The Applicant’s claim was based on her assertion that she was on official travel status at United Nations expense when she was forced to have a stopover of 23 days in Khartoum. Accordingly, she claimed that she was entitled to DSA in accordance with staff rule 7.10. The Tribunal found, however, that there was no category under the applicable legal framwework of entitlement to DSA under which the Applicant’s time in Khartoum fell.
TEST -Rename- Benefits and entitlements-45
The Applicant’s post termination correspondence seeking to clarify what his terminal benefits would be, his eventual receipt of a statement of payments on 20 September 2021 and the filing of a new MER on 27 October 2021 reiterating the points previously made and decided on by the MEU did not re-set the time for the filing of the application. The Applicant waited approximately seven months after receiving the June 2021 MEU response, which addressed his submissions about entitlement to termination indemnity, before filing the application. The application was therefore outside the permitted 90...
Pursuant to staff rule 11.2(c), the Applicant should have requested management evaluation of the 31 August 2021 decision by 30 October 2021, or even earlier, if the intent was to argue against the recovery decision communicated between 30 June and 9 July. The Applicant was contemplating resorting to management evaluation already in July 2021, he, however, requested management evaluation only on 3 November 2021, which was after both deadlines.
A former staff member contesting a decision stemming from his elapsed appointment or contract is, for the purpose of staff rule 11.2, considered a “staff member”. As a former staff member, the Applicant was not exempt from submitting a request for management evaluation. Therefore, the Tribunal was not competent to entertain this application.
Whether the application is receivable in its entirety Although the Applicant questioned the legality of the threshold to qualify for a single parent allowance, contained in sec. 4.4 of ST/AI/2018/6, it must be understood as part of his legal reasoning or arguments and cannot be considered as the “contested decision” as suggested by the Respondent. Indeed, the Applicant does not claim in the abstract that the requirement contained in sec. 4.4 of ST/AI/2018/6 is unlawful but rather seeks to challenge the direct and individual application of the specific requirement to his case as it adversely...
The logical consequence of rescinding the contested administrative decision would be to remand the case to DHMOSH for a new consideration in light of the Tribunal’s findings in the present case. As the basic legal premise for the contested administrative decision was flawed, the Tribunal find that this would be the most appropriate remedy in the present case (in line herewith, see the Appeals Tribunal in Gueben et al. 2016-UNAT-692, para. 48). In this regard, the Tribunal notes that it has no jurisdiction as to directing the work of a potential medical board or the ABCC. The Tribunal finds...
Regarding the applicable Appendix D to the present case, the Tribunal notes that in the current Appendix D (ST/SGB/2018/1/Rev.1), it is stated that “[f]or claims filed for incidents that occurred prior to the entry into force of the present revised rules, the previously applicable rules will be applied” (see art. 6.1(b)). According to the Applicant’s own factual submissions, whereas his compensation claim was submitted on 29 June 2018, it concerned incidents that occurred somewhere between 2015 and until his medical leave started in August 2017. The applicable Appendix D is therefore one...
UNAT held that an analysis of the e-mail and other correspondence between UNDP and the Appellant indicated that she could not have been led to believe that her home leave request for January 2020 would be granted. She had been advised that a staff member was entitled to home leave only if the staff member’s contract was anticipated to continue for more than six months after the return from home leave, yet Appellant’s continuing engagement with UNDP was unknown, and her current contract end date was June 30, 2020. UNAT held that UNDP complied with its obligations to consider and decide the...
Ms. Coleman appealed. UNAT dismissed the appeal and affirmed the UNDT Judgment. UNAT noted that in reaching its conclusion that it was reasonable for the Administration to decide that it was not in the interest of the Organization to keep Ms. Coleman on pay status whilst not performing work until the expiry of her fixed-term appointment, the UNDT considered, inter alia, that: i) she had placed herself in a situation in which she could no longer perform her duties in Pakistan; ii) she had rejected the temporary assignment offered to her in South Soudan; and iii) she was not interested in...
UNAT first explained that under the new reimbursement regime, an expense would be recoverable if: (i) it’s for tuition; (ii) it is paid directly to the school; and (iii) it is certified by the school as being necessary for attendance. UNAT rejected the staff member’s claim that because another Ăĺ±±˝űµŘentity would apply a rule more favorably to his case, that entity’s interpretation should trump over the one given by the organization where he actually works. Second, UNAT disagreed with the Administration’s approach that if an item in a category of fees was inadmissible, then the Administration...