696	1,297	601	8.9
Lebanon	1,072	1,442	370	4.2
Syria	1,187	2,579	1,392	11.1
Total 7 countries	123,247	568,962	445,708	21.9

TABLE 7: NATIONALS FROM SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES RESIDING IN SPAIN 31/12/1998 - 31/12/2005

Source: Fuente de información: Dirección General de la Policía - INE 2006

TABLE 8: ACTIVE POPULATION ORIGINATING FROM ARAB COUNTRIES, ACCORDING TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, COUNTRY OF DESTINATION AND OCCUPATION $^*$ 

Clerks

Legislators, senior officials and managers

Country of Origin

Country of Destination

Professionals

Technicians and associate professionals

Service workers and shop and market sales workers

Skilled agricultural and fishery workers

Craft and related trades workers

Plant and machine operators and assemblers

Elementary occupations workers

Armed foCe1c-0yorkers

35

## Professionals Technicians and associate professionals Clerks Service workers and shop and market sales workers Stilled agricultural and fishery workers Craft and related trades workers

Plant and machine operators and assemblers

Country of Country of Origin Destination Legislators, senior officials and managers

36

#### TABLE 9: MIGRANT POPULATION AGED 15

Country of origin	Country of residence	Below primary or primary	Lower secondary or secondary	Tertiary	Total	
	Tunisia	58	118	174	676	
	United-States**	13985	9265	24420	47670	
	Jordan	1623	29	96	1748	
	Total	21417	14772	37813	74323	
	Austria	602	378	70	1050	
	Canada	655	1050	3510	5215	
Tunisia	France	69515	58559	36233	164307	
	Spain	94	536	32	662	
	United-States**	915	1030	3610	5555	
	Total	71781	61553	43455	176789	
Total 8 countries		825132	789106	550232	2165921	

\*Only countries of residence providing the distribution by occupation of Med-MENA migrants are included in the table

\*\* Population aged 24 and over

*Sources* : Statistical Institutes of Austria (2001), Germany (2001), Canada (2001), Spain (2001), USA (2000), France (1999), UK (2002), Jordan (2003) and Tunisia (2004).

Country	National (most recent / surve	census	United Nations 2005	Difference UN / National	
	Number Year		Absolute	Relative	
Algeria	72	1998	242	170	237%
Bahrain	245	2001	295	50	21%
Comoros			67		
Djibouti			20		
Egypt	1	1996	166	50	43%
Iraq			28		
Jordan	315	1994	2225	1910	606%
Kuwait	1388	2001	1669	281	20%
Lebanon					

TABLE 10: NUMBERS OF IMMIGRANTS IN ARAB COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO NATIONAL SOURCES AND UN ESTIMATES

TABLE II. NUM	BERS OF APPREND	ENDED IKKEGU	LAK MIGKANI.	S IN MOROCCU	, 2000-2005	
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Nationals	9850	13002	16100	12400	9353	8000
Foreigners	14395	15000	15300	23851	17252	22000
Total	24245	28002	31400	36251	26605	30000

TABLE 11: NUMBERS OF APPREHENDED IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN MOROCCO, 2000-2005

Source: Moroccan Ministry of the Interior