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**INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT:  
DYNAMICS AND CHALLENGES IN SOUTH AND  
SOUTHERN AFRICA\***

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\* The views expressed in the paper do not imply the expression of any opinion on the part of the United Nations Secretariat.

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## A. INTRODUCTION

International migration is a relatively new subject on the public and policy agenda of the South African government and has come to prominence as a result of a protracted and controversial process of drafting new immigration policy and legislation.<sup>1</sup> One of the key obstacles to the drafting and finalisation of new immigration policy and law has been the lack of definition and agreement on its objectives. So for example, the Draft Green Paper on International Migration (a preliminary discussion document) proposed that migration policy should be refocused as a tool of development.<sup>2</sup> However, the subsequent Draft White Paper on International Migration (a draft policy document authorized by the adviser to then Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosutho Buthelezi) shifted the focus of migration policy away from development to illegal immigration, control and enforcement.<sup>3</sup>

South Africa's migration policy and legislation has also been developed in the context of a process that has been in motion since 1993 to draft a development-oriented Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The Protocol has deadlocked several times and has no immediate prospect of being finalised, but has important development implications for South Africa and the SADC region as a whole.<sup>4</sup>

South Africa's development programmes and policies, including those that are directly related to, or impacted upon by migration must be understood in the context of the African continent in general and the SADC in particular. While it is true that in global terms, South Africa is a developing country that faces the myriad of issues that other developing countries around the world are faced with, in continental and sub-regionononononri Pr South16 in the ci.1(c10.)-2(efu)1.3(s11.4ofu)1.3(t2( tak(d on)2

Since 1994, there has been a seeming hardening of public attitudes to migrants and immigrants in South Africa, or a rise in xenophobia. These changing attitudes are a reflection of changes in the political dispensation, including a new nation-building project, a situation where whereby the majority of South Africans and the fact of changing migration streams and their perceived threat to citizens' rights and interests.<sup>8</sup>



There has been an enormous increase in legal temporary cross border traffic from the rest of Africa to South Africa (particularly the SADC). Between 1990 and 2000, for example:

- total visits to South Africa increased from 1 million to 5.1 million
- African visits to South Africa increased from 550,000 to 4 million
- SADC visits to South Africa increased from 500,000 to 3.7 million

The numbers cited here reflect the number of times the border is crossed rather than the number of individual border crossers. A survey conducted by SAMP in the late 1990s showed that the purpose of most recent entry to South Africa varied markedly from country to country (Table 2). In the case of Mozambique, some 67% of entries were work-related, compared with 29% from Zimbabwe, 25% from Lesotho and only 10% from Botswana. Business (including trading and shopping) was the predominant reason for entry amongst Zimbabweans (49%) and Botswana (32%).

In contrast to the post-apartheid explosion in temporary intra-regional movement, legal immigration to South Africa has been on the decline. There was a consistent drop in the number of immigrants to South Africa in the 1990s (defined as those obtaining permanent residence status) (Table 3). There was a significant shift towards the rest of Africa as a source region with the proportion of immigrants climbing from 11% in 1990 to nearly 40% by 2002. The absolute numbers are, however, not large and do not substantiate the claim of some that there has been a massive “brain drain” from the rest of Africa to South Africa since 1990.

Table 2. Reasons for entry to South Africa (%)

<i>Reason for Entry</i>	<i>Botswana</i>	<i>Lesotho</i>	<i>Mozambique</i>	<i>Namibia</i>	<i>Zimbabwe</i>
<i>Employment related</i>					
Work	7	17	45	11	15
Look for work	3	8	22	2	14
<i>Business related</i>					
Business	6	2	2	8	7
Buy and sell goods	2	3	2	2	21
Shopping	24	19	4	1	21
<i>Other reasons</i>					
Visit family	23	34	12	13	39
Medical	5	6	4	4	2
Holiday	14	2	5	19	3
Study	3	1	1	3	2
Other	12	8	2	12	3

Source: SAMP database

Table 4 provides a supplementary breakdown of the major African sources of immigrants during the 1990s. First, it is clear that the initial post-1990 movement of African skills to South Africa tapered off from most countries. The most obvious example is Zimbabwe (from 1,637 in 1990 to 237 in 1997). Second, there was a temporary surge of immigration from the DRC to South Africa in the mid-1990s which has fallen off since. Third, the majority of the movement, such as it is, was from neighbouring countries within SADC and not the rest of Africa.

