End of Project Evaluation Report: Women and Girls as Drivers of Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization

January, 2019

This evaluation was conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic from August to December, 2018 with field research in November and December, 2018 as commissioned by UNFPA, the lead agency for the project, *Women and Girls as Drivers of Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization*, by:

Team Leader: Meghan McCormack   Field Leader: Baktygul Kapalova
Field Researcher: Azamat Bakiev   Field Assistant: Kyzzhybek Nurbekova

The team benefited from advising and counsel from Frauke de Weijer, Associate Consultant to PeaceNexus Foundation, in completing the evaluation. De Weijer's guidance was instrumental in surfacing underlying project theories of change, formulating the initial evaluation matrix, and providing guidance and commentary at all major stages of the evaluation, including by reviewing the research tools, sampling frame, and draft report. The evaluation team is deeply indebted to her generous support and guidance.

List of Acronyms

CPP	Crime Prevention Plan
CRRS	Center on the Religious Situation of the Kyrgyz Republic
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

These methods - i.e. the development of community cohesion and trust as a method of preventing radicalization - have a basis in global peacebuilding and radicalization prevention efforts as well as in social cohesion literature, which indicates that dense, voluntary, and high-quality interactions among citizens can improve their mutual trust, shared values, and with it their sense of civic integration (i.e. connection to their communities and nations). Feedback from p

Overall project impact could have been heightened by improved coordination, monitoring, and exit planning. Indeed, though this project had better coordination than most and incorporated meaningful strategies for team learning, the impact of implementers' lack of agreement on fundamental project concepts, timelines, and methods could clearly be seen in the on-the-ground results in target communities. A lack of clear exit planning also undermines the foreseeable sustainability of the (significant) gains made, though this adverse impact is somewhat mitigated

This evaluation was structured around the updated theories of changes presented above, seeking to assess the relevance and efficacy of the logic that was used for actual project implementation as opposed to that encapsulated in the initial Theory of Change from the Project Document.

Project Context

The Project took place from January, 2017 to December, 2018 in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The Kyrgyz Republic is a nation of approximately 6 million citizens, located in Central Asia and a prior member of the Soviet Union up until declaring independence in 1991. After becoming an independent state, Kyrgyzstan "witnessed a considerable religious revival…. the number of new madrasas and other religious educational initiatives skyrocketed, and public manifestations of religiosity became visible" (Maksutova 2017: 16). Some 80% of the country's population now identifies as Muslim, with the remaining plurality following Russian Orthodoxy and a mix of other faiths (Protestantism, Buddhism, etc).

Though the State took a relatively tolerant and laissez-faire approach to this growing religiosity on its territory over the 1990's and early 2000's, terrorist activities both foreign and domestic prompted a re-orientation of State policy and attempts at greater control, continuing into the present (Malikov 2010). Thus while freedom of religion and religious expression are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, the government takes an active role in regulating religious organizations on its territory. In 2006, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic enacted the State Policy in the Sphere of Religion, by which the Hanafi madhhab and Russian Orthodox Church were recognized as being core in state-religion relations (Maksutova 2017). In 2009, the "Law on Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations" was adopted, putting in place significant restrictions on the activities of religious organizations, including the requirement that all religious organizations register with (and be approved by) the government's State Committee on Religious Affairs (SCRA) and the explicit banning of some religious organization for extremist ideologies. Under current legislation, individuals can be imprisoned based on mere possession of materials espousing the ideology of one of these banned groups - a context that underlies much of the knowledge and awareness building of the project being evaluated here. Notably, while these banned organizations include foreign-based groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, other groups such as Jannat are Central Asian-based and focus not so much on foreign fighting but on establishing a Halifat on the territory of Central Asia.

In the time immediately preceding the drafting of the project proposal for *Women and Girls as Drivers of Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization* in 2016, significant numbers of Central Asian citizens were travelling abroad to join violent extremist organizations - with estimates ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 in the period from 2012 to 2015 (Spekhard 2017). Of particular concern to the Kyrgyzstani government was the rising portion of women joining these outflows, reaching some 23% by 2016 (ibid). The combination of a focus on preventing violent extremism and working with women specifically as presented by this project was timely, given the rising trend of Kyrgyzstani women leaving for battlegrounds.

As will be discussed more in the section on "relevance", poverty, economic inequality, and government repression have all been theorized as "push" factors - or contributing conditions - to individuals' radicalization to violent extremist ideologies. Though Kyrgyzstan has seen significant economic improvements since the crash of the Soviet Union and remains t(d)-15420049>14004C}TJETnd 2(23)

9

urban centers and externally to foreign countries - most prominently Russia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan - a phenomenon that some link to youth exposure to violent extremist ideologies (see, e.g. Tucker 2015; Elshimi et. al. 2018; but see Nasritdinov 2017 for counter arguments).[1] The portion of women taking part in foreign labor migration from Kyrgyzstan has been consistently high, with 58% of labour migrants being women as of 2000 and 60% as of 2017 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2017: 26).

Though Kyrgyzstan has by and large avoided the politically-oriented repression of citizens that some of its neighbors engage in, problems of corruption and human rights violations remain - with implications for the rule of law and the prevention of violent extremism. Police torture of suspects is notoriously widespread (see e.g. OSCE 2012; UN CAT 2013; Open Society Foundations 2015), which researchers have noted is motivated not so much by political repression as by the desire for bribes and a constraining quota-based performance system for law enforcement officers - as such, arrestees are given the choice to pay a bribe, confess (thereby helping officers meet their quotas), or endure more torture (OSCE 2012; Open Society Foundations 2015; Baijumanova 2016). This phenomenon is not a mere abstraction when it comes to the project in question: during the evaluation interviews, one project participant recounted how his/her son was imprisoned and tortured for 1.5 months by local police, who requested a bribe of $10,000 for his/her son's release.[2] The participant had not joined the project's initiatives to improve local police officers

State Personnel Service of the KR, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Healthcare). CRRS also conducted the initial baseline research that provided an implementing frame for much of the rest of the project.

Geographic context and boundaries: Project activities were conducted 16 neighborhoods located in five of the nation's seven provinces and in its two main cities, Bishkek and Osh. Below we indicate these locations, though without naming the sub-neighborhoods and villages in which project activities were based:

1. Batken Province
    a.

Committee on Religious Affairs. At the local level, key partners included local self-government authorities, members of the local police (uchastkovii), duty bearers, and women religious leaders.

Implementation status: As of the writing of this report, all components of the project were completed. W o6(W)-33 3ec T 1 72.024 60 were

Evaluation Purpose, Objectives, and Scope

Notes on Terminology and Definitions

Prior to discussing the evaluation purpose, it is worthwhile to lay out a few key definitions and understandings developed by the evaluation team during the literature review, used to frame and implement field research, and deployed throughout this report.

