



THEMATIC REVIEW OF
DDR CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACEBUILDING
AND THE ROLE OF THE PEACEBUILDING FUND

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ACRONYMS

AMAA - Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies
APRD - Armée populaire pour la restauration de la République et de la démocratie
BCPR - Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery
CAAFAG - Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups
CAR - Central African Republic
CONADER - DRC's National Commission for DDR
CPA - Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN-M - Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist
CRRP - Community Recovery and Reintegration Programme
DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo
FDPC - Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain
HIV/AIDS - Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
IAWG - Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross
IDDRS - Integrated DDR Standards
ILO - International Labour Organization
IRF - Immediate Response Facility
ISSSS - International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
MDRP - Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MLCJ - Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice
MONUC - United Nations Mission in the Congo
MONUSCO - UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NPTF - Nepal Peace Trust Fund
OHCHR - Office of the High Commission for Human Rights
PBC - Peacebuilding Commission
PBF - Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO - Peacebuilding Support Office
PRF - Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility
RECOPEs - Réseaux communautaires de protection de l'enfant/Community Child Protection Networks

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR (IAWG), of which PBSO is also a member, jointly undertook a review of the contributions of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes to peacebuilding (DDR Thematic Review). The review draws on the experiences of three case studies: Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Nepal and focuses specifi-

Each case study outlines how DDR was approached in the peace process; the nature of the DDR process undertaken; summary of PBF DDR funding; the project's fulfillment of PBF funding goals for being catalytic, relevant and sustainable for peacebuilding; and challenges encountered in implementing the project for DDR and PBF.

Case Studies

- † CAR is the only case study country on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. The PBF contributions enabled a stronger preparatory phase of DDR, ensuring that DDR planning reflected the

- † PBF support for DDR may require rapid investment, especially to undertake reinsertion as a temporary stopgap before reintegration or to compensate for delays in the DDR.
- † PBF is a flexible fund, and this flexibility for DDR should be safeguarded so that DDR can be adapted and tailored according to changes in context, overcoming unforeseen challenges and obstacles and adjusting for alternate sequencing.
- † UN should promote the development of trust funds, such as the UNFPN, with a view to promoting multi-agency programmes and that allow the flexibility demonstrated in PBF funding.
- † UN should strengthen their mechanisms, with PBF support when possible, for fostering integrated multi-agency approaches to DDR. It should be recognized that PBF funding could also generate increased multi-agency coordination.

3. Strengthen capacities that can promote peacebuilding results in DDR programming

It is often difficult for DDR practitioners to have the full/sufficient profile of the beneficiaries, and the contexts and capacities to where the beneficiaries are returning, etc. DDR interventions must be flexible to quickly tailor or adjust programmes according to needs and evolving conditions on the ground.

- † PBF support is already flexible and this flexibility should be systematically maintained, however, the UN should seek to find alternative means for pooling resources that can be used in a flexible manner, such as in a trust fund.
- † DDR practitioners should strengthen their partnerships and relationships with other sectors on the ground so as to minimize duplication of efforts in such areas as conflict and needs assessments and market analysis, etc., and to undertake peacebuilding activities that promote social cohesion with other vulnerable groups and communities at large.

There is often a lack of local capacity on the ground, particularly in rural areas, to be able to meet the particular challenges associated with dealing with ex-combatants.

- † PBF should encourage projects that build up the capacity of local networks and mechanisms that could be used to support/include ex-combatants in their scope.
- † DDR local implementing partners should systematically receive training in conflict-sensitive programming, reconciliation, trainer-training on conflict management and reconciliation, and other peacebuilding activities. Training should be tailored to the specific needs of the community and should be delivered in a way that is accessible to all, including women and children.

t UN should aim to plan community-matching approaches in the design and planning of reinsertion and re-

1. INTRODUCTION

This report reviews the contributions of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) to peacebuilding, with a particular focus on the DDR and DDR-related projects supported by the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). PBF aims to help build security, reconstruct social fabrics and develop human capacity for ex-combatants and associated members who otherwise pose a significant risk to the stability and security of post-conflict environments. PBF recognizes the value of DDR in building a sustainable, long-term peacebuilding capacity thus places DDR high within its agenda.

The review forms part of a broader series of thematic reviews on peacebuilding led by the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

2. SETTING THE SC

confidence in the political process; strengthening core national capacity for conflict management. The report thus calls on the international community to be “capable of responding coherently, rapidly and effectively to these core objectives through:¹³

- † Support to basic safety and security, including mine action, protection of civilians, DDR, strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform (SSR);
- † Support to political processes, including electoral processes, promoting inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, and developing conflict management capacity at national and subnational levels;
- † Support to the provision of basic services, such as water and sanitation, health and primary education, and support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees;
- † Support to restoring core government functions, in particular basic public administration and public finance, at the national and subnational levels;
- † Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and livelihoods (in agriculture and public works), particularly for youth and demobilized former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is concerned with ensuring that “key actors involved in the peacebuilding process at national and local level are politically and institutionally able to mitigate risks of lapse or relapse into conflict”.¹⁴ Different programmatic approaches to peacebuilding focus on strengthening social cohesion and community resilience; state legitimacy, capacity and accountability and state-society relations; policies, structures and processes that address the drivers of violent conflict and set the conditions for addressing the root causes of conflict.

2.2 DDR

There is no one blueprint for DDR and related activities since country contexts differ greatly, according to the nature of the conflict, its duration, and causes and the programme must adapt according to the political, physical and cultural environments where the DDR is taking place. Nevertheless, the IAWG Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) defines DDR as “a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods”.

As initially defined by the Secretary-General in 2005 and affirmed in the IDDRS, disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

Reinsertion may be used, if necessary, as a stopgap between demobilization and reintegration and can last up to one year. It is defined as the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance. It is important to highlight that for the purposes of this review, unless otherwise stated, the term ex-combatants covers ex-combatants, members associated with armed forces and groups and dependents of ex-combatants.

Different aspects of reintegration aim to provide ex-combatants with the tools, means and direction to return to civilian life economically, socially, and politically:

- t Economic reintegration involves the provision of vocational or professional training, grants, apprenticeships or micro-financing to capacitate individuals in the areas of agriculture, animal husbandry, micro-business or entry into public or private service.
- t Social reintegration thus provides the necessary complement to socio-economic reintegration by focusing on interventions that seek to disarm and demobilize minds and behaviours through such areas as psychosocial and mental health counselling, medical treatment and activities that promote reconciliation and social cohesion.

¹⁹ A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations, Workshop Report, International Peace Academy, New York: December 2002, p.8.

²⁰ United Nations - Integrated Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration Standards (IDDRS), Module 1.20 p. 6.

²¹ United Nations – IDDRS Module 1.20 p. 6. Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Note by the Secretary-General, United Nations A/C.5/59/31, New York: 24 May 2005.

²² United Nations – IDDRS, Module 1.20 p. 6.

²³ In this review, the term ex-combatant includes associated groups and dependents.

²⁴ United Nations – IDDRS, Module 1.20 p. 6.