Table 3. Immigration to South Africa, 1990-2002

<i>Year</i>	<i>Legal Immigrants</i>	<i>African Immigrants</i>	<i>% African</i>
1990	14,499	1,628	11.2
1991	12,379	2,065	16.7
1992	8,686	1,266	14.8
1993	9,824	1,701	17.3
1994	6,398	1,628	25.4
1995	5,064	1,343	26.4
1996	5,407	1,601	29.6
1997	4,102	1,281	31.2
1998	4,371	1,169	26.7
1999	3,669	1,504	40.1
2000	3,054	831	27.2
2001	4,832	1,419	29.4
2002	6,545	2,472	37.8
Total			

Table 4. Immigration from African Countries to South Africa

<i>SADC</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>
Botswana	81	46	31	34	48	28	50	28
DRC	40	42	230	243	244	78	93	71
Lesotho	175	167	126	261	227	222	233	124
Malawi	95	128	75	54	68	85	98	45
Mauritius	91	97	64	46	38	39	51	43
Mozambique	115	81	32	41	45	41	53	39
Swaziland	114	124	62	81	110	83	97	71
Zambia	n/a	141	62	66	75	66	69	61
Zimbabwe	1,637	889	379	642	244	405	394	237
<b>Other African</b>								
Ghana	6	11	39	46	72	n/a	149	n/a
Kenya	17	20	16	35	38	24	47	n/a
Nigeria	3	8	4	27	25	n/a	n/a	n/a
Uganda	2	12	16	21	12	n/a	51	n/a
Other	47	42	41	36	48	255	146	490

A number of reasons have been advanced for the absence of a major post-apartheid “brain drain” to South Africa from the SADC region and Africa as a whole since 1990. The first is the effect of the more general immigration policy of the post-apartheid government. This has been labeled restrictionist and anti-immigrationist. The reasons for this restrictionism have been discussed at length elsewhere but basically relate to the imperatives of nation-building, job protection for South Africans and rampant intolerance of outsiders, bordering on xenophobia.<sup>12</sup> Hence it has become extremely difficult for Africans with skills to get permanent and even temporary residence permits in South Africa through official channels.

The argument is sometimes heard that South Africa, as a matter of policy, will not denude other African countries of their skills base. But there is very limited evidence that this is the reason why foreign Africans have found it so difficult to settle in South Africa. For example, in no speech or policy document from the Department of Home Affairs since 1994 is this mentioned as a significant

policy consideration. Only in one case does there appear to have been concern about skills loss from other African countries. At the request of the Zimbabwean government, South Africa informally undertook not to recruit health professionals from that country in the mid-1990s.

Third, there are various push or “repulsion” factors that make South Africa a less attractive destination than might, at first, appear. Levels of xenophobia are extremely high in South Africa and are directly particularly at other Africans.<sup>13</sup> This intolerance and resentment touches the foreign business executive in the boardroom as well as the foreign trader on the street. While only 5% of skilled foreign residents of South Africa reported that that had negative or very negative relations with South Africans, stories of the hostile climate in South Africa inevitably reach home countries and have a dampening effect on chain migration.

Finally, there is the impact of social and political conditions in South Africa. In a survey of foreign Africans in South Africa conducted by SAMP, respondents were asked to compare conditions in their home country with those in South Africa (Table 5). It is clear that economic factors such as cost of living, income, and employment availability are key benefits of South Africa, as are education, health care and other services. However, only 16% felt that their personal or family security was better in South Africa. This is an extraordinary finding given stereotypes about the rest of Africa. The perception is rooted in personal experience. As many as 59% reported being robbed, 45% being harassed and 23% being assaulted in South Africa.<sup>14</sup> South Africa’s uncontrolled crime situation therefore exercises a clear deterrent effect on immigration.