<u>Religious</u> radicalization: During the evaluation and in this report we use the terms "religious radicalization" and "religious extremism". Some project partners oppose the inclusion of the word "religious" in the above terms, noting that the violent actions taken by, for example, ISIS, do not represent 'true' or 'correct' interpretations of Islam. This may be true. But the use of phrases like "religious radicalization" do not imply that the religious interpretation being proffered as a justification for violence is 'correct' - to the extent that there is any 'correct' or 'incorrect' way to understand various faith traditions or religions. Rather, it is a clarification that the "interpretive framing and narrative encoding of conflict and violence" (Brubaker 2002: 174) being deployed by the extremist groups in question is (i) based on a reference to religion, (ii) an attempt to use religion to concretize group identity, (iii) and to thereby motivate violent action.

Key here is the fact that, by definition, violent extremist groups operate by establishing an 'in' group and justifying violence against those who do not belong to the group (see, e.g. Doosje et. al. 2016). The way in which members of a violent extremist group determine who is 'in' and who is 'out' typifies the group's ideological basis, be it ethno-national, racist, religious, single-issue, political, and so on and so forth (note also that these bases often overlap, as in Nazi-fascism's intermixing of racist and political bases for 'in' group identification). To say that a group promotes religious extremism is to say that it defines its 'in' members (and 'out' members) on the basis of their adherence (or lack thereof) to the group's own religious interpretations, justifying extreme actions against those who do not believe - or at least do not externally profess belief in - the religious ideology being proffered. Whether the underlying religious interpretation is textually accurate or even whether leaders of violent extremist groups truly believe in their interpretation or are cynically deploying it for political or personal ends is, terminology-wise, beside the point. What is relevant is that the ideology being used to engender group meaning and action is framed in terms of religion.

This project worked with women and girls of "conservative" religious outlooks - and explicitly those of the Muslim faith (as opposed to the myriad of other faiths practiced in Kyrgyzstan) - reflecting its core goal of creating resilience to certain schools of *religious* thought and specifically to some sub-

extremism" reflect an implicit assumption that the 'true' orientation of the project toward the prevention of interpretations of Islam that promote violence is so obvious that no further clarification is needed - as assumption that shows an underlying essentialization of radicalization as religious and that obfuscates the possibility that there may be other, non-

Evaluation Purpose

This evaluation provides a final independent assessment of the project *Women and Girls as Drivers for Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization* at the completion of project activities. The evaluation is being conducted pursuant to the requirements of the monitoring and evaluation plan articulated in the original Project Document, approved by the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in late 2016.

The observations provided herein are intended for staff of the participating UN agencies, implementing partners, the donor, and other relevant project stakeholders. For these audiences, information related to the effectiveness of their project design, theory, and implementation; their methods of coordination; and the impact of their efforts on beneficiary communities are needed to inform ongoing work and assess progress already made. Other development organizations that seek to prevent religious radicalization – and particularly that of women and girls – may also find the information in this report useful when considering the design and implementation of their own strategies.

The main findings and recommendations from this report were shared with the Kyrgyz Republic PBSO Secretariat, UN agency implementers and their implementing partners on December 18, 2018 in an initial presentation, with the first draft of this report shared on December 20, 2018. This final report provides further rationale, data, and detail on those findings and recommendations. It is intended to be read by all of the relevant audiences list

Evaluation Scope

The scope of the evaluation is as outlined in the Terms of Reference, and follows the "key evaluation questions" listed therein, with modifications and additions as agreed upon at the evaluation inception workshop on September 4, 2018 and documented in the Evaluation Matrix. These are provided in Annexes 4 and 1, respectively. As reflected in the Evaluation Matrix, the criteria chosen for this evaluation include relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coordination, and sustainability.

Integration of Gender Equality and Human Rights Orientation: as recognition of the importance of gender equality and human rights mainstreaming has spread throughout the development community, they have gained notable importance in monitoring and evaluating UN activities (UNEG 2014). This evaluation has incorporated GE and HR principles in the following ways:

> Where possible, disaggregated data by age, gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, religious orientation, and other identity-markers relevant for the project has been sought in project documentation, literature consulted, and via the research tools used in this evaluation. Though priority has been put on gathering such information, care has been taken to avoid the marginalization and harm that can come from labelling and targeting individuals for their membership in minority or disadvantaged groups. As such, research instruments used in this evaluation do not ask about participants' ethnicity and socio-economic status, while all questions relating to self-identification with religious beliefs are optional;

> The evaluation process has been inclusive, participatory, and has sought to incorporate and prioritize the perspectives of stakeholder and beneficiaries from marginalized and disadvantaged groups wherever possible. This has entailed careful consideration of how to find and invite respondents to take part in the evaluation, of creating conditions conducive to their participation (comfortable accommodations, meeting where and when feasible for participants, and including remote intervention communities in the evaluation).

> Specific evaluation questions related to GE and HR concerns have been incorporated into the Evaluation Matrix and were explored through all phases of the evaluation. These questions developed in reference to the guidance provided in the UN Evaluation Group's *Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations* (2014: 76 – 80).

Evaluation Methodology

Description of Methodology

A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods were used to explore the achievement of project outputs, outcomes, and goals within 9 of the 16 target communities. The launch point for all of the methodology was the Evaluation Matrix, jointly agreed upon by the evaluation team and all key stakeholders, which was used both to track data sources used for each question and was also the basis for developing all field tools and research instruments. These instruments are included in the annexes as is the evaluation matrix, allowing for easy tie-out across each of theation, literatu

17

English, Kyrgyz, and Russian. Translation of all research instruments was conducted directly by the field research team and reviewed by the Team Leader.

For field research, key respondents were identified at the national level, oblast / district level, and local level. Once key groups of respondents were identified, implementing partners and UN agencies were contacted to share relevant contacts and the field research team attempted to contact a randomly selected subset of participants from each evaluation community (to better

The logic of this criterium is the same as that of #1, namely that if individual(s) inJETs) inJETs) inJI

Data Quality Measures

Efforts to ensure data quality were taken before, during, and after field work. Pre-field preparations included joint workshop sessions with the full evaluation team to review research instruments, ensure understanding of all questions and reasons for their inclusion, and to improve translations and terms as needed. A 3-day pilot of all research instruments was conducted in a community in Bishkek in mid-November, on the basis of which key terms and translations of them were further elaborated and improved, again jointly by the full field research team in a 1-day post-pilot workshop. Field researchers were additionally provided with interviewing instructions, training on research ethics and potential challenges in the field, and handouts to provide to respondents on key terms (radicalization, marginalization, etc.) should such clarification be needed and useful. As previously described, all research instruments were structured to provide data triangulation opportunities across different components of the project.

During the field research, team members travelled together for reasons of safety and to improve data quality. Field researchers were able to mutually support one another and comment on improved interviewing method

counteract these risks somewhat through their patient delving and digging into the content of responses during interviews and focus group discussions.

Meanwhile, the evaluation team was either not able to or had difficulty connecting with some key groups of respondents, impacting our ability to evaluate the work conducted with these groups:

Women participants in Mutakallim's trainings and other events. A large minority of the Mutakallim-supplied phone numbers of women religious leaders and other program participants were either out of service or turned off for all of the times that the field team tried calling (generally, at least 4 call attempts were made over the course of several days before a potential interviewee was removed from the list of possible evaluation participants). Those participants who did respond to our calls were frequently those who had also taken part in FTI's programming. As such, the majority of interviewees for our evaluation of Outcome 1 results had participated both in Mutakallim's and in FTI's work (~85% of all women religious leader respondents); some 10% had take part only in FTI's work and 5% only in Mutakallim's work.

