

18 July 2023

Excellency,

We have the honour to address you in our capacity as **Co-Chairs of the Intergovernmental Negotiations** on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other related matters to the Security Council (**IGN**) during the 77<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly.

Kindly find attached a copy of a letter dated 13 July 2023 received by the Co-Chairs from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Costa Rica to the United Nations. Upon the request of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Costa Rica, the attached letter and its document will be **posted on the IGN website** which acts as a repository of the IGN process.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of our highest consideration.

lexa de

Alexander Marschik Ambassador


Tareq Albanai Ambassador Permanent Representative of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations





United Nations





Annex to the note verbale date 24 June 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the Uited Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Security Council enlargement and the cascade effet: enlargement of the permanent member categoryand its effects on the United Nations system

The present working paper is an effort to examine the possible effects of Security Council enlargement, in the Permanent Member cate

Members of the Security Council displace all other Member States from seats and posts that should, respectively, be open to democratic election by Member States or appointment by the Secretary-General. The precise impact of the Cascade Effect on each seat varies in relation to the total number of seats available for election in each organ. Similarly, it varies on each post in relation to the total number of posts to be appointed by the Secretary-General. Therefore, although comprehensive in its grasp, the Cascade Effect can manifest itself differently in each case.

When considering the expansion of the Security Council and, in particular, the possible creation of new Permanent Members, it is necessary to examine whether new Permanent Members would enjoy the advantages that arise from the Cascade Effect. Without proper safeguards to correct the legal and political factors that give rise to it-- for example, a firm

# 1. Economic and Social Council and Subsidiary Bodies

# 1.1 Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1961-1971), Permanent Members have served continuously on the ECOSOC since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947. Of all the elective organs within the United Nations Systems, the ECOSOC is one organ where the Cascade Effect is most evident.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS		CONTINUITY	
France	1946-2005	100.0%	
United States	1946-2005	100.0%	
Russian Federation	1947-2005	98.3%	
United Kingdom	1947-2005	98.3%	
China	1946-1960, 1972-2005	81.7%	

Of the 54 seats in the ECOSOC, 5 [9.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing op portunities for the broader membership from 90.7% to 79.6% of the seats

## 1.2 Commission on Human Rights [CHR]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1964-1981), and just 4 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Human Rights since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS		CONTINUITY	
France	1946-1976, 1978-2005	98.3%	
Russian Federation	1947-2005	98.3%	
United States	1947-2001, 2003-2005	96.7%	
United Kingdom	1947-1978, 1980-1990, 1992-2005	95.0%	
China	1947-1963, 1982-2005	68.3%	

Of the 53 seats in the CHR, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats withthe addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing op portunities for the broader membership from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats

# 1.3 Commission on Narcotic Drugs [CND]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1970-1985), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS

CONTINUITY

## 1.5 Committee for Program and Coordination [CPC]

With the exception of one Permanent Member that began to serve in 1987, all Permanent Members have served continuously in the Committee for Program and Coordination since its creation in 1973 or immediately after in 1974.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS		CONTINUITY
United Kingdom	1973-2005	100.0%
France	1974-2005	96.9%
Russian Federation	1974-2005	96.9%
United States	1974-2005	96.9%
China	1987-2005	62.5%

Of the 34 seats in the CPC, 5 [14.7%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [32.4%] seats withthe addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing op portunities for the broader membership from 85.3% to 67.6% of the seats

## 1.6 Commission on Social Development [CSoD]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve in 1965 and between 1969-1988, another Permanent Member has not served since 1983), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Social Development since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS		CONTINUITY
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
China	1947-1964, 1966-1968, 1989-2005	64.4%
United Kingdom	1947-1982	61.0%

Of the 46 seats in the CSoD, 5 [10.9%] seats have been affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing op portunities for the broader membership from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats

# 1.7 Commission on Sustainable Development [CSD]

All Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Sustainable

## 1.9 Statistical Commission

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1969-1986), and just 3 one to three-year gaps, Permanent Members haveserved on the Statistical Commission since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS

CONTINUITY

# 2. UN Funds and Programmes Executive Boards and Councils

# 2.1 United Nations Development Pr ogramme Executive Board [UNDP]

With just 4 one-year gaps and 1 two-year gap, Permanent Members have served continuously in the UNDP Executive Board since its creation in 1994.

#### PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS

CONTINUITY

China	1994-2005	100.0%
United States	1994-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1994-1995, 1997-2005	90.0%
France	1994-1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2003	60.0%
United Kingdom	1994-1995, 1997-1999, 2002-2004	60.0%

A/59/856

# 3. International Co urt of Justice [ICJ]

With one exception (nationals of one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1984), nationals of Permanent Members have served continuously in the International Court of Justice since 1946. Judges in the ICJ are ellect by the Security Council and the General Assembly in separate but simultaneous elections.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS			CONTINUITY
France	J. Basdevant	1e164i	10%Y

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# 4. UN Specialized Agencies

4.1 Food and Agriculture Organization Council [FAO]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1949-1972) and 1 oneyear gap, Permanent Members have served in the FAO Council consecutively since its creation in 1947. The Russian Feder**ti**on is not included for it is not a member of FAO.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS

CONTINUITY

# 4.3 International Civil Aviatio n Organization Council [ICAO]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1972 while another did not serve until 1974), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization since its creation in 1947 or immediately after in 1948.

PERMANENT MEMBE	R TERMS	CONTINUITY
United Kingdom United States France Russian Federation China	1947-2005 1947-2005 1948-2005 1972-2005 1974-2005	100.0% 100.0% 98.2% 57.1% 53.6%

Of the 36 seats on the ICAO Council, 5 [13.8%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 86.2% to 69.4% of the seats

#### 4.4 International Maritime Organization Council [IMO]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1975) and just 2 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Maritime Organization since its creation in 1959.

ER TERMS	CONTINUITY
1959-2005	100.0%
1959-2005	100.0%
1959-2005	100.0%
1975-81, 1983-87, 1989-2005	63.0%
	1959-2005 1959-2005 1959-2005

Of the 40 seats on the IMO Council, 5 [12.5%]seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [27.5%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as

## 4.5 International Telecommuni cations Union Council [ITU]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1990-1993 and has not served since 2003), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Telecommunications Union since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS		CONTINUITY
China	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1947-1989, 1994-2002	86.6%

Of the 46 seats on the ITU Council, 5 [10.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing op portunities for the broader membership from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats

4.6 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council

Permanent Members have served continuously on the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons since its creation in 1997 or immediately after in 1998.