Table 5. Comparing South Africa with home country

<i>Personal Economic Conditions</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>African</i>	<i>Other</i>
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Table 6. Work permits issued and renewed, 1990-2000

<i>Year</i>	<i>New Work Permits</i>	<i>Renewals</i>	<i>Total</i>
1990	7,657	30,915	38,571
1991	4,117	32,763	36,880
1992	5,581	33,318	38,899
1993	5,741	30,810	36,551
1994	8,714	29,352	38,066
1995	11,053	32,838	43,891
1996	19,498	33,206	52,704
1997	11,361	17,129	28,490
1998	10,828	11,207	22,035
1999	13,163	10,136	23,299
2000	6,643	9,191	15,834
<b>Total</b>			

*Source:* DHA Annual Reports

Table 7. Travellers to South Africa for work purposes, 1998-2000

	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>
Africa	14,118	13,258	11,061
Europe	28,030	26,660	23,528
Asia	7,211	7,284	7,025
North America	7,322	6,912	6,150
Australasia	1,635	1,688	1,360
Middle East	489	465	470
South America & Caribbean	1,093	787	967
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>59,898</b>	<b>57,054</b>	<b>50,561</b>



Table 8. Travellers entering South Africa for business purposes, 1998-2000

	1998	1999	2000
Africa	476,665	414,916	431,075
Europe	115,863	141,083	136,915
North America	37,496	32,880	33,950
Asia	26,876	25,615	24,211
Australasia	10,274	10,227	10,281
Middle East	4,436	4,626	5,005
South America and Caribbean	3,596	2,933	3,725
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>675,206</b>	<b>632,280</b>	<b>611,212</b>

Source: Unpublished data, Department of Home Affairs, 2001.

### 3. Migrants under contract

A significant shift in patterns of labour migration to South Africa since 1990 has been the declining importance of traditional contract migration to the South African mines.<sup>16</sup> In the late 1980s, the South African gold mining industry entered a long period of restructuring and downsizing as a result of declining ore reserves, rising costs and a stagnant gold price (Table 9). At the time of the 1987 Strike, 477,000 migrant workers were employed on the mines. By 2003, the figure had more than halved to 200,000. Retrenchments have exacerbated poverty in many rural mine-sending areas, shutting off remittances to many households and denying young school-leavers the chance to migrate to the mines.

Table 9. Mine labour recruitment, 1990-2000

Year	South Africa	Botswana	Lesotho	Mozambique	Swaziland	% Foreign	Total
1990	199,810	14,609	99,707	44,590	17,757	47	376,473
1991	182,226	14,028	93,897	47,105	17,393	49	354,649
1992	166,261	12,781	93,519	50,651	16,273	51	339,485
1993	149,148	11,904	89,940	50,311	16,153	53	317,456
1994	142,839	11,099	89,237	56,197	15,892	55	315,264
1995	122,562	10,961	87,935	55,140	15,304	58	291,902
1996	122,104	10,477	81,357	55,741	14,371	58	284,050
1997	108,163	9,385	76,361	55,879	12,960	59	262,748
1998	97,620	7,752	60,450	51,913	10,336	57	228,071
1999	99,387	6,413	52,188	46,537	9,307	54	213,832
2000	99,575	6,494	58,224	57,034	9,360	57	230,687

Source: TEBA

Table 9 shows that mine migration has declined for all sending areas except Mozambique. The drop in internal migration has been particularly rapid (approximately 100,000 jobs lost to 2000). The most striking aspect, however, is the proportional increase in foreign migrants. The proportion of foreign miners has risen from around 40% in the mid-1980s to nearly 60%. Mozambique has been a particular beneficiary with more Mozambicans employed in 2000 than in 1990 (57,000 v 45,000). A quarter of all miners are now Mozambicans (up from 12% in 1990).

