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The Applicant’s letter of appointment stated that his appointment was subject to termination in the interest of the Organization, as determined by the Secretary-General. By signing his letter of appointment, the Applicant agreed that his appointment could be terminated, in addition to the reasons stated in the staff regulations and rules, this additional discretionary clause. The Tribunal considers that the determination of the interest of the Organization is the Secretary’s General exclusive attribute and the circumstances under which the Secretary-General is to determine “the interest of the...

The UNDT found that the Administration reconstituted the fact-finding panel in January 2013, following the filing of the application, which was therefore moot. The UNDT found that, even if the application were not moot, it would not be receivable as the Applicant did not comply with the requirement of first requesting management evaluation prior to filing her application with the UNDT. The UNDT rejected the argument that the Applicant was not required to request management evaluation of the contested decision prior to filing her application with the UNDT on account of her being a former staff...

The UNDT found that the decision was in violation of an express written promise of renewal for three months by the head of her mission.

The application was withdrawn by the Applicant.

The UNDT found, on the one hand, that UNAMA decision to close the case given the conclusions of the investigation constituted a valid exercise of discretion by the Administration, and that the Organization did not breach the Applicant’s rights by not sharing the full investigation report with her. On the other hand, the Tribunal found that UNAMA failed to take diligent action with respect to the Applicant’s complaint and that it incurred inordinate delays both in reviewing and assessing the Applicant’s complaint and in setting up a fact-finding panel and conducting the investigation into her...

Although requested by the Registry to file supporting documentation, including the contested decision and a request for management evaluation, the Applicant did not provide it. The Tribunal declared the application non-receivable, since it was not directed against an administrative decision as per the terms of Tribunal’s Statute, and the Applicant had not submitted the contested decisions for management evaluation.

The application is now moot. The Applicant has essentially received the relief sought, as the decision has been rescinded and his claim is being reconsidered. On this matter, he could not have been granted greater relief by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the Tribunal exercises its power under art. 9 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure to summarily dismiss the application, but noting that no decision has been made on its merits.

The Tribunal found that her separation upon the expiry of her contract was not the subject matter of the Application before it. Damages for moral injury – As held by UNAT in Asariotis, damages for moral injury may arise in two situations: first, for a fundamental breach of the employee’s substantive entitlements arising from his or her contract, and/or from a breach of procedural due process entitlements; secondly, where the employee has produced evidence of harm, stress or anxiety caused by the breach.

Have the facts on which the disciplinary measure was based been established? Regardless of the standard of proof applied, the facts of the case as recounted are undisputed. They were first established during the investigation process and confirmed during the hearing by the Applicant and the testimony of two eyewitnesses. Furthermore, the Tribunal heard testimony from the investigator and the security officer who recorded the complainant’s report. The Tribunal did not find any evidence of ill-motivation on the part of the witnesses, and was satisfied that the facts related to the allegations...

Termination for misconduct vs. termination for facts anterior: Termination on the basis of staff regulation 9.3(a)(v) and staff rule 9.6(c)(v) is not to be confused with a measure involving separation as a result of disciplinary proceedings, including in cases where the facts in question could have constituted misconduct. Neither the procedure, nor the standard of proof is to be transposed from one to the other. Regarding in particular the standard of proof applicable to “facts anterior”, in the absence of a clear applicable legal norm or ruling of the Appeals Tribunal, it may not be assumed...