PERMANENT MEMBER TERMS		CONTINUITY	
China	1997-2005	100.0%	
France	1997-2005	100.0%	
United Kingdom	1997-2005	100.0%	
United States	1997-2005	100.0%	
Russian Federation	1998-2005	88.8%	

Of the 41 seats on the OPCW Executive Council, 5 [12.2%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [26.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership from 87.8% to 73.2% of the seats

4.7 World Health Organization Executive Board [WHO]

# 4.9 International Labor Organization Governing Body [ILO]

# 5. General Assembly Subsidiary Bodies

#### 5.1 General Committee

By virtue of resolution 33/138 of 1978, 5 of the 21 Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly are representatives of the Permanent Members and thereby members of the General Committee. The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, is uncertain and cannot be easily ascertained in this case.

## 5.2 Advisory Committee on Administrati ve and Budgetary Questions [ACABQ]

With one exception (nationals from one Permanent Member did not serve between 1952-1971) and several minor gaps (2 one-year gaps6 three-year gaps, 1 four-year gap, and 1 fiveyear gap), nationals from Permanent Members have served continuously on the ACABQ since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBE	R TERMS	CO	NTINUITY
Russian Federation	1946-2005	10	0.0%
United States	1946-1996, 2000-2005	i	94.9%
France	1946-1983, 1987-1989	9, 1993-1995, 1997-2002	84.7%
United Kingdom	1946-1980, 1984-1986,	1991-1993, 1999-2004	78.0%
China	1946-1951, 1972-1998	, 2002-2005	61.1%

Of the 16 seats in the ACABQ, 5 [31.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [68.7%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing op portunities for the broader membership from 68.7% to 31.3% of the seats

# 6. United Nations Secretariat

Permanent Members have customarily had one or more nationals serving in the most senior positions within the United Nations, typically at the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General level. Moreover, at times several nationals from a single Permanent Member have monopolized the most senior positions within a particular department, and at times a Permanent Member has traded off one department for another, as is evidenced in part by the following (this is not a comprehensive or exhaustive listing):

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS
China	Department of Trusteeship and No Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	n-Self Governing Territories 1946-1953
	Department of General Assemb ly / Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	Affairs and predecessors 1954-1961
	Technical Cooperation for Developr Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	nent and predecessors 1962-1972
	Department of Political Affairs, Tr Tang Ming-chao	usteeship and Decolonization 1972-1978
	Technical Cooperation for Developr Bi Jilong Xie Qimei Ji Chaozhu	nent and predecessors 1979-1984 1985-1990 1991-1992
	Department for Economic and Soc i Ji Chaozhu	al Affairs and predecessors 1992
	Technical Cooperation for Developr Ji Chaozhu Jin Yongjian	nent and predecessors 1993-1995 1996
	Department of General Assembly Jin Yongjian Chen Jian	Affairs and Conference Services 1997-2001 2001-
France	Department for Economic and Soc i Henri Laugier Guillaume Georges-Picot Philippe de Seynes Gabriel van Laetham	al Affairs and predecessors 1946-1950 1951-1954 1955-1974 1974-1978

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS
France [cont.]	Jean-Louis Ripert Antoine Blanca Jean-Claude Milleron	1978-1990 1989-1992 1993-1996

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS
United Kingdom [cont.]	Department of Management [DM Andrew A. Stark Horatio K. Matthews	M] and predecessors 1968-1970 1971-1972
	Department of Peacekeeping O Sir Brian Urquhart Marrack I. Goulding	per ations [DPKO] and predecessors 1974-1986 1986-1992
	Department of Political Affa irs Marrack I. Goulding Sir Kieran Prendergast	[DPA] and predecessors 1993-1996 1997-2005
	Department of Safety and Secu David Veness	rity 2005-
	Executive Office of the Secretar Mark Malloch Brown	y-General, Chef de Cabinet 2005-
United States	Executive Office of the Secretar Andrew W. Cordier	y-General, Chef de Cabinet 1946-1961
	Department of Management [DN Byron Price	M] and predecessors 1946-1953
	Department of Peacekeeping O Ralph J. Bunche	per ations [DPKO] and predecessors 1955-1970
	Department for Political Affairs [ F. Bradford Morse William B. Buffum Joseph Verner Reed Ronald I. Spiers	DPA] and predecessors 1972-1975 1976-1986 1987-1988 1989-1991
	Department of Management [DM Dick Thornburgh Melissa Wells Joseph E. Connor Catherine Bertini Christopher Bancroft Burnham	M] and predecessors 1992 1993 1994-2002 2003-2005 2005-

The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect on appointments at the most senior level, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, cannot be easily ascertained.

24/06/2005



**General Assembly** 

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-ninth session Agenda item 33

# QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RELATED MATTERS

Letter dated 15 September 1995 from the Permanent Representatives of Finland and Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly

As Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, we have the honour to forward the compendium of observations and assessment of the two Vice-Chairmen, their discussion papers, as well as proposals and other documents presented to the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to

#### ANNEX

Compendium of observations and assessment of the two Vice-Chairmen	,
their discussion papers, as well as proposals and other documents	_
presented to the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of	_
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<sup>\*</sup> The present section is being published as received, without formal editing.

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A/AC.247/2

9 January 1995

#### II. SUGGESTED LIST OF QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The present non-paper has been prepared by the Permanent Representatives of Finland and Singapore, Vice-Chairmen of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council in 1994, in the light of informal consultations held on behalf of the President of the General Assembly, on 21 and 24 October and 15 November 1994.

Attached is a list of questions on the two main areas of discussions on this subject. The questions, which are not new, will need to be discussed in some detail. These questions are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. The order of the listing of the questions does not indicate any order of priority. The questions represent an attempt to facilitate a systematic and constructive exchange of views in the Working Group.