This resulted in several evaluative limitations. First, given that Mutakallim worked with many more women than FTI, the over-representation of FTI in the evaluation sample presumably skews the data away from de facto results (e.g. we do not have particularly representative data for the relatively high number of women who took part in Mutakallim programming alone). Second, the fact that the majority of evaluation respondents had taken part in both Mutakallim's and FTI's (topically similar) programming makes it difficult to tease out which efforts were the most successful and which may need to be reconsidered. As such, the results for Outcome 1 discussed in the "Findings" section are understood by the evaluation team to represent the joint efforts of FTI and Mutakallim, though FTI's influence is likely to be somewhat over-represented.

Journalists who took part in a UNDP training. Some 30 were invited to take part in an online questionnaire about the training they received but only 1 responded. We thus do not include an assessment of the journalism training in th0 g2 320.45 oC↓1@003>134@052↓3@049>4@003

22

secured such a letter and provided it to the evaluation team in support of their work. As is, the data collected from police on these programming elements is thin.

Wherever possible, we tried to overcome data shortages resulting from the somewhat low participation of the groups noted above (or difficulties in contacting members of those groups) by triangulating across other respondent groups. In some cases - such as that of the journalists - this was not possible, and so no evaluation is included.

A final limitation of this evaluation is its timing: being conducted immediately after the conclusion of project activities, this evaluation cannot assess with any measure of confidence the sustainability of the project's efforts nor the project's possible impact on the long-term processes that it sought to influence. Thus while we include some brief reflections on each project element's sustainability and on the project's overall effectiveness in increasing women's and girls' resilience to religious radicalization leading to violent extremism (the overall impact sought), project implementers could benefit from a more rigorous assessment of these aspects in a 3 to 5 year timeframe.

Findings

This section details the evaluation team's findings in relation to the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coordination, and sustainability of the project, *Women and Girls as Drivers for Peace and the Prevention of Radicalization*. As is covered in the sub-sections below, this project was broadly relevant to the challenge of preventing women's and girls' religious radicalization in the Kyrgyz Repubnat 77b[(an)3(165G[(e)13(f)-oj)-ti0(cov)165G-80(i)3(165Gso)5(n)13 77bdo5(ad)3(ind3G6n)13 77

That unemployed middle aged men of moderate education would be susceptible to violent extremist ideologies makes sense in the context of literature on religious radicalization. As will be covered in more depth below, numerous studies have identified individuals' loss of a sense of personal meaning and a feeling of social or moral injustice as a common context for their initial turn to radical ideas. Men in their 30's, 40's, and 50's in the Kyrgyz Republic face the burdens of high expectations to provide materially for their families, a tight and rapidly changing emp

improve economic opportunity, political inclusiveness, and the rule of law - all in the hopes of creating a context where individuals can find more meaning in their lives and paths to personal success without turning to violent extremist ideologies. In its breadth and generality, UNDP's approach is to a certain extent and endorsement of "development work as usual" as a PVE model, applying long-standing strategies to the prevention of violent extremism. At the same time, its publications advocate in no uncertain terms for tailoring programming to the specific sensitivities involved in VE prevention and to understanding the unique local context in which VE occurs in a given country rather than putting a PVE label on untailored development work (ibid).

Of note for the upcoming discussion on project methods, in its 2018 stock-taking on the effectiveness of the "building block" strategy, UNDP highlighted as core learnings that there was greater need to understand "why some communities are more vulnerable than others, and the factors that contribute to resilience and *social cohesion*" (2018: 15 emphasis added). They further emphasise that development work conducted from 2016 to 2018 revealed that most violent extremism is motivated by 'positive' concepts (e.g. ending social injustice, supporting group members, etc.) rather than a self-propelled desire to do vio.024

learnings they gained and service they did to their communities gave them a newfound sense of meaning and purpose;

In these ways, the project could be said to embody findings from social cohesion literature on successful methods for promoting mutually beneficial cohesion.

Much of this project's work also focused on giving women and girls a shared set of values and moral compass in relation to specific rights topics - among them the rejection of extremist ideologies, prevention of early marriage, and promotion of "good" behavior as family members (community members made frequent mention of project events on being a good daughter in law and a good mother in law, i.e. training individuals on social and familial values and modes of being). This work is, on one hand, very much in line with social cohesion approaches in that it heightens in-group identification by creating shared, mutually expressed values. At the same time, Larsen's (2013) and Cheong's (2007) critiques of social cohesion approaches and the potential downsides of 'group think' are worth bearing in mind.[5] This project appears to have balanced the tension between teaching tolerance as a means of preventing violent extremism while simultaneously labelling violent extremist ideologies as wrong, but it is nevertheless a balance that needs to be constantly assessed and re-assessed through programmatic work to avoid overly-constraining conceptions of "right" values.

To the extent that enhanced social cohesion directly supports individuals' resilience to radicalization - a theory with good support - the above project methods can already be said to have positive theoretical implications for increasing resilience to radicalization in the target communities. At the same time, some additional observations can be made using Doosje's radicalization and resilience model and UNDP's "building blocks":

made here in terms of isolation not so much being a risk factor for radicalization as a sign that it is already in process;

Providing community members - and particularly women religious leaders and duty bearers - with the information and motivation to proactively play positive roles in their communities can support them in overcoming moments of personal uncertainty and internal crisis

Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
0	1,320 women and girls	5,471 women and girls
Outcome Indicator 1b. Percentage of capacitated women and girls who provide professional advice and engage local authorities on the prevention of violent extremism.		
Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
0	50% (at least 114 women and girls)	131 women and girls

Theory of Change, Outcome 1:

> IF: female religious leaders have more knowledge and awareness on women's rights and tolerance; on the presence and risks of radical groups; have strengthened critical thinking skills; feel more integrated into society and empowered to dialogue with duty bearers; and know how to recognize vulnerable individuals (women and girls) and to empower them and address their vulnerabilities:

> THEN: girls and women in the communities will be more resilient to radicalisation and violent extremism:

> BECAUSE: the trained female religious leaders will feel a stronger sense for and belonging to the community and will therefore raise awareness among girls and women in the communities on the presence and risks of radical groups, and will proactively aim to reduce the vulnerabilities of the vulnerable groups including through engaging them in community initiatives.

Part 1: Achievement of "IF" statement

Knowledge and awareness of women's rights and tolerance:

Women religious leaders gave themselves a 4.8 (out of 5) in terms of having learned concepts of women's rights and tolerance. We discuss below those women's rights and tolerance topics that were clearly internalized plus some areas where there is room for improvement.

Women's rights: The Project transformed women religious leaders' conception of their own rights as well as their perspectives on early marriage. Many women religious leaders (WRLs) described, with apparent surprise, the lesson that, "Muslim women's rights are the same as all women's rights" (A1: 1). Several were surprised that the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic both guarantees women's rights and is equally applicable to religious and non-religious women. Several women who previously had not interacted with state bodies to protect their rights were motivated by the trainings and, with the support of local project coordinators, secured their rights. In one such woman's words:

> The trainings on rights impacted my life enormously. I learned my rights, applied to get

ourselves. We used to think that because we're Muslim, we're lower, we can't go outside" (Community AC FGD: 2). As is notable from the above quotations, the trainings were particularly helpful in supporting women who had thought that their religious beliefs were a bar to their state-guaranteed rights.