Union gains for migrants in the mining industry in the 1980s were systematically rolled back in the 1990s through sub-contracting. Once dominated by a handful of powerful, centralized mining

#### ***4. Irregularity and migration***



The largest claimant-generating countries are those which one might have reasonably anticipated: Angola, Burundi, Zaire (DRC) and Somalia (Table 13). There have also been significant numbers of claimants from countries such as Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, India and Pakistan. Rejection rates are very high for claimants from these countries, perhaps suggesting that economic migrants have attempted to use the refugee system to establish themselves in South Africa (Table 14 and 15).

Patterns and purposes of women's migration differ significantly from those of men. Women's migration is more varied, complex and multi-motivational and is driven by a wide range of social and

### **C. SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSES TO MIGRANTS AND IMMIGRANTS**

One of the conundrums of post-1994 South Africa, given the country's stated commitment to

with South Africans. The latter has ranged from verbal abuse (and the use of the derogatory term, “*makwerekwere*” to physical attacks. Hostile attitudes can be found in the media, in statements by public officials as well as in the day to day lives of migrants.

Not every African has bad experiences in South Africa, however. A survey of African migrants



Table 18: Emigration from South Africa, 1987-1997

	<i>Total</i>		<i>Professionals</i>	
	<i>Departures</i>	<i>Arrivals</i>	<i>Departures</i>	<i>Arrivals</i>
Australia	17,650	28,747	2,658	4,533
Canada	6,354	18,125	1,132	3,251
New Zealand	5,979	14,009	1,344	3,214
United Kingdom	26,169	90,788	3,596	16,959
United States	5,936	46,724	1,410	4,339
Total	62,088	198,393	10,140	32,296

Source: Adapted from Brown et al, *The Brain Drain*, pp. 102-3.

By applying an undercounting formula for official data for the period 1989-2003, World Bank researchers have estimated total emigration for the period at 521,571 (compared to 130,965 in the official data).<sup>37</sup> Overall, then, between 1987 and 2003, South Africa lost an estimated 720,000 emigrants to five major developed countries. This is a significant “brain drain” by any standards.<sup>38</sup>

i These figures undercount in two other ways. First, South Africans do not only emigrate to these five countries. Second, they do not take into account the impact of skilled South Africans who leave

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The Emigration Potential index suggests that the popular assumption that skilled emigration is a “white” phenomenon is a grave misconception. There

Table 19: Satisfaction with quality of life in South Africa

<i>Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with (%)</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Africans</i>
Cost of living	71	72	64
Present level of taxation	74	75	74
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	59	59	59
Personal safety	66	65	61
Family's safety	68	69	54
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g. parks, beaches, toilets)	70	79	37
Customer service	56	65	27
Future of children in South Africa	55	61	29
Availability of affordable/quality products	28	29	31
Job	23	18	39
Security of job	26	20	44
Level of income	37	30	60
Prospects for professional advancement	30	32	35
Ability to find house wanted	21	17	37
Ability to find a good school for children	27	27	27
Ability to find medical services for family	21	19	23
N=	724	522	131

*Source:* DA McDonald and J Crush, eds. 2002. *Destinations Unknown: Perspectives on the Brain Drain in South Africa*. Pretoria: Africa Institute and Southern African Migration Project.

A more recent SAMP study in 2003 looked at the emigration potential of a representative sample of final-year students in tertiary education institutions across the country.<sup>44</sup> Just over one quarter (28%) said they wanted “to a great extent” to move overseas to live and work for two years or more. One in five (21%) said that it was “very likely” that they would actually do so. Short term emigration potential appears to be even higher. Four in ten said they wanted “to a great extent” to go to live and work for less than two years. One quarter said it was “very likely” they would actually go. About one in five said that it was “very likely” that they would leave the country within six months of graduation. Smaller numbers said they would leave within two years (15%) and within five years (18%). Compared to the SAMP survey of skilled South African adults, the proportions of students with a “very high” emigration potential are exactly the same (2%) (Figure 1). However, twice as many students have a “high” emigration potential (20%) with a further 25% having a moderate potential. As many as 20% of skilled adults had zero emigration potential, compared to only 3% of students. In other words, emigration potential is *higher* among students than people already pursuing their chosen profession.