²⁵ United Nations – IDDRS, Module 1.20 p. 6.

† Political reintegration supports interventions such as civic education and providing ex-combatants with valid identification documents that support the ex-combatant “in claiming rights and fulfilling duties, including those related to participation in political processes, such as elections and community-based decision-making processes.”²⁶ Political reintegration promotes confidence and investment in the peace process and transitional state structure.

2.3 General overview of DDR contributions to peacebuilding

DDR is unique from other peacebuilding sectors, such as health, social and administrative services, education, and the security sector, etc., as these sectors are continuous and inherent to the daily and sustainable functioning of a state. In contrast, DDR is a programme with a determined beginning and end, in spite of the fact that the implications of DDR, from its negotiations through its implementation and conclusion, penetrate a wide range of longer-term processes and programmes. The closing of a DDR programme is highly symbolic of a state’s return to stability and signals another milestone in the state’s transition out of post-conflict recovery. Once the DDR is completed, the sustainability of its results depends upon the ability of other peacebuilding sectors to incorporate individuals who were once formerly known as ex-combatants as regular citizens in longer-term peace, recovery and development programmes.

Similarly, national ownership, buy-in and support to national institutions implementing DDR are guiding principles of DDR and are seen as essential for the success and sustainability of the DDR programmes themselves. However, lack of political will is often a challenge for implementing DDR and while its absence may impinge upon the success of the programme, many DDR programmes and related activities can still proceed. Unlike the other sectoral peacebuilding themes, the national government is not expected to take up DDR sectorally or departmentally once DDR is complete. Instead, it is the linkages between DDR to other issues such as SSR, Transitional Justice, Rule of Law, National Reconciliation, Development and Armed Violence Reduction that carry aspects of DDR thematically and sustainably forward at the national level.

Despite the finite nature of DDR as a programme, the contributions of DDR to peacebuilding are many, raising the more speculative question of what aspects of DDR do not contribute directly to peacebuilding? DDR directly supports implementation of peace agreements, supports the provision of basic security, promotes socio-economic revitalization and other such peace dividends as social cohesion and enhanced community resilience and helps to build confidence in the peace process and statebuilding.

2.3.1 DDR implementation challenges and its effect on peacebuilding

Successful DDR helps set enabling conditions for peacebuilding; however, disruptions or setbacks in the DDR can negatively affect security and on the overall peace process, even becoming a source of new or renewed tension within the country or neighbouring areas.²⁷ Delayed or incomplete disarmament can fuel the proliferation of arms within and outside the country.²⁸ Ex-combatants may opt out of a delayed or ill-timed DDR or be drawn across

²⁶ The State of Reintegration 2010, Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, forthcoming, p.31.

²⁷ United Nations—IDDRS module 3.30, 2006.

²⁸ Report of the Secretary-General on Prevention of armed conflict, United Nations, A/55/985-S/2001/574, New York: 7 June 2001; Back ground paper, Children at War: Impact, Protection Rehabilitation, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra: 2006 p.9; Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) practices in peace operations; Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York: 2010, p. 9; Knight, M & Ozerdem, A. Guns, Camps and Cash: disarmament demobilization and Reinsertion of former combatants in transition from war to peace. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 41, n° 4, July 2004, pp. 499-500.

²⁹ Independent External Review of the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN), Organisation Development Centre, Kathmandu: June 2011.

³⁰ Twenty-second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Liberia [S/2011/72], 14 February 2011, paras. 15-17; W. Andy Knight. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview. African Security, Routledge. June 2011, p. 33-34. Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program: End of Program Evaluation (Final Report), Oslo: June 2010.

³¹ Swarbrick, Peter. Avoiding Disarmament Failure: The Critical Link in the DDR: An Operational Manual for Donors, Managers, and Practitioners. Small Arms Survey, Working Paper n° 5, Geneva: February 2007 p. 20-21; W. Andy Knight. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview, African Security, Routledge, June 2011, pp.28, 42.

Several circumstances affect the implementation of DDR. First, as the report, “Second Generation DDR” prepared by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations states the UN is increasingly tasked with undertaking DDR before or in the absence of the necessary preconditions for undertaking DDR. For instance, peace agreements provide the legal framework for DDR, however they often lack detailed provisions for DDR that are in line with the IDDRS. There may also be ongoing conflicts in other areas of the country or in neighbouring countries that may threaten to spillover where the DDR interventions are taking place.

Second, the DDR process may lack political will from the government. As the Nepal case study explores in the annex, the Government imposed restrictions that limited the UN’s access to cantonment sites or other areas that would facilitate needs profiling; imposed funding ceilings on the amount of assistance that ex-combatants could receive; and issued negative propaganda against the programme. National programmes themselves, as explored in the annexed case study of CAR, may be undermined by capacity limitations or elements of corruption or mis-managed funding, which can affect the overall public perception of DDR and create obstacles for DDR activities implemented by other agencies.

Third, another recurring challenge for DDR is the fact that DDR, particularly reintegration, relies primarily upon voluntary funding. Only DD may be covered by the UN Mission ‘assessed budgets’ when it takes place within a peacekeeping operation. The typical immediate launch of DD leads to gaps in programming when compounded by the need to secure funding and prepare reintegration programmes, which by their nature is a much longer and resource-intensive process than DD. Moreover, as the fiscal year of the assessed budget begins and ends annually in June, it is difficult to effectively coordinate the timing and sequencing of funding of DDR activities. As a result, there can be gaps between the implementation of DD and R that can have serious security implications.

Lack of funding can also mean that reintegration programmes must be scaled down in time and scope, undermining the success and sustainability of the DDR process. Scaled down reintegration thus provides little more advantage than the short-term reinsertion. Reinsertion bridges demobilization and reintegration in order to foster stability, maintain the momentum of the DDR and to minimize the negative effects that delays to the DDR programme can have on the process overall. However, reinsertion cannot be used as a substitute for longer-term reintegration support.

Fourth, the “Second Generation DDR” report highlights the challenges regarding the difficulties of obtaining and verifying real numbers of weapons and the continued circulation of weapons within a community, compounded by a lack of legal framework governing weapons ownership. Initial commitment to disarming may be low or, alternatively, the number of individuals presenting themselves for DDR may be more than anticipated or artificially inflated, making it difficult to define who is a militia member. Regarding demobilization, there is often a poor understanding of the types of, specific needs and agendas of the groups and organizations (militias, clans, ethnic groups) that are being demobilized.

Fifth, ex-combatants are reintegrated into areas characterized by the reduced productive capacities, destroyed infrastructure and social services and collapsed markets typical of post-conflict environment. The abrupt release of thousands of ex-combatants into the labour market can breed tension and competition among other conflict-affected populations³⁷ and there can be competition over natural resources, particularly in areas where groups are returning. In addition, the condition of natural resources that underpin livelihoods in such areas may be degraded due to effects from the conflict or coping activities of displaced populations, such as deforestation, contamination of water sources or destruction of crops. While DDR helps beneficiaries rid themselves of their ex-combatant

³³ For a more in depth discussion of the preconditions, see Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Practices in Peace Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, NY: 18 January 2010, pp.8, 10, 12.