One women's rights topic stands out in terms of awareness and improvement is that of **early marriage**. Significant training time and multiple messaging forms were used to communicate the detriments of early marriage, resulting in palpable progress on this issue. These messaging platforms included organized lessons with gynecologists, doctors, and social services specialists plus interactive forum-theaters that brought out emotional, personal responses to the topic. In one of the most successful examples of women's rights work that was inspired by this Project, one woman religious leader described how in her community, "we ended early marriages. The kaziyat, police and doctors started to work together and stopped it. I wonder to myself why we didn't do this work ourselves earlier" (A1: 8). Discussions with community members confirmed her claim that they had managed to stop early marriages it this location.

Discussion of women religious leaders' community initiatives to end early marriages and their impact is included under discussion of the effectiveness of the "because" elements of the Theory of Change.

Tolerance: Women religious leaders by and large said that they had learned important lessons about the concept of tolerance. Looking more deeply into their conceptualizations of tolerance, however, reveals both meaningful progress made and the need for continued work on how they translate "tolerance" into their daily lives.

In terms of progress made, quite a few women religious leaders discussed their openness to talking with people of other faiths and backgrounds, particularly in their own communities. Highlighting a few of these comments:

> We have to be open not just to one religion, but to give space to all religions - that's what we started to believe [from the trainings]. (A8: 1).

> We had never heard the idea of tolerance before…. We were taught religious tolerance. We hadn't known that the government was tolerant of religions…. Religious tolerance, geographic tolerance, we didn't know about this. For example, sometimes people come from the village and we look down on them, "You're provincial, I'm from the city" we say; or take youth and elders, old people and young people, we need to respect one another. Treat everyone the same, be tolerant - that's what they taught us (A7: 2).

> We should be tolerant, this is what Islam says, we should all be united. The trainings taught us this. We used to have secular women, teachers sit on one side and we [covered] women sitting on the other. They used to call us a "second sort", we were below them. Those with a religious education are a second sort they'd say. But our path is one. We taught them. We are all the same. (Community AC FGD: 6).

These comments reveal marked progress from the first Women's Leadership School, after which organizers noted that:

... participants' internal beliefs (especially religious to ...

37

Indeed, academic and development literature suggests that there may not simply be a lack of

When I go to festivals, I try to teach people what I learned. For example, I'll ask women, 'Do you refuse to go to the doctor, to show your mouth to a man, to show your body to a man? You

run from that, I think. I know I do. So why aren't you letting your daughters go to school? Why aren't you sending them to become dentists, gynecologists?' And now covered women have started sending their daughters to school. Everything starts with baby steps. (A23: 2).

This problem of religious women declining to visit doctors and dentists had indeed been noted by project implementers, who relayed to the evaluation team how some women refused to be in a room alone with a male doctor or even dentist. Though the project team approach had been sensitivity trainings for doctors -

Even if my trust in government is small, it started to appear [after this project]. After we started working, giving others help, we realized that we're not indifferent…. We started to feel some patriotic spirit. And [local government officials] also started to believe in us more…. We help them with education problems [when parents stop sending their children to school]. (A23: 2).

[I learned that] we need to participate in our communities both in the interest of the people and the interest of the government…. I trust local authorities now. We started going to them after the project to ask for help, to tell them about the work we're doing. They don't discriminate against religious women - though there are problems with hiring [i.e. discriminatory non-hiring of women who wear hijab] (A13: 4).

Ultimately, the creation of a bridge between women religious leaders and local government authorities led to direct benefits of trust, social integration, and furthered goals of improving vulnerable women's and girls' access to public benefits.

Positive feelings toward the national government were somewhat more attenuated. In one indicative statement, a woman religious leader notes:

"If we're talking about State officials, I don't trust them. But on the local level, yes. There were improvements" (A3: 4).

radicalize from the impersonal screens of their computers (Swann et. al. 2012; Doosje et. al. 2016; UNDP 2018). At the same time, numerous studies have identified social isolation as a stage in the *process* of radicalization, generally once an individual has already internalized a group's radical messages - a process facilitated by personal networks - and has started cutting ties with previous social circles (e.g. Doosje et. al. 2016; Swann et. al. 2012). Individuals who isolate themselves in these ways are thus not so much at risk of being radicalized as much as they are already well down the path. In communities where radical and extremist groups have many members - including some of the intervention communities for this Project - social isolation can, on the contrary, be a protective factor from radicalization, insulating potential recruits from prevailing norms and ties that would pull them toward extremism (ibid; Macaluso 2016; Radicalization Awareness Network 2017). Of note here is the observation that radicalization rarely happens in isolation and is often associated with finding one's identity within and merged with a group, a process that usually involves at least some human contact (Moghaddam et. al., 2016; Swann et. al., 2012; Bjorgo 2011).

In sum, future work on these topics would benefit from more developed review of relevant literature and robust conceptualization prior to being deployed in project work. Key issues that need to be unpacked include understandings of "marginalization" (it is a highly contested and amorphous concept in academia, one that leaves much opportunity for reflection and adaptation to local context) and the ways in which marginalization or underlying theories of it are deployed to explain radicalization (and whether those theories have a strong basis in PVE and radicalization literature). Given their work in this project, the implementing team has the knowledge and awareness of on-the-ground conditions to think critically about existing frameworks and theories and generate meaningful insights on both of these topics.

At the same time, project implementers need to be careful when they adjust training approaches mid-course. Implementers seem to have recognized that the messages about marginalization

introverted behavior - a model that is perhaps better left out of future programming or fundamentally rethought.

Women religious leaders gave themselves a 4.4 in terms of conducting preventative work to raise awareness among women and girls in their communities about the presence and risks of radical groups. The pitfalls of trainings on "risks" has already been discussed and will not be revisited here. In terms of raising awareness on the presence of radical groups, women religious leaders successfully communicated their learnings to members of their communities in several locations.

told [the local policeman] and he told me, "Eje, don't let anyone in [to teach classes in your madrassa], check everyday." They might leave a book or propaganda or a paper [in the madrassa], so I check every day [for these things].... Their goal is to break the government, to start a Halifat…. We are very strongly against them. We are Hanafi." (A25: 5).

As these quotations suggest, banned ideologies are indeed present and actively being promoted

extremist groups and provide an early warning system, as parents will have better knowledge of "what their kids are doing."

This theory has some grounding in PVE literature (see, e.g. Pels and Doret 2012; Doosje et. al. 2015; Radicalization Awareness Network 2017), which in turn suggests that the PVE impact of such parent-child interventions could be strengthened by (i) thinking about the roles of and incorporating other family members (e.g. grandparents, brothers, sisters, and others - all of whom may play and important role in radicalization and de-radicalization processes) and (ii) providing factual information to parents, other family members, and children around laws and punishments related to extremism (Radicalization Awareness Network 2017). Given the demonstrated effectiveness of the trainings to WRLs on knowledge and awareness of the presence of radical groups - and the legal implications of joining one - implementing partners could re-work their materials for a teen audience and structure parent-child interventions around these PVE topics in addition to issues like early marriage to heighten the PVE impact of such approaches.