## **Figure I. Emigration potential of final year students and skilled adults**

### ***2. Diaspora links and networks***

The extent to which South African emigrants form “diaspora communities”, engage in transnational migration fields, and retain linkages with home have yet to be fully explored. Certainly SAMP research amongst intended emigrants shows that few intend to permanently sever their links with home. This applies to both seasoned and apprentice professionals. Stern and Szalontai note that there is no data available on remittances and that total non-official current transfers (including remittances as a sub-category) amounted to R365 million in 2003, or 0,03% of GDP (compared to Sub-Saharan Africa as a region, where remittances alone contribute 1.3% of GDP).

Table 20. Duration of emigration

<i>Length of stay at most likely destination (%)</i>	
Less than 6 months	1
6 months to 1 year	2
1 to 2 years	8
2 to 5 years	14

A number of South African-based networks have been established to mobilize the skills of the expatriate South African population. Of these, the most well-known are the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) and the Homecoming Revolution. SANSA was initially a project established at the University of Cape Town, but was later incorporated into the National Research Foundation (NRF) which is a parastatal organisation. SANSA's key area of focus is to provide a forum for interaction between South Africans abroad, including the possibility of short returns home or to make a contribution to the development of South Africa from wherever they may be located.

The Homecoming Revolution was established by an Advertising Executive who had spent some time living abroad and who, upon her return to South Africa, established the organisation which is geared towards encouraging South Africans to return home. The Homecoming Revolution offers a full range of services to assist returnees to resettle in South Africa.

### **E. MIGRATION: DEVELOPMENT OR CONTROL?**

South Africa represents an interesting case study in the competing pressures for unilateralism, bilateralism and multi-lateralism in the search for workable instruments of migration governance. Historically, regional migration to South Africa was governed by bilateral accords. Unilateral instruments, i.e., immigration legislation, governed white immigration. New immigration legislation in post-apartheid South Africa is unilateral.

At the same time, South Africa has had to respond to regional initiatives for a multi-lateral approach within the SADC as well as its commitment to regional integration and cooperation for development. South Africa is also committed to regional integration and cooperation through the African Union (AU) and NEPAD. New bi-lateral agreements, which will not supercede existing bi-lateral agreements are currently under negotiation with some neighbouring states.

ideas about immigration were not always consistent with government policy.”<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the Act was hastily passed to meet a constitutional deadline, stalling debate and changes to the legislation. Hence, the introduction of the Immigration Amendment Act in 2004 following the elections of April 2004 and the appointment of a new ANC Minister. A review of regulations is also currently underway.

Although much was made of the stated intention of the Immigration Act of 2002 to facilitate stated government policy to remove obstacles to the entry of skilled migrants, the Act and the accompanying regulations were largely inconsistent with stated government policy.<sup>47</sup> And, with the exception of large employers, the IA together with regulations, largely made the process of entry more complicated and time consuming.

The IA states that in the administration of the Act, government will pursue several objectives including regulating the influx of “foreigners” to promote economic growth by (a) ensuring that South African businesses may employ foreigners who are needed; (b) facilitating foreign investment, tourism and industries which are reliant on international exchanges of people and personnel; (c) enabling exceptionally skilled or qualified people to “sojourn” in the country; (d) increasing skilled human resources; (d) facilitating the movement of students and academics within SADC for study, teaching and research; (e) promoting tourism and (f) encouraging the training of citizens and

This is effectively a “block” or “group” permit allocated to an employer rather than individual employees. In granting such a permit, Home Affairs must first consult with Labour and Trade and Industry to determine the number of foreign employees who can be hired under the permit. Management of the permit, including allocation of individual permits, becomes the responsibility of the corporation or institution.

Business permits are to be issued to individuals wishing to establish or invest in a business in which they may be employed. The criteria here are very stringent including a R2.5 million investment, proven track record, employment creation for South Africans, export potential in certain prescribed sectors, and financial viability.