[pages 19-22 offset]

A/AC.247/3

6 January 1995

#### III. PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT ON THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY MEMBER STATES DURING THE FORTY-NINTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. The present non-paper is prepared solely on the basis of the views expressed by Member States during the general debate as well as the debate on agenda item 33 at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

2. The list of views contained in the present non-paper is intended to provide background material for the Working Group. It should be read together with the two similar compilations dated 28 February and 27 May 1994, respectively. The non-paper is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of every view presented by the delegations concerned; rather, it seeks to identify salient points and broad trends to help facilitate deliberations of the Working Group.

3. The views reproduced in the present non-paper are not indicative of the number of delegations holding a similar position on specific suggestions and proposals. The views were expressed either by one or several Member States. Furthermore, the views reflected in the list are not necessarily literal transcriptions of the exact expressions used by Member States as similar positions have been grouped together under a given category. It should be noted further that the order of listing of the items neither reflects nor implies any order of priority.

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#### V. SUBMISSIONS BY MEMBER STATES OR GROUPS OF MEMBER STATES

1. Argentina

A/AC.247/5 (a)

[Original: English]

[14 September 1995]

1. Please find enclosed herewith a preliminary working paper prepared by our delegation (see annex). It is only an "evolving" document, on which we will continue to work, intended to highlight a matter of concern, related to the overall presence in the United Nations system or the permanent members of the Security Council, beyond the Council itself.

2. The working paper is presented for the purpose of stimulating consideration of the issue, at a time when the membership is examining the structure of the Security Council. It is our view that the aspects contained in the enclosed working paper should - in that connection - be also the object of analysis.

3. We are still double-checking some of the factual information contained in the enclosure and we plan to return to the issue when we are able to complete that work.

(Signed) Emilio J. CARDENAS Ambassador Permanent Representative

#### ANNEX

#### Submission by Argentina on the "cascade effect": effects of the status of the permanent membership of the Security Council on the United Nations system

1. The present working paper is only a first and preliminary attempt to examine, in both quantitative and comparative terms, the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council in the United Nations system as a whole.

2. When analysed in contrast with United Nations institutional regulations, as stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations, a statistical study of the actual participation of the permanent members of the Security Council in the various organs of the system makes possible the identification of a problem intrinsic to the Organization's representative mechanism, namely, the large representation ratio of certain countries to the detriment of others.

3. Such a de facto situation is somehow analogous to granting a different status to a number of Member States in the system as a whole. Given its vast repercussions, it reflects a reality of the United Nations beyond the stipulations of the Charter.

4. We will, therefore, consider both the Charter and the representation figures separately, and take as a basis for comparison the situation of the five permanent members of the Security Council - France, China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation - to try to assess their overall representational advantage, as the centrepiece of the paper.

I. REGULATIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

5. On the basis of Charter regulations, the status of permanent member has special bearing on:

(a) Voting prerogatives in the Security Council - veto right - (Art. 27);

(b) Composition of the Military Staff Committee (Art. 47), which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members or their representatives;

(c) Composition of the Trusteeship Council (Art. 86, b), integrated by the five permanent members. China joined the group in 1989.

6. As regards participation in the General Assembly, the Charter regulations postulate, inter alia \_\_\_\_\_, the following:

- (a) General Committee
- (i) According to rule 31 of its rules of procedure, the General Assembly elects 21 vice-presidents. By decision 1 of the Assembly (in

reference to resolution 33/138 of 19 December 1978), five of these vice-presidents are representatives of the five permanent members;

- (ii) The General Committee is highly significant, given its role in assessing the provisional agenda and supplementary list of items, and introducing recommendations as to their inclusion in agenda rule 40);
- (iii) On the other hand, permanent members may not assume the chairmanship of the General Assembly, or the chairmanships of the Main Committees. The latter conforms to rule 31, which indirectly indicates that the presidencies of the Assembly and chairmanships of the Main Committees cannot correspond to the same countries;
- (iv) Likewise, it is established practice that the permanent members do not assume the posts of vice-chairman or rapporteur of the Main Committees;

(b) <u>Committee on Contributions</u>. Established by General Assembly resolution 14 (I) of 1946, this Committee advises the Assembly on matters relating to the allocation of the organization's expenses and on the application of Article 19 of the Charter in cases of arrears in the payment of contributions. Its membership has been expanded several times, now standing at 18. Members are selected by the General Assembly on the basis of geographical distribution, personal qualifications and experience. They serve for a period of three years, retire by rotation and are eligible for re-appointment.

#### II. STATISTICAL FINDINGS

A. General Assembly

1. Committee on Contributions

7. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members belonged to the Committee in any given year, showing a 70 per cent re-appointment rate; that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed - on averag e - 7 out of the 10 times they were eligible for re-appointment. On the other hand, non-permanent members have a 48 per cent re-appointment rate, that is, they succeeded in getting re-appointed a little under 5 out of 10 times when they were eligible for re-appointment.

#### 2. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

8. Established at the first session of the General Assembly, by resolution 14 (I) of 13 February 1946, this particular Committee examines and reports on regular and peace-keeping budgets and accounts of the Organization, as well as on the administrative budgets of the specialized agencies. It also advises the Assembly on other administrative and financial matters referred to it. Its membership has been expanded numerous times, now standing at a total of 16. Members are appointed by the Assembly on the basis of geographical distribution,

personal qualifications and experience. They serve for three-year periods and retire by rotation, but are eligible for re-appointment.

9. For the period 1984-1993, an average of four permanent members served on the Committee in any given year. They presented a combined re-appointment rate of 70 per cent, with France, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation each presenting a 100 per cent re-appointment rate. On the other hand, non-permanent members have a combined re-appointment rate of 41 per cent, re-entering the Committee only 4 out of 10 times when they are eligible to do so.

