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By Adriana Abdenur 

Adriana Abdenur is Executive Director of Plataforma CIP?, a Brazil-based think tank, and a member of the Ãå±±½ûµØCommittee for Development Policy (CDP)
 

, held in Stockholm in 1972, many of the concerns at the intersection between environment and development continue to be relevant as countries are confronted with the depth of the transformations required to transition towards greener, more resilient and climate-neutral economies and societies. It has become increasingly evident that, for this transition to be successful, it has to be done in a way that, among other challenges, addresses socioeconomic disparities and avoids creating new ones ¨C the concept of a ¡°Just Transition.¡±&²Ô²ú²õ±è;&²Ô²ú²õ±è;

However, debates about Just Transition are still heavily by Global North discourses that focus narrowly on mitigation ¨C reducing greenhouse gas emissions ¨C placing energy and cutting-edge technologies squarely at the center. These visions are based on the particular energy mix of rich countries, their labor market structures, policy frameworks and capacity ¨C including financial capacity ¨C to prepare and adjust to the social impacts, for example re-qualifying the labor force in sectors where job losses are anticipated towards the types of skills that will be necessary for activities that will emerge in the "green economy."   

These priorities do not always correspond to the demands and realities of developing countries, including Middle Income Countries (MICs). Around 75 percent of the world¡¯s population, and percent of the world's poor, live in MICs ¨C a diverse group of over 100 countries, ranging from small nations such as Belize and the Marshall Islands, to large ones such as Brazil, Russia, India and China. Getting Just Transition right in these countries could mean concrete change for a large proportion of the world's population. 
 

How are Middle Income Countries different?

• Greater informality: When compared to industrialized economies, in MICs there is a much greater level of in labor markets. This means that a far greater proportion of the population, especially groups such as women, minorities and migrants, are highly susceptible to economic crises, policy changes, or a combination of both. In addition, in MICs it is not uncommon for a single formal job to sustain more than one household, so even one formal job displacement may impact a much larger group of people. Add to this the fact that entire countries and even regions are dependent on a single commodity, and the socioeconomic ripple effect of job displacement in MICs is far greater than in industrialized countries.
   
• Younger population: From a demographic standpoint, while many rich countries already have sizable older-age populations and rapidly declining population growth, many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) remain . Looking to the future, population aging is expected to boom in large MICs, including India ¨C already the world's second most populous country ¨C as well as Indonesia and Nigeria, even as it further slows in the already-aged countries of Western Europe. And youth are among those hit especially hard by the unemployment and education disruptions exacerbated by the pandemic. This means that the creation of dignified, green jobs, especially for youth, will be paramount for MICs.   
   
• Higher poverty levels: Poverty remains a major challenge and has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Recent data indicates that 82 percent (or 72 million people) of the newly extreme poor (those pushed below the $1.90/day threshold by the pandemic) will be in MICs, as compared to 60 percent of the existing global extreme poor. Add to this the high levels of conflict and the increasing exposure to climate change, including through extreme weather, droughts, and floods. This means that special precautions must be taken, not only to avoid aggravating this scenario, but also to lift people out of poverty. 
   
• Distinct ecological and climate challenges: Ecological and climate challenges don't always look the same from the point of view of MICs. The energy matrix of MICs varies widely; some of the biggest economies, such as Brazil, are not heavily dependent on fossil fuels; even if they should also move further away from oil and gas, the issue of energy may not be as central to transition as, for instance, illegal deforestation. The international dimension of the ecological crisis is also central to many MICs, although domestic actors and consumption patterns have their share of blame in carbon emissions and environmental destruction. In particular, the role of the North in fueling environmental destruction is felt acutely, for instance through the pressure created by global demands for commodities on sensitive biomes like the Amazon forest, or of transnational corporations in the extractive sector causing widespread pollution and contamination in MICs.  
   
• Lower access to capital: Access to capital, including for the purposes of implementing much-needed infrastructure and industrial policies, is scant; climate financing in particular remains both scarce and murky, including for the development, adoption or adaptation of technologies. The gaps are aggravated by the failure of industrialized countries to fulfill their commitments, not only to Official Development Assistance but also to climate financing.
   
• Limited institutional capacity: And finally, in many MICs, there is limited institutional capacity to undertake the kind of multi-sectoral, multistakeholder, integrated approach across levels of government. With the exception of countries that have an established tradition of policy planning and centralized government, decision making, response design and implementation are often far less coordinated and effective than in industrial economies. Integration across public, private and civil society spaces ¨C but also harmonization between different levels of government, from the national to the local ¨C remain major challenges as sectors lack a shared vision of development. This means that, at the political level, Just Transition policies can encounter resistance and contestation from many fronts, and are far less likely to be a shoo-in. And even when they are agreed upon, implementation may not be effective.  
   

What are the paths forward?

• One central element of Just Transition in MICs is the creation of decent green jobs, especially for youth, through national employment policies in line with . Depending on the context, new jobs might cluster around renewable energies, climate-smart agriculture and fisheries, ecotourism, resource conservation and restoration (such as reforestation efforts) and the circular economy.  This parcel of the population will also need upgraded education and training for skills required by those jobs. More broadly, decision-making about Just Transition should incorporate the meaningful participation of youth ¨C especially since debates, decisions and resources relevant to Just Transitions, whether in industrialized or developing countries ¨C remain heavily concentrated in the hands of older people, and therefore often fail to adequately incorporate an intergenerational perspective. 
   
• Robust social protection systems, including public health and public education, are needed that boost the economic and climate resilience of disadvantaged groups such as women, indigenous groups, migrants and youth. These protection systems must cover workers in both the formal and informal economies, for instance through broad payment for environmental services programmes, and they should include enhanced safeguards for occupational hazards. 
   
• While new technologies ¨C including cutting-edge types ¨C have a role to play in Just Transition in MICs, they should not be viewed as a panacea, and the risks they introduce in MICs ¨C including job displacement, threats to data privacy, and enhanced socioeconomic inequalities, should be better understood, anticipated and mitigated. In addition, there is a need to promote social technologies in areas such as public education, public health and agriculture, which have long been the object of South-South Cooperation and that can also be fomented through assistance or triangular cooperation arrangements.
   
• There are broad needs for capacity-building at many different levels. In addition to the expanded access to public education and vocational training, efforts should target institutions, from research organizations and think tanks ¨C where research and development should be fomented with sustainability in mind ¨C to government bodies, so as to strengthen capacity to design, implement and monitor Just Transition policies. 
   
• There is a risk that Just Transitions in rich countries and regions may have negative consequences for MICs, from job displacement to undermining local capacity for adaptation and resilience. In order to avoid these negative transnational impacts, North-South dialogue around this topic should be strengthened, and cooperation structured so as to address the displacements underway as rich countries transition away from fossil fuels, change consumption habits, and introduce new regulatory frameworks and policies in areas such as trade, investments, and science and technology. This will also require more serious follow-through by industrialized countries to commitments made in international development and climate financing. 

Just Transition in MICs won't just benefit the people living in those countries. Ultimately, positive change will also ripple out to other countries, especially low-income ones. Simply put: without Just Transition in Middle Income Countries, there will be no global Just Transition.