Visitors’s permits and cross-border passes (for people from neighbouring countries with a common border who do not hold passports and live in border areas) are issued for short term stays of up to three months. Purpose of visit does not have to be specified but work is specifically precluded. Business activity is permitted, however, which means that cross-border trading can be carried out legally under these permits.

The creation of six new modes of entry for migrant labour has been described as “likely to prove at least unwieldy to administer, if not entirely unworkable.”<sup>48</sup> The system is therefore likely to be streamlined in the current process of revision of the regulations.<sup>49</sup> The Immigration Amendment Act also streamlined the process a little.

The Immigration Amendment Act of 2004 makes technical and legal clarifications, simplifies the more complex provisions of the Act and makes some changes to immigration governance. The preamble refers to a need for scarce skills, investment and tourism and to the role of South Africa in the region.<sup>50</sup> Notwithstanding, the preamble, the IAA tightens provisions on the issue and renewal of visitors permits and tightens existing immigration control over work-related activities.

Repatriation procedures for irregular migrants evident in ACA were largely retained by the IA and IAA. Suspected irregular migrants (usually from the SADC) can be arrested, detained (in a detention centre or police stations and prisons) and repatriated to their country of origin, without the option of appeal to a court of law. Repatriation procedures have caused some tension between the South African government and governments of neighbouring states and have been criticised by some human rights organisations.

In summary, three points need to be made about South Africa’s new framework for admission of migrant workers: (a) the new Act, which proposes to use migration as a tool of economic growth, represents a significant break from the control-oriented mindset of the past; (b) the Act facilitates temporary entry or varying periods of time but does not encourage permanent immigration; (c) the Act does not encourage family members to accompany labour migrants to South Africa.

The new framework, in effect, asserts the right of South Africa to craft its own immigration



agreement with Malawi is defunct. The others are still operative. There has never been a similar agreement with Zimbabwe. As noted above, and reflecting its foreign policy, the South African government has concluded a new bi-lateral agreement with Mozambique and is also in talks with the governments of other neighbouring countries.

The existing bilateral treaties were concluded in the 1960s (with Mozambique) and the 1970s (with the others). The full text of these agreements can be accessed at the following web address: <http://www.queensu.ca/samp/policy.html>.

The treaties specify a series of conditions and obligations on the following issues:

- Recruitment – including the right of the private sector to recruit, length of contract, time between contracts, quotas, payment of recruiting fees, the need for written contracts, and provision of facilities for recruiting and processing contracts;
- Contracts – including identification of employer and employee, home address, place of employment, contract length, minimum wage, in-kind contributions, transport to and from work;
- Remittances and Deferred Pay – provision for compulsory deduction of a proportion of wages and transfer to home country;
- Taxation – exempting contract workers from being taxed in South Africa;
- Documentation – including the need for valid contracts, passports, vaccination certificates, employment record books;
- Unemployment Insurance
- Length of Agreements
- Labour Offices – to be established in South Africa and be responsible, inter alia, for “protecting the interests of workers,” registration of undocumented workers, transfer of money, providing information on conditions of employment, and consulting on the repatriation of destitute and sick workers.

The treaties are badly outdated and no longer observed in every particular. Indeed, both sides could demonstrate numerous examples of breach. Many of the provisions have been superceded by events. Others (such as the right of neighbouring countries to have a Labour Office in South Africa to look after the interests of migrants) continue as before.

The primary beneficiary of the bilateral agreements has been the mining industry. Although the mines are not mentioned specifically, it is clear from the wording of the treaties that they were specifically designed for this industry. The bilateral treaties licensed the mining industry to pursue its own private recruiting in neighbouring countries. The mines (through TEBA) had complete control over who they would recruit and where. On the supplier side, the treaties contained provisions to ensure that some of the benefits of migration flowed back home and to make it impossible for migrants to ever become permanent residents of South Africa. In that respect, they were prototypical bilateral agreements. In the period after 1994, the Chamber of Mines lobbied hard for the continuation of the treaties. They even proposed that the treaties be extended to other sectors.