#### 3. General Assembly ad hoc and subsidiary organs

10. Permanent members also take part in a number of important United Nations bodies dependent on the General Assembly:

(a) Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgements. By its resolution 957 (X) of 8 November 1955, the General Assembly established a committee, authorized by paragraph 2 of Article 96 of the Charter, to request consultative opinions from the International Court of Justice on decisions of the Administrative Tribunal. The Committee is constituted by the members of the current or most recent General Committee, which includes permanent members;

(b) International Law Commission \_\_\_\_\_. Established by resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947, the Commission was established by the Assembly with the function of encouraging the progressive development of International Law and its codification. Its membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 34, and is elected on the basis of geographical distribution. With the sole exception of the United Kingdom, who did not participate for four years, the permanent members belonged to it continuously during the period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were retired, at a rate of 20 per cent;

(c) <u>United Nations Conciliation Committee for Palestine</u>. Established by resolution 104 (III) of 11 December 1948, this Committee was, inter alia established by the General Assembly to help with the repatriation of refugees and to assist Israel and the Arab States to achieve final settlements on all questions outstanding between them. The Committee's regular members are France, Turkey, and the United States of America - two of them Security Council permanent members;

(d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal . Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 351 A (IV) of 24 November 1949, the Tribunal hears and passes judgement on applications alleging non-observance of contracts of employment on the part of the United Nations Secretariat staff members or of their terms of appointment. Members are appointed by the Assembly on the recommendation of the Fifth Committee for a three-year term. For the period 1984-1993, at least three of the seven positions of the Tribunal corresponded, at any one time, to permanent members, with their tenure averaging 45 per cent of the total;

(e) <u>United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic</u> <u>Radiation</u>. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 913 (X) of 3 December 1955, the Committee reports on all major sources of exposure to ionizing radiation in the human environment and submits annual progress reports to the Assembly. Its membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 21. With the exception of three years, in which only four of the five permanent members participated, the five permanent members were included continuously in the Committee during 1984-1993;

(f) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . This Committee, established in 1959, acquired permanent status through General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI) of 20 December 1961. Its membership has been gradually expanded to a present total of 53 members, which includes the five permanent members, on a continual basis;

(g) Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations . Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, it consists of 34 members, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(h) Joint Inspection Unit \_\_\_\_\_\_. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2150 (XXI) of 4 November 1966 and beginning its work in 1968, the Unit ensures that the activities undertaken by organizations of the United Nations system are carried out as economically as possible, with optimum use being made of available resources. It consists of no more than 11 Inspectors elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution and serving in their personal capacity for a term of five years, which can be renewed only once. With the exception of China, permanent members averaged 3 Inspectors out of 11 at any one time;

(i) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law \_\_\_\_\_\_. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, the Commission seeks to promote the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade. Its membership has been expanded on several occasions, with a present total of 36 elected on the basis of six-year terms. With the exception of 1985, when only four of the five permanent members participated, all five served continuously during the period 1984-1993. Other members rotated or were retired at a rate of 15 per cent;

(j) Committee on Relations with the Host Country \_\_\_\_\_. Established by the General Assembly by resolution 2819 of 15 December 1971, it consists of 15 members nominated by the President of the Assembly, which includes the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(k) Consultative Committee on Disarmament . Established in 1978 by the General Assembly by resolution S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, the Committee is composed of 20 eminent personalities, all nominated by the Secretary-General. It includes experts representing the five permanent members on a continual basis;

 (I) Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the <u>Strengthening of the Role of the Organization</u>. By its resolution 3499 of 15 December 1975, the General Assembly re-established the former Special Committee on the United Nations Charter under a new name. After a number of successive expansions, the Committee today consists of 47 members nominated by the President of the Assembly, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(m) <u>Committee on Information</u>. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 33/115 C of 18 December 1978, it has undergone successive expansions and currently consists of 83 members assigned by the President of the Assembly, including the five permanent members on a continual basis;

(n) United Nations Environment Programme \_\_\_\_\_\_. Established in 1972 by General Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, UNEP is represented by a Governing Council whose functions are, among others, to promote international cooperation in the environment field, recommend policies to this end and provide general policy guidance for the coordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations system. The Council reports to the Assembly through the Economic and Social Council and is composed of 58 members elected by the Assembly on the basis of geographic distribution and four-year terms. For the period 1984-1993, the five permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation, thus covering the entire period. The rest of the members - combined - averaged eight years of participation;

(o) Human Rights Committee \_\_\_\_\_. Based on available information for the period 1986-1993, three permanent members participated in this Committee continuously during the given period, while the rest of the membership was subject to rotation or changes at a rate of 12 per cent;

(p) Committee on the Elimination of Racial d50(to)-600(this)-600(end)-600(and)g600 124.8 4344 10 374mmit /

Assembly

years). 1 \_/ For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while all other members - combined - averaged 3.9 years of participation (39 per cent) in the same period. Figure 1 (sample graph) of the appendix shows this result. Figure 2 establishes the same comparison, but shows a breakdown of the component of the column "others" corresponding to figure 1 (on the basis of geographical distribution).

#### 2. Subsidiary organs of the Economic and Social Council

13. Permanent members have also taken part in a number of other important United Nations bodies dependent on the Economic and Social Council:

(a) Statistical Commission \_\_\_\_\_\_. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 8 (I) of 1946, the Commission assists the Council in promoting the development of national statistics, coordinating the statistical work of certain specialized agencies and advising United Nations organs on questions regarding statistical information. Its membership has been expanded a number of times to a present total of 24, elected on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: 3 years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). All other members combined averaged 3.2 years of participation (32 per cent) in the same period;

(b) Population Commission \_\_\_\_\_\_. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 3 (III) of 1946, the Commission studies and advises the Council on demographic questions and related social and economic matters. Its membership has been expanded successively since 1946, now standing at a total of 27. Members are elected by the Council for four-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Committee continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.7 years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period;

(c) Commission for Social Development . Originally known as the Social Commission, it was established by Economic and Social Council resolution 10 (II) of 1946 and renamed in 1966. It advises the Council on social policies of a general character. Its membership, elected directly by the Council for four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution, has been expanded a number of times and now stands at 32. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: 11 years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.8 years of participation (88 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 2.9 years of participation (29 per cent) in the same period;

(d) Commission on Human Rights . Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 5 (I) of 1946, the Commission reports on questions regarding

<sup>1/</sup> Combined default time: total time of non-participation.

the international bill of rights and other related declarations on civil liberties and various forms of discrimination. Its membership has been expanded numerous times, now standing at a total of 53. Members are elected for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members were members of the Commission almost continuously from its inception until 1993 (combined default time: three years). For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). All other members averaged 3.5 years of participation (35 per cent) in the same period;