Discussion of Effectiveness - Media Campaign

Outcome 1 included a media campaign intended to change stereotypes between secular and religious members of society and thereby increase tolerance. As encapsulated in Output Indicator 1.2.3, these media products were intended to be "developed by capacitated women and NGO project partners" to raise awareness. At the Inception Workshop, project partners and the evaluation team elaborated the following Theory of Change to further clarify the project logic:

> IF media products related to the prevention of violent extremism – i.e. products that provide alternative narratives, question stereotypes related to religious and secular groups, and provide women and girls with positive leadership role-models – are produced and distributed to a wide audience:
>
> THEN girls and women in the communities will become more resilient to radicalization and violent extremism:
>
> BECAUSE the public – including girls and women – will better understand the risks and process of radicalization, there will more tolerance between religious and secular members of society, and sense of greater connection among women and girls of religious (and secular) backgrounds to their communities and nation.

Overall, some 65 materials were produced - 10 brief videos intended primarily for social media, 5 TV series, and 50 articles - along with a training for journalists on PVE sensitivity. Unfortunately, only 1 of the roughly 20 journalists contacted to take part in this evaluation responded. Given the small sample size, we do not include an assessment of the journalism training in this report.

In terms of the other BCC products, upwards of 65% of the women religious leaders had seen them and 95% of those who had seen them believed they were both effective and needed. Though few community initiative participants mentioned the videos, in one location a respondent noted:

Of note here is that while the videos were roundly described as useful by women religious leaders, that use seems to have been distinct from the one envisioned by the project team: though the media products were originally envisioned as a means to break down stereotypes across secular and religious groups of society, their distribution primarily to those of strong faith backgrounds and content focusing primarily on overcoming stereotypes about Muslim people appear to have resulted more in the breakdown of stereotypes *within* these groups of strong believers (e.g. dismantling stereotypes about what it means to be Muslim, such as the belief that women who wear hijab cannot exercise in public). While this is a beneficial outcome - particularly in terms of women's rights - some members of the project team stated in evaluation interviews that they wished there had been additional content to help people of strong faith backgrounds overcome stereotypes about secular people, thereby creating a two way street in terms of tolerance-building.

Though the evaluation team was not able to assess the effectiveness of the media campaign in changing widespread beliefs and perceptions (an assessment that would have required a baseline and a control group), we were able to see that the videos on social media (YouTube) had been viewed anywhere from a high 6,588 times - a video about a young woman wearing her hijab - to a low of 194 times - a video about being respectful of others on public transport - as of the time of drafting this report (Decem6(ng)300912 .270q0.00000912 0 612 792 rer t 208( )10( )nott Apr1rto see

> Respondent 3: During the election campaiging, we all met up and when the local council members came out we told them - our neighborhood is muddy, dirty, help us get the mud off our street. And the candidates cleaned it up. We don't have a block leader (*kvartalnii*), so we got together and asked the candidates to put in drainage pipes, and they did. It's been really useful. ------ [the WRL] organizes us. (8)

In location AB, women community members described similar political organizing, saying,

> We organize meetings for our local deputies. Deputy ----- ----- of the national parliament has come to these meetings quite a few times, especially during Ramadan, the mayor and social worker always take part, we tell them about our challenges. We tell the social worker about women from our neighborhood who aren't working, who are having hard lives. We're doing this. (3)

This progress in women's political participation was not an explicit target of the project and is all the more remarkable in that many of the speakers are from the Uzbek ethnic minority, a group that largely withdrew from political processes in the wake of ethnic violence in 2010. These successes suggest that there is latent, untapped potential to increase women's political participation through on-the-ground programming oriented around rights-awareness, concepts of social responsibility, and network-building. While a common refrain is that local "mentality" undermines issues-based politics and local public service, these women's efforts suggest that such barriers can be overcome and in a relatively short (24 month) timeline.

Effectiveness: Outcome 2

> *Outcome 2: Law enforcement institutions, local authorities, legal aid providers, and social workers engage women and girls at risk of violent extremism in dialogue to ensure access to public services.*

Given that efforts to achieve Outcome 2 were split across 3 UN agencies and their implementing partners - and implemented in relative isolation from one another - we explore each sub-component on its own terms below.

Component 1: Duty Bearer Services

UN Agency Partner: UNICEF
Implementing Partner: Center for Research on the Religious Situation of the Kyrgyz Republic (CRRS)
Achievement of Indicators in the Joint Monitoring Plan (JMP):

Outcome Indicator 2a. Perception of women and girls from target groups on public services access in communities is improved.		
Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
See chart in discussion	Awareness, availability, and quality of duty bearer services - 10% increase	Targets appear to have been met in all relevant categories, though data

section below		challenges do not allow for to full assessment
Outcome Indicator 2b. Number of capacitated select … local authorities … and social workers who provide social protection support and assistance.		
Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
0	128 social workers, local self-government bodies, teachers, school administration, healthcare workers	301
Output Indicator 2.1.1. Number of successful cases on social protection of women and girls at risk to violent extremism (e.g. obtaining social allowances and enrolling children in school).		
Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
0	64 (4 cases per community)	64 (4 cases per community)

Discussion of Effectiveness - Indicators:

As shown in the table aboveMCID0 0 1 225.53 44(ou26u4(ov[(t(s)y0.98 0. 0 0 1 72.024 430.87 Tm 72.02ar152

With all of that said, quantitative gains in awareness and access are visible in the categories for which somewhat comparable data is available (pension benefits, social welfare, and social services):

Particularly in the area of social services, evaluation participants had markedly higher awareness and access than baseline study participants.

"Satisfaction" was measured differently across the baseline and post-project evaluation, with the baseline using a general "satisfaction" percentage while

For the evaluation, satisfaction was rated on a 1 to 5 scale and asked in relation to satisfaction with relevant duty bearers and opposed to with each category of services (this was an attempt to distinguish perceptions of the professionals themselves from intervening factors such as dislike of legal frameworks or benefit requirements. For example, someone may be satisfied with their social welfare agent but dissatisfied with the legal framework on social benefits; we aimed to gage

evaluation team conducted focus group discussions that brought together social workers, doctors, teachers, and social welfare agents (among others) to talk about what they had learned through the project trainings and how they were using their new knowledge.

Duty bearers noted that they learned new methods of building trust and communicating with local citizens, skills that they had known themselves to be lacking:

> The training was about how to help disadvantaged families, how to build trust as a government employee with people of all different ethnic backgrounds. Do they trust us? Do they not trust us? … We hadn't really done this kind of work before (Duty Bearer FGD, Location AC: 1).