³⁴ United Nations—IDDRS module 2.10.

³⁵ Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Practices in Peace Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, NY: 18 January 2010, p.13.

³⁶ Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Practices in Peace Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, NY: 18 January 2010, p.13.

³⁷ The D> BDC 8s deforestation, contamination

3. PBF SUPPORT T

3.2 PBF contributions in Case Study countries

The case studies for CAR, DRC and Nepal are annexed to this review. Each case study outlines how DDR was approached in the peace process; the nature of the DDR undertaken; summary of PBF funding for the DDR; an exploration of the projects in relation to PBF funding goals; and the challenges encountered in implementing the project. To facilitate the reading of this review, which is meant to place particular emphasis on PBF contributions to DDR, only the PBF aspects of the case studies, and the general context in which they take place, are summarized here.

3.2.1 Central African Republic

The government and three politico-military groups, operating in the north-eastern (UFDR), North-central (FDPC) and north-western (APRD) signed the Libreville Global Peace Agreement in June 2008. The Agreement included a specific provision on DDR. However, it was more than two years after the launching of the DDR Steering Committee (2009) before the disarmament and demobilization (DD) operations began in June 2011. Several reasons are attributed to the delays in launching the DD, including continued outbreaks of violence; political disagreements resulting from the absence of a power-sharing agreement between the government and politico-military groups; and political tactics to delay the process until after the elections (which took place in January and March 2011). The government began DD in June 2011 and UNDP joined the operations three weeks later in July 2011.

Neither the Libreville Peace Agreement nor any other agreement included provisions on children associated with armed forces or armed groups (CAAFAG). UNICEF used the International Conventions on the Rights of the Child and the fact that children were not covered under the national agreements to justify the need to commence the DDR of CAAFAG immediately. UNICEF thus initiated the process of removing CAAFAG from armed opposition groups in 2008, independently of the formal, adult DDR process.

Under the SSR component of CAR's Peacebuilding Priority Plan, the PBF contributed funding to three DDR projects.

Table 2: PBF contributions to DDR projects in CAR 2009 to present

PROJECT TITLE	BUDGET (US\$)	TIMELINE	UN AGENCIES
Support for the start-up of the DDR process for Armed Groups (PBF/CAF/B-3)	3,955,710	Apr 09-Sep 10	UNDP
Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Socio-Economic Reintegration of CAAFAG and Other Children and Women' (Child DDR – PHASE I; PBF/CAF/B-2)	2,000,000	Nov 08 - Oct 11	UNICEF
Prevention of Recruitment, Demobilization and Socio-Economic Reintegration of CAAFAG and Other Children and Women' (Child DDR – PHASE 2; PBF/CAF/K-12)	1,500,000	Sep 10 - Feb 12	UNFPA UNICEF 43EF

Managed through UNDP, the first project 'Support for the start-up of the DDR process for Armed Groups' received US\$ 4 million from the PBF. This amount covered the full costs of the preparatory phase of the DDR, which included staff costs;⁶ support for Steering Committee meetings and sensitization activities and building the institutional capacity necessary for designing, planning, steering and implementing the national DDR programme. The project also supported the development and building the capacity of the different units and committees, including the functions of the DDR Steering Committee, put in place to oversee and implement DDR. It also implemented the sensitization and public information campaigns for the process.

- † Sensitization to prepare armed groups to disarm;
- † Building Disarmament and demobilization centre;
- † National Partners logistic aspect support;
- † Ex-combatants transport and food support;
- † Sensitization activities to prepare communities for the return of the ex-combatants;
- † Identification and preparation of the beneficiaries for their reinsertion/reintegration programmes, including placing the beneficiaries into community-based solidarity groups;
- † Market and employment studies; and
- † Training for the beneficiaries on i) technical aspects of their chosen vocation, ii) management (iii) civic

another three years, until January 2010, of additional negotiations and high-level advocacy before the Maoist army

4. CONTRIBUTIONS OF PBF

The same effect was evident throughout the region. The project addressing the war wounded was thus catalytic in removing the barricades around Masisi and bringing greater stability to the areas where the wounded CNDP were based. The doctors participating in the project noted that it had a positive impact on the morale of the military and their families and helped in building their confidence in the government and state more broadly.

Unfortunately, the fact that only the war wounded from CNDP benefited from that project created frustration among other armed groups. These groups have responded with volatility, setting up barricades. The important lesson being to discourage projects that favour one group over another and to ensure that adequate communication and outreach is extended informing other combatants of when and how they might receive similar support.

In CAR, armed groups were becoming impatient; having already begun assembling under the promise of DDR in the peace agreement. The rapid investment in the preparatory phase of the DDR had an early positive impact on security. Seeing the creation of the DDR Steering Committee and the sensitization and verification activities that followed raised hopes among ex-combatants that the DDR process would begin in earnest, which led to a reduction of violence in conflict areas, though spates of insecurity continued through to the lead up to the elections and until the DD component of the operations itself began. The fact that the ex-combatants had already begun assembling even before the DDR strategy was agreed added urgency to beginning the DDR. However, as is often the case with DDR processes, the gap between launching the process and commencing the DD also bred frustration. Labour-intensive reinsertion projects could thus have proven useful in maintaining stability in the interim period.

The three projects in Nepal, promoted the safety and security of women and children. UNFPA ensured that the basic needs of women were met in the cantonment sites and that special arrangements were made during the rehabilitation phase to ensure the safety of minors and women who would have to commute long distances for their education and training. The third project oversaw the protection of children and monitored child-rights violations. In CAR, the two PBF-supported projects removed children from the armed groups and focused on preventing their (re-) recruitment into armed groups. Also, the early stability that accompanied the launch of the DDR process in CAR, helped to provide an increased sense of security among women. Several women's testimonies in Bocaranga in CAR highlight that they feel safer traveling to market or working in their fields without the fear of being extorted or raped by the APRD armed group.

4.3 Peace dividends

4.3.1 Socio-economic revitalization

DDR and related activities promotes economic revitalization most evidently by promoting socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. In the case studies, ex-combatants benefited from vocational training and start-up kits for micro-enterprise and trades such as mechanics and tailors, in agriculture, animal husbandry and health services, etc. The community-matching approach adopted in the CRRP, in the education option for minors in Nepal and for the reintegration options of minors in CAR provided a wider footprint of economic revitalization and benefit for the communities.

In addition to helping ex-combatants engage in markets and services, reintegration provided economic dividends to communities at large. For instance, in DRC, the purchase of a mill in one initiative benefited the whole community, as there became an increased production of grain. Likewise the soap-making activity of a solidarity group in Uvira, DRC, led to the availability of more affordable soap for the community. Similarly, under the UNIRP programme in Nepal, the health service training reintegration option, which aimed to give especially women government-accredited professional training as an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife and Community Health Worker, heeded Nepal's high demand for health workers, both within the public and private sectors.