(e) Commission on Transnational Corporations . Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 1913 (LVII) of 1974, the Commission comprises 48 members elected directly by the Council for three-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent). The remaining members averaged 4.8 years of participation (48 per cent) for the same period;

(f) Committee for Programme and Coordination \_\_\_\_\_\_. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 920 (XXXIV) of 1962, the Committee functions as the main subsidiary organ of the Council and the Assembly for purposes of planning, programming and coordination. Its membership has been expanded a number of times to its present total of 34. Members are elected by the Council for three-year terms on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Committee continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 9.4 years of participation (94 per cent), while all others averaged 3.7 years of participation (37 per cent);

(g) Commission on Narcotic Drugs \_\_\_\_\_. Established by Economic and Social Council resolution 9 (I) of 1946, the Commission comprises a total of 53 members elected by the Council for four-year terms at two-year intervals on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 9.6 years of participation (96 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 5.2 years (52 per cent);

(h) <u>Commission on Human Settlements (Habitat</u>). Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 32/162 of 19 December 1977, the Commission comprises a total of 58 members elected for three to four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members sat on the Commission continuously from its inception until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 8.4 years of participation (84 per cent), while the

(86 per cent), while the remaining members averaged a total of 3.7 years (37 per cent).

14. Appendix figure 3 (sample graph) shows average participation of permanent and non-permanent members in the Economic and Social Council subsidiary organs mentioned above. Figure 4 establishes the same comparison, but shows a breakdown of the component "others" corresponding to figure 3 (on the basis of geographic distribution).

#### C. International Court of Justice

15. Although the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not directly specify it, the five permanent members of the Security Council are de facto permanent members of the Court.

#### D. Related United Nations programmes and specialized agencies

#### 1. International Atomic Energy Agency

16. Beginning its activities in 1957, the Agency seeks to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. Its executive organ is the Board of Governors, members of which are designated on an annual basis by the Board itself and on a bi-annual basis by the Agency's General Conference, all by the principle of equitable geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Board continuously since 1957. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 years of participation (100 per cent); other members combined averaged 3.1 years of participation (31 per cent) in the same period.

#### 2. International Civil Aviation Organization

17. Beginning its activities in 1947, ICAO fosters the planning and development of international air transport so as to ensure a safe growth of civil aviation throughout the world. Its executive body is the members' Council, composed of 33 contracting States. Permanent members participated in the Council for an average of 35.6 years (possible total: 46 years) between 1947 and 1993, that is, almost 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years of participation (18 per cent) in the same period.

#### 3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

18. Established in 1945, FAO includes a main Council as its chief executive organ, composed of 49 member nations elected by the FAO Conference for three-year terms. With the exception of the Russian Federation, which is not a member, the permanent members averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent) in the period 1984-1993; the rest of the membership averaged 2.7 years of participation (27 per cent) in the same period.

#### 4. International Maritime Organization

19. Established in 1959, IMO regulates standards of maritime safety and facilitates cooperation among Governments on technical matters affecting international shipping. Its chief executive body is the IMO Council, composed of 32 members. With the exception of China, the permanent members have sat on the Council continuously since 1959. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period.

#### 5. International Telecommunication Union

20. The Union's chief executive organ is its Council, the members of which are elected by the ITU Conference and are eligible for re-election (total Union membership is 183). With the exception of the United Kingdom, the permanent members have been members of the Council continuously since 1947. For the period 1984-1993, all five averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.9 years (19 per cent) in the same period.

#### 6. World Meteorological Organization

21. WMO became a specialized agency in 1951, with the WMO Executive Council serving as its chief executive body. Permanent members sat on the Council for an average of 31 years (possible total: 42 years) between 1951 and 1993, that is, 75 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five permanent members averaged 8.7 years (87 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 1.8 years (18 per cent) in the same period.

#### 7. World Health Organization

22. WHO became a specialized agency in 1948, with the WHO Executive Board serving as its chief executive organ. Permanent members served on the Board for an average of 36 years (possible total: 45 years) between 1948 and 1993, that is, 80 per cent of the total time. For the period 1984-1993, all five permanent members averaged 9.2 years (92 per cent) of participation, while the rest of the membership averaged 2 years (20 per cent) of participation in the same period.

#### 8. <u>United Nations Educational, Scientific and</u> Cultural Organization

23. The organization was established in 1945. Its chief executive organ, the Executive Board, is elected by the UNESCO General Conference and consists of 51 member States who appoint representatives for four-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. For the period 1984-1993, China, the Russian Federation and France were members of the Board continuously (10 full years of participation), while the rest of the membership averaged 3 years (30 per cent) of participation in the same period.

#### 9. United Nations Children's Fund

24. Originally established as the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund in 1946, it became a full permanent organ by General Assembly resolution 802 (VII) of 15 September 1953. Its leading executive body is the Executive Board, comprising 36 members elected for three-year terms on the basis of geographic distribution. With the exception of China, the permanent members served on the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while the remaining members averaged 3.6 years (36 per cent) of participation in the same period.

#### 10. United Nations Development Programme

25. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 2029 (XX) of 22 November 1965, UNDP includes a Governing Council as its chief executive organ. The Council's membership has been successively expanded - now standing at a total of 48 - and is elected on the basis of equitable distribution among "developed" and "developing" countries as two separate categories. With the exception of China, the permanent members participated in the Board continuously until 1993. For the period 1984-1993, they averaged 10 full years of participation (100 per cent), while average participation for the remaining "developed" countries (excluding the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation) averaged 6.5 years (65 per cent).

#### 11. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

26. Established by the General Assembly by its resolution 319 (IV) of 3 December 1949, UNHCR includes an Executive Committee as its leading organ. The Committee's membership has been expanded a number of times, now standing at a total of 46 regular members, which includes (and has always included) all Security Council permanent members except for the Russian Federation.

#### 12. Universal Postal Union

27. UPU became a United Nations specialized agency in 1948, with an Executive Council as its leading organ. For the period 1984-1993, the five permanent members averaged 6 years (60 per cent) of participation in the Council, while the rest of the membership averaged 2.1 years (21 per cent).