In theory, the bilateral agreements as a mode of entry could be replaced by the new corporate permits, or even quota permits. This would signal the end of bilateralism and the triumph of unilateralism in all aspects of South African migration policy. The problem here is that all of the other provisions of the treaties, including potential protections for workers, would also fall away. One of the briefest sections of the Immigration Act, and one of the most significant in terms of labour migration, is the treaty permit. These permits “may be issued to a foreigner conducting activities in the Republic in terms of an international agreement to which the Republic is a party” (Section 14(1)).

ensure, in legal terms, that the Act did not breach any existing labour agreements. In policy terms, the future of the treaties themselves, is th

The Immigration Act therefore makes reference to SADC only in the context of academic exchanges and student permits. This is to accommodate the SADC Education Protocol to which South Africa is a signatory, and which facilitates training across borders in the region.<sup>52</sup> The treaty permits may be seen as a de facto concession to supplier countries providing migrant mineworkers. However, South Africa's position within SADC is not explicitly factored into the new Act.

How has South Africa responded to efforts at the regional level to craft a multi-lateral, region-wide response to intra-regional migration? Three draft protocols on the movement of people were developed in the 1990s.<sup>53</sup> The first was the Draft SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of People which proposed a phased adoption of free movement between all member countries. The model was heavily based on Schengen and was rejected by South Africa (as well as Namibia and Botswana). South Africa responded with a Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People which proposed minimal levels of harmonization on issues such as visa-free entry. This Protocol was rejected by the SADC Secretariat. A third Protocol, also called the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of People was designed by the Secretariat. This Protocol contained many of the same proposals as the defunct Free Movement Protocol but proposed a more generous time line and a greater degree of individual state responsibility for implementation. This Protocol was shelved by the SADC Council of Ministers in 2001 following further objections from the original three opponents. In 2003-4, the Draft Protocol was re-circulated to national governments for additional comment. It is unlikely that the Protocol will be accepted in its current form.

South Africa has also agreed in principle, with other relevant SADC countries to the introduction of a Univisa. Intended to facilitate the movement of tourists in the region the visa (if and when introduced) would allow for the movement of tourists from outside the region from country to country. It can be argued, that it will therefore, allow for more freedom of movement for people from outside the region than for Southern Africans themselves.

In 2001, the IOM, SAMP and other partners formed the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA). This has proven to be a highly successful RCP (Regional Consultative Process) in encouraging multi-lateral dialogue, identifying areas of common interest and raising capacity and awareness amongst SADC governments. South Africa has been an active participant in MIDSA, sending senior delegations from Home Affairs, Labour, Justice and Foreign Affairs, to participate. The most recent activity within MIDSA is a survey of national immigration legislation across the countries of SADC and debate of proposals for regional harmonization.<sup>54</sup> Incremental steps towards a multi-lateral, harmonized approach seem more likely to succeed than comprehensive multi-lateral protocols. MIDSA could play a critical role in this regard but currently acts only in an advisory capacity. One way forward might be for SADC to take MIDSA on board as a regional process.

On a continental level, South Africa is committed to the aims of the African Union (AU) and to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Freer movement of people across the continent is cited as a key long-term objective of the AU. However, little analysis has been undertaken of the possibilities or desirability of this objective, and there has been no systematic discussion of the institutional mechanisms by which this might be achieved. While the development of programs and policies under NEPAD are still in their early stages, the only real mention of migration concerns the movement of skilled professionals and particularly health professionals (or brain drain migration from the continent). The South African Department of Health recently represented the position of some African countries regarding the migration of health professionals to the north at a World Health Organisation meeting in Geneva.

#### ***4. The African Union***

The value of co-operation and integration between countries in all spheres, but particularly in the political and economic spheres has been recognised and has long been a feature of political and economic life on the African continent. The formation of the African Union and the creation of the



## ENDNOTES

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<sup>26</sup> Crush, Borderline Farming