⁵⁷ UNDP, Minister of Interior for eastern DRC, also noted in Vlassenroot, K. Hoebek, H. & Risch, L. Multipart: Country Study Paper. EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations. December 03 2009. P.24-26.

⁵⁸ Interviews with diplomats and donor representatives (Int.) of ex-combatants high

The increased security situation, which DDR promoted particularly in DRC and CAR also contributed to the freedom of movement and thus return of economic activity in certain areas. Following the removal of wounded CNDP, the increased security situation in the region and subsequent opening of the barricaded routes facilitated the redeployment of the administrative authorities and security forces in the areas.

In Bocaranga, CAR, the early stability that accompanied the launch of the DDR process led to the lifting of barriers held by the armed group APRD; and an increase in the number of people attending weekly markets in Bocaranga (some travelling up to 10km) as well as an increase in commercial exchange with traders travelling through from Chad and northern CAR; and the re-building of agriculture and animal husbandry activities. Children who were inserted into existing collectives with other adults (as part of the agriculture and animal husbandry option) shared in the profits of collectives and thus generally fared better than the children who had to compete alone in more competitive markets such as for tailoring.

The community-matching approach to the projects also produced several social dividends. By engaging the communities in the process, and having the ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups work side by side, the CRRP (DRC), UNIRP's education option of the VMLR (Nepal) and the child DDR (CAR) managed to help reduce some of the stigma associated with being an ex-combatant. It also mitigated the typical frustration of non-combatants that the ex-combatants are being rewarded for their part in the conflict as community members also benefited.

Implementing partners and beneficiaries of the CRRP and the CAR's child DDR provided testimonies that there is a notable difference in the attitudes and behaviours of the ex-combatants. For instance, solidarity groups were established under the CRRP, which consisted of both ex-combatants and other vulnerable group beneficiaries. Working closely together, ex-combatants learned how to better engage with others in a non-military fashion, how to live differently and to appreciate a normal civilian life. By the end of the CRRP a significant percentage of ex-combatants and the other community beneficiaries were providing mutual assistance, had formed alliances and pooled their money and set up a credit system.

In Nepal, the CAAFAG Working Group, which UNICEF had previously established in 2006 and was a beneficiary of the PBF support, established mechanisms that brought VMLR and communities together (such as youth clubs, trained psychosocial workers, education and peacebuilding activities). Many of the CAAFAG Network's activities have also benefited broader peacebuilding programmes and communities alike. For instance, VMLRs have engaged in peace building activities that did not specifically target them such as cultural events sports/games, reconciliation meetings, including various types of social activities with local youth clubs and community members. Several VMLR informed the UNIRP implementers that these events were the first time they had been able to positively interact with the communities. The peacebuilding activities creatively acted as an entry point to approach some VMLR who were not enrolled in any of the packages.

In CAR, the PBF-supported child DDR saw the creation of RECOPEs, which promote community resilience. The networks are typically composed of a village chief, religious leader, woman leader, teacher, representative of the parent-teacher association, and a child elected by his/her peers. Having received training from the programme, RECOPEs aim to promote child protection through community-level sensitization on such issues such as rights of the

4.5 Gaps and challenges in PBF -supported projects

4.5.1 Funding gaps

While the PBF helped fill a gap for implementing the CRRP project in the DRC, the project still faced a significant funding shortfall to the detriment of the project's full implementation. The shortfall prevented the project from equally matching ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups as planned thus having a smaller ratio of community beneficiaries. The fact that other vulnerable groups were included in the project and the project's overall contribution to community development, it should have enabled funds from other sectors, including from within the PBF, to come on board in a cross-sectoral approach.

Indeed, DDR often faces criticism for not sufficiently linking up substantively and programmatically with national and/or UN programmes on the ground in such areas as SSR, transitional justice, rule of law, armed violence reduction and economic. It would be, therefore, useful to see how both the DDR community and the PBF could help bridge the financial and programmatic linkages and build coherence between DDR and other sectors.

Similar criticisms are made regarding DDR engagement on national programmes that address cross-cutting issues in the areas of health, education, disability, youth and children, HIV, gender, natural resource management and reconciliation.⁶⁵ As pointed out in the annexed DRC case study, there is a marked absence of funding for gender-based programmes that target masculinity. PBF has funded several interventions focusing on women, however, targeting masculinity in DDR programmes, including campaigns for male ex-combatants on the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, is particularly essential as male dynamics toons fege, is 9nci 10 122s ftoons fonciliatitoig1 just

to integration and mission-UN Country Team relations in preparing the Adult DDR, which reportedly only recently improved as a result of a recent (2011) SSR/DDR Assessment and renewed inter-agency commitments. Further, the phase II of the Child DDR project is intended to be multi-agency, however, observers on the ground highlight that the agencies have been working independently of one another. It may thus be useful for the PBSO and DDR community to review in greater depth the challenges of multi-agency coordination and how the PBF could be used more concertedly as an instrument for fostering inter-agency coordination.

4.5.3 Sustainability

Achieving sustainability of peacebuilding results poses a unique challenge for DDR, given the precise parameters of DDR interventions and the important symbolism of ending DDR as countries move further along the peace process.⁶⁷ However, implementing partners in all of the cases expressed concern over the short-duration of the support coming from the programmes. In DRC and Nepal, for instance, many of the micro-enterprises will have just been getting off the ground by the end of the support, while on the agricultural side, support may end before the beneficiaries reach the harvest season.

In Nepal, some of the minors require more support than is provided through the 2-year duration of the programme. The UNIRP review warned that there could be a high number of drop-outs from the education programmes from those who will not be finished their studies within the 2-year duration of the programme and especially for those who live outside of the home to get their education.

Children in CAR also face the same challenge. The Child DDR programme supported the education of the children for one year, but the majority of families are too poor to continue the schooling beyond this. Some RECOPEs managed to provide additional help for primary school children (which were in the village), however they could not extend support for the students to attend the secondary schools further away. The justification for the second phase of the PBF project Child-DDR project was to address the fragile socio-economic environment into which ex-CAAFAG were reintegrated during the first phase, however the activities of the second-phase reportedly are not specifically addressing some of the key sustainability challenges.

Further on the issue of sustainability, RECOPEs had received support for a one-year period and many now struggle with raising funds to sustain their support services. While RECOPEs are expected to carve out their own means for sustainability, the short-term support of the programmes may not be enough to give the beneficiaries sufficient opportunities to make the best of the support they received. RECOPEs that are not included in the phase II of the Child DDR project will not be able to continue to provide the same level of community support as when they were first created and risk disappearing.

These challenges emphasize the broader value and need for ensuring there is an adequate and sustainable exit strategy in place to link the reintegration programmes into more sustainable recovery and development programmes.