28. The above data make it somehow clear that the effective rates of participation of the five Security Council permanent members seem to be not directly reflective of Charter stipulations. In effect, they may be producing a certain degree of disequilibrium in the United Nations structure.

29. Such an apparent disequilibrium may find its roots in a number of reasons, which cause what can be called the "cascade effect". The permanent members' relative weight and negotiational advantage when soliciting their admittance into organs outside of the Security Council may well be reverberating throughout

[pages 63-64 offset]

2. Australia

A/AC.247/5 (b)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

1. I hereby submit the attached paper entitled Possible Models for Enlarging the Security Council to be included as part of the compendium of papers of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council to be circulated as a General Assembly document.

2. The paper, which was previously circulated in the Open-ended Working Group, provides a chart that illustrates the current situation and models that could be used to facilitate discussion on how the composition of the Security Council might be changed. I would like to emphasize that these are not formal proposals but simply models to assist further deliberation of these issues.

3. I would be grateful if you could ensure that the present explanatory letter is attached to the Australian paper for inclusion in the compendium.

(Signed ) Richard BUTLER, AM

ANNEX

Possible models for enlarging the Security Council

	Total	S	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>	Total	10	10	20
	Latin America and the Caribbean (33)		_2	2	Latin America and the Caribbean (33)	-	-2	<del>د </del>
					Asia (49)	2	2	4
	Africa and Asia (102)	۲-	2	9	Africa (53)	2	က	വ
	Eastern Europe (20)	~	-	7	Eastern Europe (20)	٢	-	2
<u>ent a</u> /	Western Europe (27)	ю	2	2	Western Europe (27)	4	2	9
Existing arrangement		PM p	NPM_¢	Total	Simple model	PM	NPM	Total

Alternative models

A. Existing groups

Western Europe Eastern Europe (27) (20)

AfricaEud7 (Afrisi43s,-180070(Europe)]TJ9)]TJ 3 - 1.12.34 [(EasLve)0)

A/49/965 English Page 67

#### 3. <u>Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary</u> Ireland and Slovenia

A/AC.247/5 (c)

[Original: English]

[9 May 1995]

#### Discussion paper

1. The present discussion paper on the main issues under consideration in the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council has been prepared by an informal group of small and medium-sized countries.

2. In drawing up the paper, the delegations concerned considered that a sufficient level of broad agreement existed between their positions on the principal issues under consideration for it to be worthwhile setting these down with a view to establishing a general framework within which further work could be undertaken.

3. In the view of the group, a stage has been reached in the deliberation of the Open-ended Working Group at which there would be merit in sharing its approach with other delegations. It is for this reason that the group has decided to circulate the present discussion paper now.

4. In doing so, the group wishes to stress that the positions reflected in the paper are flexible and evolving. The discussion paper should not be seen as cutting across the work of the Open-ended Working Group, nor should it be viewed as a package solution to all the outstanding issues. It is intended, rather, as a contribution to the ongoing work of the Working Group from a group of countries that share a similar approach to the problems being addressed.

5. In this context, the views of other delegations are welcome, particularly those delegations which felt that they would wish to join with the group in developing the ideas further.

#### General comments

6. The reform of the Security Council should be in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The reform of the Security Council must not put in danger its effectiveness, on the contrary it should strengthen it;

(b) Enlargement of the Security Council should enhance its representativity, taking into account the emergence of new economic and political powers as well as the increase of United Nations membership;

A/49/965

#### 6. Other matters

12. Review of the composition of the Security Council should remain possible in order to adapt it to the changing configuration of international relations.

#### Cluster 2

13. Measures already taken to enhance the relationship between the Council and the general membership as well as to improve the working methods and procedures of the Council, constitute a positive development. These measures should be maintained and improved, and, when appropriate and if possible, should receive a certain degree of formalization. Other new measures should be developed along the same lines. An amendment of Article 24 of the Charter might recognize the principle of information and consultation of all Member States by the Security Council to the largest possible extent.

14. The following should receive particular attention:

(a) Briefings on the work of the Council by the President of the Council;

(b) Open orientation debates of the Council;

(c) Consultations between Security Council and troop-contributing countries;

(d) Transparency of the work of sanctions committees.

#### 4. Veto

Ideally, the veto power should not be retained. If this is not feasible, it should be thus modified: a minimum of 3 States (if the Council is enlarged to over 25) or 2 States should jointly cast vetoes.

#### II. INTRODUCTION

1. At various times this delegation has presented its ideas both in this Working Group and in the plenary, as it did on 13 October 1994. Given the diversity of cultures, regions and economic and social realities, and the complexity of our proto-twenty-first century world, we stand by the proposals elaborated on that occasion. Nevertheless, in our endeavour to move forward, this delegation is today offering some additional thoughts. Some of these are based on ideas that have been expressed by several distinguished delegations. At the same time, our present formulation includes several elements from our previous proposals. Chief of these is the composite or constituency modality of membership.

Central to our notions is the importance of ensuring democracy in the 2. United Nations. If this Organization's moral authority is to be preserved in an increasingly democratized world, it is inescapable that its own processes must be made more democratic. The essential ingredients of such democracy must be the introduction of equality and even-handedness. The first notable area in which this must be accomplished is that of membership categories and terminology. Surely the very notion of permanent membership contradicts the fundamental principle of democracy for which we have waged at least one major war in this century. It was a cardinal principle in the Atlantic Charter of the Second World War and the Charter of this Organization, which was spawned by that war. I would insult the intelligence of my listeners if I were to say any more on the history of this subject than that an entire large branch of international law and United Nations law is based on a veritable forest of weighty resolutions of this Assembly, notably resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial territories and peoples. In view of the vital importance of democracy, this delegation therefore proposes that the category of permanent membership should be relabelled "indefinite membership" and that the incidents of that category should reflect the basic notions of democracy, without posing any threat whatsoever to the peace and security of the world.

3. Similarly, overall democracy within the Organization and internal democracy within the Council itself must be made to apply to the incidents of voting, particularly the veto, which this delegation has previously recommended should be the foundation of reform. Logic would suggest that the veto should be abolished. But, in the realm of peace and security, logic is an abominable master. Therefore we repeat our suggestion that the veto should be reformed.