> Once we started to run around, really give help [after the trainings], people started trusting

To better understand the extent to which the positive changes that duty bearers felt in themselves were experienced by end beneficiaries in their communities, we asked women religious leaders about their perceptions of duty bearer services and conducted a survey with both direct

In terms of decreasing experiences of discrimination, of the 95 respondents to the quantitative

		48% rate sensitivity as high
Outcome Indicator 2b. Number of capacitated select law enforcement individuals ... who provide social protection support and assistance.		
Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
0	At least 250 internal affairs officers [engaged in] community policing work	235 (18 women) police officers capacitated on PVE
Output Indicator 2.1.2. Number of dialogue platforms and the number of adopted PVE action plans that engage women and girls facilitated by local administrations and law enforcement agencies.		
Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
0	16 plans (1 per community)[6] *No target for dialogue platforms provided*	14 CPPs drafted (1 per community) On dialogue platforms: 16 conducted with 236 participants (103 women)

As shown in the table above, all relevant quantitative metrics were achieved. To assess community members' awareness of, access to, and assessment of the quality of security services at the time of evaluation, the evaluation team distributed a quantitative survey with relevant questions to 95 individuals in the target locations. These individuals were both direct recipients of duty bearer services (31 respondents) and participants in women religious leaders' community initiatives (64 respondents). This data was compared with quantitative metrics on the awareness, access, and quality assessment of duty bearer services that had been backed out from qualitative research conducted for the baseline study in early 2017. The table below shows changes in respondent awareness and use of law enforcement services between the baseline and evaluation:

---

[6] Note that this target of 16 CPPs, though included in the Joint Monitoring Plan (JMP), is higher than the number of communities in which the partners worked, which was 14. It seems that more care was needed in drafting of indicators, though given that this JMP was written a year into implementation it's surprising that the indicators are not an accurate reflection of the work planned to be conducted.

As can be seen above, awareness of police services increased by upwards of 35%. Actual use of police services decreased by 24%, a result that seems more likely to be positive than negative for these communities (the project target was a 10% increase in use of police services but it is not clear how this would be a positive indicator).

Satisfaction with the police, meanwhile, was markedly lower than that with other government representatives (teachers, social workers, etc.) but still a significant improvement over baseline indicators. The baseline survey suggests that only 6% of respondents were satisfied with law enforcement services. By the time of the evaluation, 52% of respondents rated police competency as either high or very high, while 48% rated their sensitivity as high or very high. Though the analysis of this data is complicated by the lack of a statistically relevant sample, control group, and consistent respondent group, the change is so marked that the evaluation team has confidence in overall increased rates of satisfaction with law enforcement in the target communities.

To tease out where these improvements came from as a qualitative matter, we now turn to exploration of the theory of change of the project's work with law enforcement officers.

Discussion of Effectiveness - Theory of Change:

Theory of Change, Outcome 2, Component 2:

> IF dialogue platforms are established and used effectively to collaboratively develop and implement joint plans on crime prevention and radicalization by police, local authorities and communities (including women and girls), *and*

> IF police officers apply gender and religious sensitive preventive approaches in policing and PVE, provide more accurate information to the broader public about PVE, and collaborate with communities in prevention of crime and radicalization,

> THEN girls and women will be more resil

BECAUSE approaches of crime prevention and security are more people-centered, and the communities feel safer and better protected by police officers, they will be more willing to cooperate with police in the PVE.

Dialogue Platforms and Crime Prevention Plans:

The effectiveness of the dialogue platforms and crime prevention plans has been one of the most difficult elements to assess. In terms of actual implementation of the CPPs, this evaluation comes too early in the process to truly determine, as the CPPs are only now being shepherded through ratification by local councils. All 14 plans had been adopted and ratified by their local village councils as of the conclusion of this evaluation (January 2019), a positive indicator in terms of local council buy-in for the content and the potential for future implementation. However, since adoption of the *de jure* plan is only the first step in implementation, it's quite difficult to assess how much of an impact these plans will have on the communities in which they are used. Ongoing monitoring of actual implementation and support for local government, police, and citizens in using these plans could be highly beneficial during this early post-ratification stage.

To this end, there is reason to believe that continued work and support to local communities is needed to increase the likelihood of effective on-the-ground implementation of the CPPs. Only 30% of women religious leaders involved in the project had heard about the CPPs - under-use of a vital resource that could have contributed to the dialogue platforms and drafting of PVE content for the plans. Meanwhile, policemen themselves (*uchastkivii* and members of the 10th department) expressed confusion with the plans or did not see a link to PVE. One, for example, described his community's plan as being about family violence and not having any PVE content - and that PVE was not his responsibility. A member of the 10th department said that while PVE was his responsibility and was included in the CPP, he found the CPP unclear and did not understand how it was to be implemented or what its contents meant. Other law enforcement officers chose not to speak with the evaluation team, and so their opinions and perspectives are not known.

In its commentary on the draft version of this report, the project implementing partner rightly noted that the feedback from these two officers may be unrepresentative (the additional 6 officers who provided feedback for this evaluation gave answers that were so brief that there was no usable data related to the CPPs). As discussed in the "limits to the evaluation" section, the evaluation team made extensive efforts to include police officers in the data sample but was largely rebuffed. We agree that the comments made by the few police officers who took part may be unrepresentative, and we strongly encourage the project implementation team to leverage its personal relationships with the full pool of officers to garner more extensive feedback and insights on the CPPs.

It seems that the idea of the CPPs was well conceived, with the philosophy of open dialogue, platforms for discussion, and a sustainable CPP as a result all fitting well with the overarching project design. But actual implementation in the field was not as processually and inclusively oriented, with experts largely drafting the plans themselves after conducting focus groups and interviews with some 200+ local residents (103 of whom were women). Project documentation describes the model not so much open dialogue and join drafting as expert research and separate

drafting by project coordinators, a method that may be driving policemen's subsequent confusion and lack of buy-in on the CPPs. This may come down to the need for more intensive engagement with field coordinators and trainings for them on concepts and methods of inclusive dialogue.

A majority of women religious leaders described the positive impression that these officials made on them, the fact that they had shared their phone numbers, and that they remained in touch though the training and programming had long since stopped.

Officials from the 10th Department, meanwhile, relayed personal stories of having heard from and helped these women religious leaders - and in particular with PVE problems. In one indicative story, a WRL called the trainers after a young man was arrested for possession of extremist materials. Though the man did indeed possess the materials - and therefore could have been imprisoned -

the fact that police officers in rural areas may be responsible for overseeing upwards of 4 distinct villages at a time undermine the core logic of community policing, i.e. that officers who are closer to and more integrated into their communities can more effectively prevent crime in that they will have the trust of and information-sharing from local residents.

Catalytic effects: Growing out of this project's efforts, UNODC and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have developed an e-course on PVE topics, including community policing principles, communication with population, and legislation related to prevention of violent extremism. It is hoped that this e-course will improve ongoing professional growth and understanding of law

Baseline	Target (JMP)	Achievement
0	At least 20 lawyers	35 lawyers trained

Discussion of Effectiveness - Indicators:

All indicators for which data is available were exceeded (though data is notably missing in some cases), reflecting effectiveness of this component of the work in terms of meeting its goals. No baseline data was available on perceptions of legal services (i.e. awareness, use, and satisfaction) and so measurement of this was not conducted during the evaluation either.