4.5.4 Gap between DD and R and alternative sequencing

As highlighted above, DDR often faces gaps between the immediate implementation of DD and reintegration for a range of reasons from financial to political to also the time needed for planning and preparation of multi-year reintegration programmes. DDR in CAR faced significant delays between the launching of the DDR process and implementation of the DD. It is also likely to face serious delays between the completion of DD and the commencement of R. This disconnect can pose grave problems for the fluidity and complementarity of the DDR process. Local civil society groups in CAR warn that, given the current atmosphere among the ex-combatants and their continued ties to their armed group's chain of command, the ex-combatants could return to the armed groups if there are significant delays in the process or if the reintegration packages are not adequate.

d'Ivoire, DRC and Liberia as a bridge to longer-term reintegration. Such measures could have proven useful during the delays that occurred such as in CAR between the launch of the DDR process and the commencement of DD and between the DD and R.

The DPKO report, *Second Generation*, further highlights that occasion and circumstance may mean that not all the components of DDR may be necessary, or that certain components could be implemented earlier, such as reinsertion or reintegration as a way to encourage DDR. In CAR, the long delays between the launch and commencement of DD could have been a useful opportunity to undertake certain reinsertion projects as a way to stabilize/maintain security leading up through the elections.

4.5.5 Local capacity

The PBF requires that its supported projects provide capacity-building for the local or national governments and local civil society. All of the projects reviewed in this case study provide at least some degree of training on substantive thematic issues, project and financial management, monitoring and evaluation, information technology and other certain(ei

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 Findings

Financially, the contributions of the PBF are relatively small in comparison to the costs of DDR and PBF's overall allocations to a country. It is difficult to judge what the state of the DDR process would have been had the PBF assistance not been made available, however, the results of the case studies cast little doubt of the relevance and value of the PBF projects in meeting both DDR and peacebuilding objectives.

At some level, all of the PBF-supported projects reported dividends in the areas of security, economic revitalization and seeing a change in the attitudes and behaviours of not only ex-combatants but also within hosting communities towards ex-combatants. Peacebuilding activities have helped the DDR community identify ex-combatants who are not enrolled in a programme and are a useful platform for positively promoting and providing outreach for DDR. Peacebuilding activities create opportunities where ex-combatants and community members positively interact together, promoting social cohesion and reconciliation.

Even in CAR, where several delays have undermined the programme, spates of violence surfaced and funding for reintegration remains uncertain, the PBF support for the preparatory phase ensured that the strategies developed and process as a whole reflected the content of IDDRS and that the DDR process remained present despite the delays. In Nepal, despite several government and Maoists restrictions, the PBF support ensured that special needs of women were accommodated and the CAAFAG Working Group undertook several peacebuilding activities for the VMLR and receiving communities. It is thus important not to measure the success and effectiveness of the individual PBF interventions based on the success of DDR process⁷⁰itself.

The DDR activities in the case studies also produced benefits that extended beyond the immediate beneficiaries of ex-combatants, with communities benefiting from the economic and social dividends of DDR, such as:

- † Reintegration benefits were matched with other beneficiaries deemed as vulnerable community members;
- † Micro-enterprises developed that improve the basic provision of nutritional or hygienic needs of a community (e.g., grain mills, soap);
- † Professional training provided to build national capacity in the delivery of health services;
- † Capacity-building and the provision of equipment (e.g., military hospital in DRC) that strengthened overall national capacities and services that will be useful beyond the closing of DDR projects;
- † Community networks such as the solidarity groups, CAAFAG Network and RECOPEs established or supported, which helped to promote social cohesion and reconciliation.

This review finds that the PBF has a particular value in filling gaps in DDR programming, particularly:

- † Financial gaps: funding critical parts of the programme that require additional funds (e.g., reintegration), or to 'jump start' critical activities.
- † DD and R gap/stop-gap measures: funding reinsertion projects, labour-intensive projects, community/dual targeting projects that aim to minimize the gap or serve as a temporary stop-gap measure between DD and R.

⁷⁰ In Côte d'Ivoire, the PBF also funded the 1000 micro-projects reinsertion project. Conflict resumed in the country following the elections in early 2011. It is difficult to say if the micro-projects had an impact on controlling in some way the levels of violence that ensued or in paving the way for a quicker return to stability as the conflict was resolving. Nevertheless, the project itself is widely seen to have been successful and the implementers believe it may have had an impact on reigning in the violence and restoring the peace as quickly as it did.

Based on the findings of this review, the following recommendations are presented below.

5.2 recommendations

1. Establish concrete actions for ensuring DDR ‘process’, planning and preparations are aligned with peacebuilding priorities

The DDR process ranges from dealing with DDR in the negotiation of peace agreements, through programme planning and design, implementation and closure. Each component requires human and financial investment; the lack of which can have a serious impact on the subsequent or parallel aspects of the programme and of its concrete contributions to peacebuilding. The planning and preparation of DDR must be conflict sensitive, cognizant of conflict drivers and consider how to achieve key peacebuilding results from design to programme closing.

- † The PBF should consider funding inclusive DDR dialogues that both serve as entry points for reconciliation and as vehicles for developing multi-year, inter-agency, country-specific frameworks for reintegration, as recommended by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee. Such PBF support would encourage the creation of catalytic “One UN” approaches to resource mobilization, as well as multi-sectoral reintegration frameworks that provide viable transition options for the final stages of DDR processes.
- † DDR practitioners should factor in conflict analysis prepared in the framework of peacebuilding and be aligned with country PBF Priority Plans; involve key actors from other peacebuilding sectors in the planning and preparation of DDR; plan reinsertion and reintegration activities that are conducive to achieving peacebuilding results and agree in the planning phase of how peacebuilding is included in DDR M&E.
- † Peacebuilding and DDR practitioners should consider in conflict and risk analysis and needs assessments potential new threats that emerge and become conflict drivers as a result of challenges in/obstacles to the DDR process.

- 2.

- † PBF support is already flexible and this flexibility should be systematically maintained, however, the UN should seek to find alternative means for pooling resources that can be used in a flexible manner, such as in a trust fund.
- † DDR practitioners should strengthen their partnerships and relationships with other sectors on the ground so as to minimize duplication of efforts in such areas as conflict and needs assessments and market analysis, etc., and to undertake peacebuilding activities that promote social cohesion with other vulnerable groups and communities at large.

There is often a lack of local capacity on the ground, particularly in rural areas, to be able to meet the particular

and peacebuilding events and activities that bring ex-combatants and communities together in cultural, music and sporting events and supporting the presence of psychosocial support services at such events.

† DDR planners should seek to increase their planning to include communities through the presence of psychosocial support services at such events.

ANNEX 1

Methodology of DDR Thematic Review

The review was conducted over the three-month period of June, July and August in 2011. The review team's main goal was to focus on three case studies in particular: Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Nepal. Two specific countries were selected for conducting field research: DRC and CAR. Given limitations in time and budget, and the fact that practitioners had only recently undertaken separate reviews of DDR and peacebuilding in Nepal prior to instigating this thematic review, it was agreed that the research for Nepal would consist of desk research and telephone interviews. Case study selection was based on the diversity of the DDR context of the cases:

- † DRC has an active peacekeeping mission while the peacekeeping mission in CAR had drawn down by the time DDR commenced and the rehabilitation activities in Nepal were conducted in a non-peacekeeping environment.
- † The country selection of Nepal allowed for a degree of geographic diversity given the other two cases take place in Africa.
- † The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) activities in DRC focused on a typical reintegration caseload while Nepal the PBF activities focused on vulnerable groups and the PBF activities in CAR focused on the preparatory process for DDR and on implementation of DDR for children.