4. Democracy obviously requires that there should be essential equality between the weak and the strong, between the poor and the rich, and between the small and the large. It requires the widest possible participation in representative bodies. No United Nations organ, especially the Council, must

15. It is most important to stress that this modality of membership would be

5. <u>Cuba</u>

A/AC.247/5 (e)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

Please find enclosed a copy of the proposal presented by Cuba on the question of equitable representation and on the increase in the members of the Security Council, within the Working Group on this issue.

(<u>Signed</u>) Yamira CUETO Counsellor

#### ANNEX

1. One of the formulas for the process of expansion and reform of the Security Council can be the following.

2. The increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members should be strictly in accordance with the principle of the equitable geographic representation.

3. In any formula, the expansion of the permanent membership should not only contemplate industrialized countries. This would simply generate a further imbalance in the membership of the Council. New permanent members from developed and developing countries should enter the Council together and at the same time.

4. The total number of members of the enlarged Security Council could be 23, with the following distribution:

- (a) Three from Asia;
- (b) One from Europe and others;

(c) Two from Africa (as this is the decision of the Organization of African Unity, although taking into account the amount of countries in this region and their diversity, the number could be higher);

(d) Two from Latin America and the Caribbean.

6. Indonesia

A/AC.247/5 (f)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

I have the honour to submit herewith criteria proposed by Indonesia for permanent membership in the Security Council (see annex).

It would be greatly appreciated if this could be included in the compendium of proposals submitted by Member States for consideration by the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council.

> (<u>Signed</u>) Isslamet POERNOMO Ambassador Chargí d'affaires a.i.

#### ANNEX

#### Criteria for permanent membership in the Security Council

1. The reform and revitalization of the Security Council is a conditio sine <u>qua non</u> for strengthening the United Nations and is critically important for the emerging new world order. The main objective in these endeavours is to render the Council more responsive to the emerging challenges and changing realities in the international landscape. In this context, it is essential to ensure that the question of an increase in the permanent membership reflects the current configuration of membership of the United Nations and to ensure a more representative and effective Security Council. It is undeniable that the present arrangements do not reflect the profound changes and transition that have taken place in the global arena. The international community continues to face an untenable anomaly where three States from Europe are among the five permanent members. At the same time Asia is underrepresented, while Africa and Latin America are not represented, an arrangement that in geopolitical terms is unacceptable.

2. Objective criteria should therefore guide the selection process for an increase in the permanent membership of the Security Council. While the principle of equitable geographic representation is a valid basis, it should not

7. I<u>taly</u>

A/AC.247/5 (g)

[Original: English]

[14 September 1995]

I am pleased to enclose a revised version of the Italian proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council (see annex).

I formally ask you to include the attached document in the compendium, which - as agreed in the Working Group today - is scheduled to be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI Ambassador

#### ANNEX

#### <u>A revised proposal for the enlargement of the Security</u> <u>Council of the United Nations</u>

#### 15 May 1995

#### I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1. It is generally agreed that the present membership of the Security Council is in need of expansion, if only to reflect the steady rise in membership of the United Nations. General membership has grown from 51 members in 1945, to 113 in 1965 (date of the Council's only enlargement, from 11 to 15 seats), to 185 today.

2. The five permanent members all belong to the northern hemisphere, and four of them are economically developed countries, while one is rapidly approaching industrialized status. To add new permanent seats only for two developed countries, which also belong to the northern hemisphere, would not be equitable or democratic. Rather than correct the existing imbalance, such a solution would aggravate it.

3. To redress this situation, one logical remedy might be to add three permanent seats to the Security Council, one for each of the three geographic areas presently underrepresented (Asia, Africa and Latin America), but there would be the objective difficulty of selecting the countries that should represent the three continents.

4. A more equitable solution for all would be to increase non-permanent seats only, as was the case with the reform of 1965. Among other things, this would prevent the difficulties connected with the proliferation of veto power and its dangers.

5. The numbers speak clearly: 79 countries have never been members of the Security Council, while 44 others have been able to serve only once (see appendices I and II). The problem stems mainly from the fact that, within each geographic group, several large countries tend to compete for a Security Council seat much more frequently, thus elbowing out the smaller countries. A formula must be found to redress this chronic situation and provide for a greater and more regular involvementwi0been able to t1olve cooSaO7[0(Counceo.(soluTemm [(15)-600(MoSaO7[0(C6600(to)tion)

- 1. 2. Permanent members 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Ordinary rotation 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Non-permanent members 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. More frequent rotation 16. 17. 18. (19) (20)
- 7. The Italian proposal may be better illustrated by this diagram:

8. Should there be a total of 25 members on the new Council, 10 additional non-permanent seats would be needed and 30 Seats would rotate on them; should there be a total of 24 members, 9 non-permanent seats would have to be added, to rotate among 27 States; should there be a total of 23 members, 8 non-permanent seats would have to be added, to rotate among 24 States; and so forth.

9. In other words, for the additional non-permanent seats the ratio would be of one seat per three rotating countries. The geographic distribution of these seats could be made once the total number of new seats has been defined. Naturally the subdivision should favour geographic areas that are currently underrepresented, out of respect for the principle established in Article 23 of the Charter.

# III. CRITERIA FOR IDENTIFYING COUNTRIES TO ROTATE WITH GREATER FREQUENCY

10. By way of example, one could consider the following criteria:

(a) The contribution of Member States to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization (Article 23 of the Charter);

(b) Equitable geographic distribution (Article 23 of the Charter);

(c) The capacity and willingness of States to contribute specifically to peace-keeping operations with military personnel, equipment and financial resources;

(d) The ability and willingness to participate in voluntary funds for humanitarian activities, economic development and the protection of human rights.