While it is positive that all pre-set indicators were achieved, it is unclear how much these targets were set to stretch the implementation versus to be "safe" and easily achievable. The linking of these indicators to the overall impact desired - an increase in women's and girls' resilience to radicalization - is also under-elaborated in this framework. More careful consideration of output indicator 2.2.1, for example, could have helped the implementation team think through precisely what type of legal aid support would be the most relevant for PVE and how to more effectively structure their interventions to these ends. Reflection on outcome indicator 2a may have led project implementers and designers to reflect on which members of the justice system enjoy the least trust from citizens and therefore may be the best targets for trust-building interventions from the project team (legal assistance providers may be a less ripe target for trust building as judges and prosecutors, for example). As is, the relevance of much of this work to PVE is somewhat attenuated and could have bee

training was given to a separate set of lawyers on the theory that it would help them more effectively represent those accused of extremist crimes. The somewhat ad hoc nature of these project activities would seem to undermine their effectiveness, with the trained lawyers' work being largely separate from any other project elements.

In terms of improvements in awareness and accessibility of legal services, certainly the presence of the Bus of Solidarity in each of these 16 communities would logically increase the accessibility of legal information and support. At the same time, only 40% of the women religious leaders involved in this project had heard about the Bus of Solidarity and its presence in their communities (90% of those who had heard about it had actively connected community members to the bus and its services). Of the lawyers who received trainings on PVE legislation, only two said that they had used the training in their casework with quite a few declining to be interviewed because they had not used any of the lessons learned beyond the day of the training. This suggests that greater coordination across project elements could have improved their effectiveness, enabling more of the targeted vulnerable women and girls to know about and access the free legal consultations. Meanwhile, better selection of advocate-trainees may have heightened the impact of their learnings and better ensured that the knowledge gained would be translated into actual client service.

Achieve

all interviewees were participants of both) the similarity of the topics covered and methods used suggest that there may have been inefficient repetition of content.

At the same time, the project appears to have effectively decreased the likelihood of its women participants to join extremist groups (most effectively by simply telling them which groups are

spring and, upon approval of these budgets, releases funds in January of the following year. CRRS, a government agency and UNICEF's implementing partner, was caught between these two timelines: knowledge of the award and preparation of the related budget came too late to be integrated into KR's 2017 budget. And so CRRS had to wait until January 2018 -   rds of the way into the project - to receive its project funds through the Ministry of Finance. Though the results of CRRS's work ultimately were positive, coordination benefits and synergies across project components were lost. Moreover, UNICEF and other UN agencies were not fully aware of the positive results of CRRS's work until late in 2018 - too late to fully integrate similar methods into their subsequent PVE grant applications.

To the extent that the PBF seeks to encourage national ownership of development work - including PVE interventions - careful consideration should be given to how PBF grant deadlines, funding timelines, and short project timeframes impact the capacity of government partners to meaningfully take part in PBF-funded peacebuilding work. CRRS's involvement in the project had significant benefits in terms of capacity-building at both the national and local levels. To encourage other UN agencies to take on similarly close work with government partners - despite the headaches, particularly related to budgeting processes - PBF could consider creating rolling grant deadlines that would make it easier to tailor implementation to government budgeting processes. Alternatively, PBF could consider longer-term funding options (3, 4, 5 year options, for example) where such delays would be a relatively small set back in an overall implementation plan (or ideally could be foreseen and integrated into the 5-year project implementation plan).

Staffing and staffing structures: UN agency staff and implementing partners were generally

Technical expertise:

Criterion #4: Coordination and Monitoring and Evaluation

Summary of coordination and M&E findings:

Coordination among UN agencies was well organized to share project learnings and allow for ongoing improvement of implementation methods, with significant investments of time and energy going into documenting, sharing, and integrating lessons learned.

The project would have benefitted from more coordination in terms of project logic and assumptions, a process that could have been facilitated by jointly updating the project's theory of change to reflect changing project logic (as was done for the project output and outcome statements in 2017).

Repeated efforts were made to coordinate UN agencies' and implementing partners' work on the ground in target communities, though improvements in information-sharing at the local level could have had a positive impact on the effectiveness of the project.

Coordination with government agencies in particular appears to have been positive and generated sustainability benefits.

happen, with each implementing UN agency and partner choosing its own approach to the issues at hand. Interviewees were thus able to justify their own approach and accurately identify other agencies' and organizations' approaches, but were left unable to state how these distinct approaches could be mutually supportive within a single project framework. On-the-ground project implementation reflected this somewhat piecemeal approach, as discussed further below.

2. Timing challenges undermined the planned concurrent implementation of all project components. Work on crime prevention plans, legal support, and some of the initiatives with women religious leaders were significantly delayed - by the first semi-annual report of the project only FTI's work had actually launched. The implementing agencies do not

Criterion #5: Sustainability

Summary of sustainability findings:

The gains resulted from Outcome 1 programming appear to be highly sustainable, though not necessarily because of disciplined exit planning by project implementers. Rather, the nature of the work itself - changing women's underlying beliefs and practices - serves the goals of longterm behavior change, while the re-launch of similar PVE programming in many of the same target communities will concretize and build on the gains already made. Sustainability likely could have been nehanced by consideration of institutional structures that could carry gains forward indefinitely.

The majority of Outcome 2 outputs are structured toward sustainability, including institutionalization of core training programs and methods within national government structures (e.g. UNODC's PVE e-course, CRRS's trainings for Ministry leaders). However, careful monitoring and assessment will be needed to ensure that these are actively used rather than mere paper gains.

Legal aid work does not appear to have been conceptualized in terms of sustainability, with the longterm impact of one-off legal consultations and lawyer trainings unclear. Future rule of law work would benefit from more consideration of the sustainability of the programming being implemented.

Coming immediately after the completion of the Project, this evaluation cannot definitively say whether the project benefits will continue into the long term. Instead, we rely on the insights of project beneficiaries and implementers in terms of the impacts, changes, and programs that they believe will be sustainable over the next 2, 5, and 10 years. We also include, where relevant, insights from academic and development literature on how to enhance the likelihood of sustainable results, particularly when it comes to changing behavior patterns and community norms. These perspectives and insights allow us to make a general assessment of the likelihood of continued long-term benefits as well as ways that this probability could be increased.

Sustainability of Outcome 1 Impact

The majority of evaluation participants who had been involved in Outcome 1 activities continue to leverage their knowledge and networks to conduct activities in-line with Project goals. Both women religious leaders and the community members they organized described ongoing efforts to change, impact, and improve their communities. These continued activities are, in turn, undergirded by sustained changes in their attitudes toward one another, their communities, and their local officials.

Changes in Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behaviors: As noted in the section on effectiveness, 100% of women religious leaders reported feeling a strengthened sense of connection to their local

> We'll continue doing this work. This project showed us the path and we'll keep on doing it. (A1: 8)

> We keep on working. When [woman religious leader] calls us, we support her. We invite her to our meetings, our round tables. We'll still working. (Community AC FGD: 3).