The PBSO senior consultant, in consultation with the IAWG and consultants hired for the review, prepared the methodological basis for the DDR Thematic Review in accordance with the methods applied throughout the broader Sectoral Review. This included establishing the framework principles for analysing peacebuilding, namely the provision of basic security and peace dividends, building confidence in political processes and building national capacity for conflict management (described in section two). Other specific elements of peacebuilding considered were conflict analysis and assessment of peacebuilding priorities; design and implementation of DDR projects; impact on social cohesion; national ownership; sustainability; comparative advantage; and institutional coordination. It is important to highlight that, for the purposes of this report, the terminology of ex-combatant includes associated groups and dependents.

IAWG members were consulted on the project documents for the DDR Thematic Review, including the specific Terms of Reference for the study, the selection of consultants and where the field case studies would take place. The IAWG also provided comments to the preliminary draft of the review.

⁷¹ Interagency Programming Mission Report, UN Interagency Rehabilitation Programme, February 2011, Independent External Review of the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (UNPFN), Organisation Development Centre, Kathmandu: June 2011.

ANNEX 2

Practical linkages between DDR and peacebuilding

Promoting the peace process

DDR-type programmes are very political and are a highly sensitive and visible part of the political process of consolidating peace. The majority of recent peace agreements includes at least some reference to DDR in the negotia-

Secondly, DDR contributes to security on a community and individual level by reducing the risk of opportunistic violence and general lawlessness. Ex-combatants are considered to have a high-risk potential of becoming spoilers of the peace process or committing banditry and other crimes. Removing weapons from these groups and preventing their aimless return to cities and communities directly contributes to the provision of basic security and stabilization of a country. Further, assistance to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life and helping them establish an alternative livelihood helps to minimize the likelihood that the individuals will return to armed groups or participate in criminal activities.

Security, both on the strategic and communal levels, is a basic precondition for peacebuilding. While DDR alone cannot ensure security, one of its main contributions to peacebuilding is found in the provision of basic security, which enables other activities to take place.

Peace dividends

The United Nations and other international actors use the concept of peace dividends to describe timely and tangible deliverables, which in particular contexts can facilitate social cohesion and stability, build trust in the peace process and support the state in earning its legitimacy under challenging conditions. In protracted conflicts in particular, such as in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, ex-combatants will have lost or missed out on education and livelihood opportunities that would have enabled them to more readily enter into civilian life. After

ANNEX 3

Funding Criteria for the Peacebuilding F

PBF's Standard Criteria:

- † Relevant (Programming addresses peacebuilding priorities, responds to conflict analysis, considers transitional and cross cutting issues).
- † Catalytic (gaps; accelerate larger peacebuilding effort, especially promoting sustainability / government

ANNEX 4

DDR financing (IDDRS)

The following table is drawn from module 3.4.1 of the IDDRS, “Financing and Budgeting”. It provides a break down of DDR financing sources and opportunities

PHASE	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	POSSIBLE SOURCE
Peace negotiations	t	

Demobilization: Processing phase	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> t In-bound transportation; t Registration; t Socio-economic profiling; t Health screening; t Civic education; t Discharge orientation; t Out-bound transportation (repatriation and resettlement); 	Peacekeeping assessed budget, voluntary contributions, agency in-kind contributions
Demobilization: Reinsertion phase (up to one year for each combatant)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> t Transitional safety allowances t Food t Non-food item support t Clothes t Short-term education and training t Short-term employment t Tools t Medical services 	
Reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> t Professional/vocational training; t Long-term education, accelerated learning; t Employment counselling and referral; t Job placement; t Financing of microenterprises; t Induction into uniformed services; t Family tracing and reunification, interim care services for CAAFAG; t Community support for reintegration of women associated with armed forces and groups; t Reconciliation activities; 	Voluntary contributions, bilateral programmes
Awareness-raising and sensitization, and advocacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> t Radio t Print t Local theatre groups t Advocacy, publication information and social mobilization to raise awareness about children and women associated with armed forces and groups 	Peacekeeping assessed budget, voluntary contributions, bilateral programmes

1. Central African Republic

1.1 DDR in the peace process

particularly in the north-east, and the political battles resulting from the absence of a power-sharing agreement between the government and politico-military groups. The start of DD was further affected by disagreements between Government and politico-military groups on the “pre-conditions” to DDR as well as the political nature of the DDR Steering Committee. Also, it is widely believed that each side was employing tactics in order to delay the process until after the elections (which eventually took place in January and March 2011).

The DDR programme was initially planned in two phases: (1) a preparatory phase to set up the necessary structures and operational procedures, and (2) an operational phase including the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration of combatants. The preparatory phase began in April 2009 and included as primary activities: Establishment of a UNDP Management Unit; ongoing meetings of the DDR Steering Committee; opening of field offices and support to local DDR committees; elaboration of a detailed project document outlining the entire DDR process; a socio-economic study of the areas affected by armed violence; and sensitization of ex-combatants and their verification against the official criteria qualifying them for participation in the DDR process. Although UNDP’s Management Unit was operational by August 2009, the preparatory phase had to be extended to 28 months to accommodate the first part of the operational phase being launched in July 2011. In the north and northwest, the preparatory phase was successfully concluded following the verification of combatants in August and September 2010. However, the activities in the north-east were limited to a sensitization and information campaign conducted in May 2010, and thus the preparatory phase for this region is still ongoing (as of December 2011).

The government began the operational phase of the DDR with a symbolic disarmament in June 2011, and UNDP joined three weeks later in July 2011. Despite the long delay period, the DD had to be launched without a reintegration component firmly in place. A reintegration strategy was only adopted on July 8, 2011. The strategy, developed with technical assistance from UNDP and in line with the IDDRS, adopts an individual approach. It puts forward three main options for reintegration, to: return to civilian life; become part of the national defence and security forces; participate in a six month National Youth Pioneer Programme (Jeunesse Pionnière Nationale – JPN), which provides civic education and professional and vocational training to youths between the ages of 17-24 years old. However, as detailed in the section on challenges below, there will likely be a significant gap between the completion of the DD and commencement of the R. While stopgap reinsertion activities are under consideration, there is no funding to support the activities. A request for partial funding from PBF is under consideration (as of December 2011).

Neither the Libreville Peace Agreement nor any other agreement included provisions on children associated with armed forces or armed groups (CAAFAG). UNICEF used the International Conventions on the Rights of the Child and the fact that children were not covered under the national agreements to justify the need to commence the DDR of CAAFAG immediately. UNICEF thus initiated the process of removing CAAFAG from armed opposition groups in 2008, independently of the formal, adult DDR process.