11. Needless to say, additional criteria could be taken into consideration.

#### IV. ADVANTAGES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

12. Following are some of the benefits to the Organization:

(a) An enlarged Council more representative of the increased general United Nations membership;

(b) Avoidance of new situations of "eternal" privilege, as would occur instead if additional permanent seats were created;

(c) A greater and more democratic participation of all Member States in the activities of the Council, which is a basic premise for more effective decisions;

(d) A more equitable geographic distribution of the seats in the Council. It is easier to obtain this result on a basis of 24-30 countries than on the more limited basis of two or five additional permanent member countries;

#### VII. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

18. If the Italian proposal were adopted, the General Assembly would maintain its central role and link with the Security Council for the following reasons:

(a) It would be up to the General Assembly to determine, by a resolution and on the basis of objective and agreed upon criteria, the list of 24-30 countries rotating more frequently;

(b) The General Assembly would periodically, every 10 to 15 years, review such a list and make changes in its composition;

(c) All non-permanent members of the Council - without exception - would have to submit to elections by secret ballot in the General Assembly and obtain a two-thirds majority.

19. Critics of this formula imply that it ultimately creates a third category of members. This is simply not so. First of all, in their selection, review and election for every term, these countries would be totally subject to the decisions of the General Assembly. Secondly, up to now countries rotating more frequently than others have always existed within geographic groups. What the Italian proposal aims for is an easing of rivalries and a fostering of a more fair and equitable participation in the Council for everyone. In fact, the major beneficiaries of such a reform would include the smaller States, which have thus far been kept out of the Council. Shielded from the competition of larger countries, they could in turn establish fair rotation agreements among themselves for "clean slate", with a realistic hope of being elected.

20. Last but not least, such a reform would be easy to implement. All that would be needed is to amend two articles in the Charter of the United Nations: Article 23 (composition), to reflect the increase in non-permanent members, and Article 27 (voting), to indicate the new majority required for decisions.

## APPENDIX I

(For offset)

#### APPENDIX II

Α.	Member	States	that	have	not	served	on	the	Security
	Council	_							

- 1. Afghanistan
- 2. Albania
- 3. Andorra
- 4. Angola
- 5. Antigua and Barbuda
- 6. Armenia
- 7. Azerbaijan
- 8. Bahamas
- 9. Bahrain
- 10. Barbados
- 11. Belize
- 12. Bhutan
- 13. Bosnia and Herzegovina
- 14. Brunei Darussalam
- 15. Cambodia
- 16. Central African Republic
- 17. Chad
- 18. Comoros
- 19. Croatia
- 20. Cyprus
- 21. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
- 22. Dominica
- 23. Dominican Republic
- 24. El Salvador
- 25. Equatorial Guinea
- 26. Eritrea
- 27. Estonia
- 28. Fiji
- 29. Gambia
- 30. Georgia
- 31. Grenada
- 32. Guatemala
- 33. Guinea-Bissau
- 34. Haiti
- 35. Iceland
- 36. Israel
- 37. Kazakstan
- 38. Kyrgyzstan
- 39. Lao People's Democratic Republic
- 40. Latvia

- 41. Lesotho
- 42. Liechtenstein
- 43. Lithuania
- 44. Luxembourg
- 45. Malawi
- 46. Maldives
- 47. Marshall Islands
- 48. Micronesia (Federated States of)
- 49. Monaco
- 50. Mongolia
- 51. Mozambique
- 52. Myanmar
- 53. Namibia
- 54. Palau
- 55. Papua New Guinea
- 56. Qatar
- 57. Republic of Korea
- 58. Republic of Moldova
- 59. Saint Kitts and Nevis
- 60. Saint Lucia
- 61. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
- 62. Samoa
- 63. San Marino
- 64. Sao Tome and Principe
- 65. Saudi Arabia
- 66. Seychelles
- 67. Singapore
- 68. Slovakia
- 69. Slovenia
- 70. Solomon Islands
- 71. South Africa
- 72. Suriname
- 73. Swaziland
- 74. Tajikistan
- 75. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- 76. Turkmenistan
- 77. Uzbekistan
- 78. Vanuatu
- 79. Viet Nam

8. Mexico

A/AC.247/5 (h)

[Original: Spanish]

[15 September 1995]

It is my pleasure to attach herewith the Mexican proposal for a new composition of the Security Council which was submitted in April 1995 to the Working Group of which you are Vice-Chairmen (see annex). I should be grateful if you would have this proposal included in the Working Group's compendium of documents which will be issued shortly.

(Signed) Manuel TELLO Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations

### ANNEX

## Proposed new membership of the Security Council

[Original: English]

Region	Existing	First two-year period	<u>Second two-year</u> period
Africa	3	4	4
Asia	2	3	3
Latin America and the Caribbean	2	3	3
Western Europe and other States	2	3	2
Eastern Europe	1	1	2
Permanent members	5	5	5
Japan	-	1	-
Germany			_1
Total	15	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>

[pages 94-105 offset]

11. Singapore

A/AC.247/5 (k)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

At the meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council reform yesterday, the Working Group decided to issue a compendium containing, <u>inter alia</u>, Member States' proposals to reform the Council. I am pleased to forward a copy of Singapore's suggestions (see annex) and would like to request that these suggestions be included in the compendium. These suggestions were first made by the Singapore Foreign Minister in his plenary speech at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Bilahari KAUSIKAN

Nations and in particular in the maintenance of international peace and security;

(b) The Charter confers upon the Security Council the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. A permanent member must therefore first of all have the capacity and will to wield military force in support of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. All permanent members should be prepared to give effect to Article 43 of the Charter and be ready to place their military forces at the disposal of the United Nations;

(c) A permanent member must also have the capacity and will to contribute civilian and humanitarian resources, which are increasingly needed in the growing multidimensional nature of United Nations peace-keeping operations;

(d) Privilege must be paid for. A permanent member should not shirk its financial commitments to the United Nations and must be prepared to carry a larger portion of the financial burden of the United Nations. In particular, a permanent member must bear special financial responsibilities for peace-keeping;

(e) A permanent member must be a major contributor to other aspects of the United Nations besides peace-keeping. These include international economic, financial and social cooperation, which are major elements in bringing about international peace and security;

(f) A permanent member should have the widest possible if not consensual support of all the members of the United Nations.

12. Turkey

A/AC.247/5 (I)

[Original: English]

[15 September 1995]

Please find enclosed herewith the Turkish position paper on Security Council reform (see annex). I would appreciate it if you could include the enclosed text in the compendium.

> (<u>Signed</u>) Tuluy TAN... Ambassador Chargí d'affaires a.i.

## ANNEX

## Position paper

1. Turkey presented its first written proposal pertaining to the reform of the