Areas for Improvement: While the individual participants in Outcome 1 activities underwent meaningful personal change that is likely sustainable in their individual cases, there does not appear to have any attempts to institutionalize the progress made. The extent to which these women's community work and changed attitudes will extend beyond their immediate circles and to future generations is thus largely a matter of their personal initiative. And while some of these women are leaders of their local madrassas and Women's Committees,[7] both institutions that could logically be venues for continued programming along the lines of that conducted through this project, these does not appear to have been systematic incorporation of project methods within these institutional frameworks (note, however, that some of the community initiatives funded by Mutakallim entailed purchasing sewing machines for madrassas to launch vocational trainings or funded other madrassa-based classes. These may bring forward some project-related classwork, but this is somewhat distinct from an institutionalization of the full complex of program offerings related to reconceptualizing social responsibility, critical thinking, and the nature of religious belief and radicalism). Project implementers conducting similar work in the future may want to consider whether these or other institutional frameworks could be appropriate platforms to make their progress more sustainable.

Other areas where sustainability is unclear is in the media product and behavior change campaign. Almost all women religious leaders had seen the BCC products - and specifically the short films -

creation of an e-course on PVE, meanwhile, promises to save in lasting form the learnings from the project and pass them on to new law enforcement officers. Ongoing PVE work could enhance the effectiveness of this platform by spreading awareness of it and monitoring how effectively e-course trainees internalize and leverage the information being taught.

Outcome 2, Component 3: The training for advocates appears to have positive results - particularly given advocates' own incentives to incorporate the legal content into their client work. However, the gains from this 1-day training are not sustainable, especially to the extent that relevant legislation continues to be rewritten and re-adopted (especially in terms of the changes to the Criminal Code, Administrative Code, and new law "On Probation" that go into effect on January 1, 2019). Sustainability could be improved by continuing to work with these advocates as legislation changes. Meanwhile, though the Ministry of Justice continues to use the Bus of Solidarity, its is reliant on donor fundings and is not yet a self-sustaining model at the government level (though the MoJ is working to find its own funding for the bus, a positive step). The one-off consultations provided to clients via the Bus of Solidarity, meanwhile, are certainly useful in spreading basic legal knowledge but it is unclear how effect they are in truly resolving citizens' legal problems (which presumably require more extended legal counsel) and especially on a sustainable basis.

3. **Information about banned extremist groups and ways to identify them was both highly needed and communicated in an effective way**, helping women religious leaders protect themselves and other community members from what could be called unintentional extremism - the adoption of extremist beliefs through a mere lack of knowledge that they are extreme. Given the low level of religious knowledge demonstrated even by women religious leaders at the start of the program, such information sharing could be highly positive if implemented on a broader scale. Consideration should also be given to the incorporation of information about banned groups beyond those that are religiously oriented - for example, groups with violent ethno-national messages.

4. **Special care is needed when handling conceptual topics like radicalization, marginalization, and risk factors - especially when training them to novices.** Given that linkages among these topics are highly contested and easily subject to misunderstanding, the project team should think carefully about how (and if) it will train others on these topics. Prior to training, project implementers should conduct their own comprehensive literature reviews and assessments of the relevant evidence, thereby having a better ability to assess proposed training materials before their use (and the likelihood that the training materials could be misunderstood). The majority of trainees conceptualized these topics in ways that could lead to mis-identification of 'radicals' and 'early signs' in the future.

5. **Work with duty bearers was effective, with improvements felt not merely by direct beneficiaries but more broadly in their communities as well.** The provision of clear protocols, guidelines, and contacts were simple but effective ways of promoting better service delivery on a day-to-day basis. At the same time, the trainings appear to have instilled a greater sense of social responsibility in these duty bearers - this behavior change, if sustained, could contribute to lasting improvements in community trust and vertical cohesion from citizens to local government.

to impact how judges approach their work and could be expected to have a more direct, systematic, and sustainable impact on underlying drivers of radicalization than the case-by-case legal aid and consultations.

8. **Better project coordination is likely to significantly improve results, particularly at the local level.** Had local-level participants been aware of the full scope of the project and full complex of support being provided, not only could they have increased their participation in all relevant activities but also would have been more aware of the extent to which their rights and local level capacities were increased, further supporting the sustainability of results and goals of trust, social cohesion, and mutual support.

Policy Level Recommendations

1. **Support the Ministry of Justice in enhancing the rule of law for the prevention of violent extremism.** Improvement of the rule of law is the top strategy recommended by development agencies for PVE programming (Robinson 2017; UNDP 2016; UNDP 2018). To that end, the fact that the Ministry of Justice has virtually no involvement in PVE is surprising and counter-productive - especially in light of the Kyrgyz Republic's challenges with the rule of law. Project partners could support the Ministry of Justice in thinking critically about its role in PVE and in developing internal strategies and greater collaboration with other government agencies to enhance the rule of law, including countering judicial corruption and police misconduct.

2. **Advocate for policing structures and systems that are more conducive to community policing methods**. Current policies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs run counter to community policing and local accountability - from t0 g0 e (i)5mr4ETQq0.00e(M)18(i)5(

Appendices

Annex 1: Evaluation Matrix

Research question	Sub-questions	Methods of verification
Relevance		
Relation to key drivers and vulnerabilities to radicalization and VE in Kyrgyzstan		
-	- -	-

-

-	- -	-
-	- -	-
-	- -	- -
-	- -	-
-	-	-

Effectiveness of Theory of Change

	-
	
	    o
	
	    o
	
	    o
	    o
	
	    o
	
	    o
	
	-
	
	-
	
	-
	
	-
		-

and

-

	Success stories of women, project participants	
	Notes from the GPI coordination meetings	Joint with UNFPA coordination
	UNFPA field monitoring reports	UNFPA
	Short videos about the project results	UNFPA
	Report on GPI workshop "Conflict sensitivity: risks and opportunities" (with support from Peace Nexus)	Joint with UNFPA coordination
	Report on GPI workshop on reflection of the results of baseline assessment	

	IRF results framework	
	Summary of GPI project activities	
	GPI project activities coordination	

Brief summary of activities

	Content of PVE e-course for police	UNODC
	Module for interior affairs organs	UNODC
	Otyncha individual interview questionnaire	
	Women and girls focus group interview questionnaire	
	Report UNODC	
	Situation analysis UNODC	
	Report on lawyer training	

Merton, Robert (1938). "Social Structure and Anomie," in *American Sociological Review* 3(5): 672 - 682.

Nasritdinov, Emil (2017). *Vulnerability of Labor Migrants from Kyrgyzstan to Engagement with Violent Extremist Groups in the Russian Federation.* UNDP. Available: https://www.academia.edu/35667982/Vulnerability_of_labor_migrants_from_Kyrgyzstan_to_eng agement_with_violent_extremist_groups_in_Russian_Federation

Nasser-Eddine, Minerva et. al. (2011). *Countering Violent Extremism (VE) Literature Review.* Australian Government Department of Defense: Counter Terrorism and Security Technology Centre. Available: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a543686.pdf

National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2017). *Uroven' bednosti naseleniya*

UNDP (2016). *Preventing Violent Extremism by Promoting Inclusive Development.* Available: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/norway/undp-ogc/documents/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20%20Development.pdf

UNDP (2018). *Assessing Progress Made, and the Future to Development Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism.* Available: http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/oslo_governance_centre/development-approaches-to-preventing-violent-extremism.html

United States Department of State (2017). "Kyrgyz Republic 2017 International Religious Freedom Report." *International Religious Freedom Report for 2017.* Available: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281270.pdf