The DDR project document (adopted on 4 December 2009) included a budget for Reinsertion and Reintegration activities, for which about US\$ 19.5 million were previously pledged by the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the European Commission. The funding from the European Union was limited to

⁹⁹ The ‘préalables’ were clearly stipulated in the recommendations of the December 2008 Inclusive Political Dialogue.

¹⁰⁰ Interviews of diplomats and donor representatives in Bangui, July 2011.

¹⁰¹ Comités Locaux de DDR (CLDDR) were set up by the regional UNDP offices of the project. The Government and politico-military groups requested that they be composed along the same lines as the DDR Steering Committee. They are presided by the Sous-Prefet, the vice-president is a member of a politico-military group, other members involve civil society, representatives of religious groups, etc. The CLDDR were intended to be the voice of the DDR Steering Committee on the ground, to pass on DDR information and messages to ex-combatants and communities.

¹⁰² The technology and methodology adopted for data collection and information management was suitable for such a large country with poor infrastructure, and is easily replicable. UNDP used a new methodology for handheld mobile data-gathering whereby the information went directly into a database which could be transferred directly to the capital Bangui. The tool was based on Android phones and open-source software. UNDP notes that it is easy to train people in this technology.

¹⁰³ In the DDR project document, total funding from the European Commission was assessed at US\$ 8,446,006, of which US\$ 7,592,944 (90 per cent) were to finance the FAO ‘reintegration’ project, and US\$ 853,062 to finance the Military Observers. CEMAC funding for the DDR was assessed at US\$ 12,652,000, of which US\$ 11,910,000 (94 per cent) were earmarked for reinsertion and reintegration, and US\$ 670,000 (6 per cent) as a contribution to the preparatory phase.

a project already planned with and executed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The CEMAC funds were directly provided to the CAR government under personal supervision from the President.

In a separate initiative complementary to the national DDR process, the World Bank prepared (2010) and commenced (mid-2011) a 'Community Development Project' under its Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (TDRP). The US\$ 8.6 million project, led by international NGOs, primarily targets conflict-affected communities throughout the northern provinces that have a high concentration of ex-combatant youths, youth associated with militia and banditry and youth-at-risk living among the population. However, the project is not linked to DDR and its inclusion of ex-combatants is widely considered to be a side-benefit as opposed to a purposeful targeted group of the programme.

1.3 PBF funding for DDR in CAR

Under the SSR component of CAR's Peacebuilding Priority Plan, the PBF contributed funding to two DDR projects. Managed through UNDP, the first project 'Support for the start-up of the DDR processor the sf TAR

1.4 Catalytic, relevance and sustainability of PBF funding

1.4.1 Adult DDR

PBF's contribution to the Adult DDR covered about two-thirds of UNDP's engagement and its activities in the preparatory phase of the DDR. The activities centered mainly on (a) building the institutional capacity necessary for designing, planning, steering and implementing the national DDR programme, (b) supporting the DDR Steering Committee put in place to oversee the DDR process, and (c) conducting all preparatory activities required prior to launching the operational DD phase, such as sensitization and public information campaigns.

Relevance

The PBF directly supported the implementation of the Libreville Peace Agreement, specifically at the beginning of the process-oriented preparatory phase of the DDR, when there were no other donors coming forward to fund the planning and preparations of DDR.

The meeting, which additionally signalled the launch of the DDR process, came at a time when there was a sense of urgency to get the DDR process underway: armed groups were becoming impatient, having already begun assembling under the early promises of DDR in the lead up to and included in the peace agreement; and there had been early hopes to complete the DDR before the elections. The rapid investment in the preparatory phase of the DDR had an early positive impact on security. Seeing the creation of the DDR Steering Committee and the sensitization and verification activities that followed raised hopes among ex-combatants that the DDR process would begin in earnest, which led to a reduction of violence in conflict areas, though spates of insecurity continued through to the lead up to the elections and until the DD component of the operations itself began.

The preparatory phase of the DDR process is also relevant to peacebuilding as the highest authorities of the politico-military groups were involved in the DDR planning, and the government and politico-military groups worked together in the DDR Steering Committee, which contributed to confidence-building between the parties and to the DDR process itself. Decisions of the DDR Steering Committee were met by consensus, meaning the government and politico-military leaders were continuously meeting and negotiating on forward-looking political and security matters. While these were important achievements, they should be understood within the context of the overall criticism of the DDR Steering Committee, which includes a lack of medium-term and long-term approaches, overt focus on operational details without addressing the larger issues, and a perceived disconnect between the representatives of politico-military movements and their military leaders on the ground.

Furthermore, the information and sensitization campaigns conducted as part of the PBF contributions helped build the confidence of, and engage the population living in, conflict-affected areas in the political process. Community members reportedly note that, for the first time in many years, they had seen government officials travel to their area. For them, this signalled a change that the government is taking an interest in their communities. Apart from the symbolic impact of the visits and the information provided on the upcoming DDR process, the sensitization campaigns provided a key forum for representatives of the government, politico-military groups and the population at large to discuss their perceptions of the peace process and the Inclusive Political Dialogue process.

Catalytic

This preparatory phase was considered process-catalytic as it enabled the rapid launch (and subsequent development) of a DDR process, a key element of the Libreville Peace Agreement. Further, the effect of announcing the availability of PBF funds was considerable as it enabled UNDP/BCPR to mobilize an additional financial contribution to the programme.

¹⁰⁵ UNDP/BCPR provided internal funds over US\$ 1.99 million later as of 2010, as described earlier.

¹⁰⁶ Interviews with diplomats and donor representatives in Bangui, July 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Interviews with diplomats and donor representatives in Bangui, July 2011.

In particular, the RECOPEs, have reported noticing a change in behaviour of parents as a result of the sensitization activities. For instance, there has been reportedly less domestic child abuse and fewer 'marriages précoces' of young girls (parents marrying underage daughters in order to earn the dowry). Furthermore, the RECOPEs, and the

- † There are serious doubts concerning the availability of sufficient funds to cover the reintegration of ex-combatants. Civil society groups warn that if the reintegration packages are not adequately generous or if national institutions such as the JPN are not well-enough capacitated, given the current atmosphere among the ex-combatants and their continued ties to their armed group's chain of command, the ex-combatants will return to or establish new armed groups.
- † At the time of research, the terms for the integration or recruitment of ex-combatants into the national defense or security forces had not been agreed, and senior figures in the Ministry of Defence do not ap-

2. Democratic

UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) took the immediate charge of minors and organized family reunification. The World Bank, within its Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP), supported the government financially for the programme, including the reintegration component of the PNDDR or “civic reinsertion” as it was known. The six-month civic reinsertion consisted of a resettlement allowance of US\$ 110 upon leaving the transit center and US\$ 25/month for up to one year as a transition allowance. Additionally, 54,000 of the 102,148 demobilized adults received other forms of socio-economic reintegration benefits such as in the area of micro-enterprises.

MONUSCO (initially as MONUC) further undertook DDRRR of the foreign nationals, seeing to their disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and resettlement back to their own country.

The narrow eligibility excluded a large number of ex-combatants, both foreign nationals and individuals who did not qualify for the national programme.¹²⁶ These individuals¹²⁷ were widely considered to still pose a significant threat to security. In 2010, at the request of the government and in collaboration with UNICEF and MONUSCO, UNDP thus led the reintegration of residual combatants in an 18-month Community Recovery and Reintegration Programme (CRRP). The CRRP adopted a community-based reintegration approach, whereby vulnerable members of the community received comparable support to that received by ex-combatants. The ratio, originally planned to be 50 per cent ex-combatants and 50 per cent other identified vulnerable groups was revised to be 70 per cent - 30 per cent respectively. In total the CRRP processed 4,378 combatants, while 4,031 combatants and 1,713 community members were beneficiaries of the socio-economic reintegration (total 5,744).

As the 2009 Ituri Peace Accord called for the support of wounded CNDP combatants, UNDP, in collaboration with MONUSCO, ICRC and the government, provided capacity support for the military hospital in Goma, funded the treatment of 265 wounded CNDP combatants and facilitated their integration into the FARDC or their respective demobilization and socio-economic reintegration over a 10-month period.

2.3 PBF support for DDR in the DRC

Under priority two of the PBF Priority Plan for the DRC, “Demobilization and community-based reintegration of combatants and high-risk groups¹²⁸”, the PBF allocated funds for three DDR-related activities: the CRRP, and the project supporting the war wounded and demobilization of residual ex-combatants.¹²⁹

¹²⁵ CONADER in particular but also the UE-PNDDR has been criticized for the management of DDR funds and for what many have perceived to be a too short and limited reinsertion programme. The UE-PNDDR further admitted the difficulty of implementing the reinsertion programme given the disparity in education and skills of the ex-combatants and the fact that implementing partners did not have the capacity and/or time to better tailor the programmes. Several ex-combatants are reported to have sold their reinsertion kits.

¹²⁶ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2010/512, 8 October 2010.

¹²⁷ The CRRP covered ex-combatants who were not eligible to the PNDDR programme. The term ‘residual combatants’ was coined after the declaration of the end of the Amani Leo process, which stipulated that the armed groups were all integrated/reintegrated. The estimation made in October 2010 speak of residual elements, but in the CRRP, the target groups was still called ex-combatants.

¹²⁸ The PBF Priority Plan covers the period September 2009-December 2011. The total envelope for the funding is US\$ 20 million, which is divided along the four priority outcome areas: 1. Improving security and civilian protection 2. Demobilization and reintegration of combatants and high-risk groups, 3. Extension of State authority; 4. Local peacebuilding and recovery. UN PBF Priority Plan for the Democratic Republic of Congo, PBF, pp.5-6 <www.unpbf.org/docs/DRC-Priority-Plan.pdf>.

¹²⁹ PBF-funded Projects: “Community Reintegration and Recovery Programme in eastern DRC (PBF/COD/B-1) of 2 February 2010 and “Support to War Wounded” (PBF/COD/B-2) of 6 April 2010.

Table 2 – PBF contribution to DDR in DRC

PROJECT TITLE	BUDGET (US\$)	TIMELINE (MM/YY)	UN AGENCIES
Community Reintegration and Recovery Programme in eastern DRC (PBF/COD/B-1)	4,405,342	02/10 – 06/11	UNDP
Support to War Wounded (PBF/COD/B-2)	228,962	04/10 -06/11	UNDP
DD of former Armed Groups residual (PBF-COD-B.4)	636 650	01/11 – 12/11	UNDP
Total	5,270,954		

The projected cost of the 18-month CRRP project was US\$ 18.6 million. PBF contributed US\$ 4.4 million to the project, which amounted to 24 per cent of the total cost for CRRP. UNDP’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) contributed US\$ 5 million (28 per cent). The project thus faced a shortfall of almost half of the projected budget (US\$ 9 million).

For the project supporting the war wounded, PBF provided US\$ 228,962. The PBF contribution amounted to 48 per cent of the total cost of almost half a million. MONUSCO, the government and the ICRC provided US\$ 18, 000, US\$ 160,000 and US\$ 61,000 respectively.

As of the time of the research, the “war wounded” project has been fully implemented and closed, while the “CRRP” project is nearly completed (70 per cent delivery rate). As to the demobilization of residual ex-combatant project, funds have been allocated but the project is not being implemented yet, due to ongoing discussions about the appropriate strategy.

The total calculation of PBF support provided to DDR in DRC is therefore US\$ 5.2 million, which comprises 26 per cent of PBF’s total engagement with the DRC (US\$ 20 million).

2.4 Catalytic, relevance and sustainability of PBF funding

2.4.1 CRRP

As noted above, the CRRP was designed to demobilize and reintegrate the residual combatants. The project also adopted a community-matching approach, meaning it provided equivalent assistance for 1,713 other vulnerable members of the community, such as high-risk youths and returnees (total caseload thus 5,744). Project activities included:

- † Sensitization activities to prepare communities for the return of the residual combatants;
- † Identification and preparation of the beneficiaries for their reinsertion/reintegration programmes, including placing the beneficiaries into community-based solidarity groups;
- † Market and employment studies; and
- † Training for the residual combatants on i) technical aspects of their chosen vocation, ii) management (iii) civic education and peaceful co-existence; provided beneficiaries with kits to help them start up their micro-enterprise.

The PBF contribution mainly covered the demobilization and orientation requirements of the ex-combatants and ex-police; however, the project itself set out to bolster five specific aspects of peacebuilding:

- † Identification of beneficiaries and socio-economic opportunities;
- † Social cohesion and conflict prevention;
- † Capacity-building of local authorities and community groups, in order to promote good governance;
- † Improved access to Social Services through the reconstruction of certain infrastructure in areas where there is a high level of ex-combatants and vulnerable community members; and
- †

3.3 PBF support for DDR in Nepal

DDR-related activities in Nepal are undertaken within two complementary funding arrangements. The government established the national multi-donor Nepal Peace Trust Fund in February 2007, as a collective financing and coordinating mechanism for peacebuilding. The DDR-related support from NPTF enabled the establishment of the basic infrastructure of 19 cantonment sites, and temporary shelters in 28 sites.

In March 2007, the UN established the UN Peacebuilding Fund for Nepal as a complementary instrument to the national trust fund. PBF funding is incorporated within the UNPFN structure and is the largest single funding contributor.

Table 2 –1 Tc 0.U/GS1 gs 15 0 0.Maroh[007,Cn2 T(5.76T) 0.0576.32>> Blar352.08T452.88Tfes in Nep050,(Cn2 T)37.65

cent) of the VMLR in the cantonment sites were children below the age of 18 at the time of their initial verification of which 30 per cent were girls or young women. Therefore, the DDR of VMLR required that particular attention be given to child- and gender-specific needs. As highlighted in table 2, PBF projects focused on the discharge of

ernment and Maoist Party imposed several restrictions on the rehabilitation of VMLR. These restrictions included

