

Joint special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1889 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh) Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities; and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011)

and organized crime. By focusing on regional specificities, responses and lessons learned, the joint special meeting was intended to complement the discussions held at the Committee's open briefing of 8 October 2018 on the linkages between terrorism and three specific criminal activities (human trafficking, drug trafficking and arms smuggling). The responses to the terrorism threat must be comprehensive,

Some terrorists were also organized criminals or close relatives of organized criminals and were involved in kidnapping for ransom; trafficking of narcotics; smuggling of weapons, gasoline or vehicles; extortion; or illegal mining. They shared with criminals the objective of weakening fragile States and undermining law and border security.

The nexus between international terrorism and organized crime: definitions and scope of the issue

8. The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) provided an overview of the academic debate on the definition and scope of the linkages between terrorism and organized crime, as well as the attention paid to the phenomenon by the Security Council, the G20, and other policymakers such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), in cooperation with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), the Council of Europe and the European Union, as well as by academics.

9. In defining the linkages between terrorism and organized crime, a context-dependent approach was required because the two phenomena took various forms in different geographical contexts. Furthermore, both terrorism and organized crime were difficult to analyse and measure. There was a need to address the two together because a joint approach provided the best opportunities to disrupt both terrorist and criminal operations.

10. From a terrorism-financing perspective, different terrorist organizations had turned to different criminal activities as a source of funding. Whereas small cells and lone actors engaged mainly in petty crimes, structured, “corporate” terrorist organizations and terrorists controlling territories engaged in more complex criminal activities and often cooperated with organized criminal groups.

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cooperation, association, or even partnership. It was therefore difficult to distinguish between criminal and terrorist groups.

13. An effective response should

criminals and terrorists were also facilitated by the fact that they operated in the same territory, belonged to the same ethnic group, or even belonged to the same family. Those ties helped create a favourable environment for cooperating without necessarily indicating an adherence to terrorist ideology. Moreover, criminal groups had often provided logistical support to terrorists and facilitated their local establishment.

20. The Central Office for the Suppression of Illicit Drug Trafficking of Niger (*Office Central de Répression du trafic illicite des stupéfiants* (

scope in the region to improve law and order and to address the porous borders and the political instability that enabled certain groups. Criminal activities of terror groups in the region offered the most obvious examples of the crime-terror nexus. The Abu Sayyaf Group's involvement with extortion and kidnapping was one example in that regard. ICPVTR recommended enhanced coordination between police and counter-terrorism agencies, better und92 re2 792c8. reW*nBT/F1 12 Tf1 0 0 1

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29. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) shared a case study involving a United Kingdom national who was acting as a petty criminal and drug dealer, while also operating as an FTF in the Syrian Arab Republic. A similar pattern was seen in Germany, where an analysis of 800 FTFs had found that one-third of the total

terrorism to identify, investigate and intercept the illegal movement of goods. There was a need to strengthen information and intelligence-sharing, both nationally and internationally.

33. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), noting its view that the expression “*nexus*” *between terrorism and organized crime* was an understatement, stated that terrorism was a form of organized crime. Terrorism across Africa was suspected to be heavily funded by other transnational criminal activities, such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, the sale of stolen cultural artefacts on the black market, the sale of illicit petroleum, counterfeiting medicines, and wildlife crimes such as oil bunkering. Many terrorist groups were essentially operating as mafia groups. One such example was Al-Shabaab, which used violence as a tactic for social control. In many failing or failed States, terrorist groups had stepped in to offer State services, in the manner of a traditional mafia group. The recent CTED report on the link between human trafficking and terrorism had noted the lack of related data. With its 17 databases and global communication system, INTERPOL was in a unique position to provide such data and thereby help “connect the dots” between organized crime and terrorism.

34. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) discussed a policy toolkit that it had developed together with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), to help States better understand the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism and effective measures to combat the nexus. The toolkit included a number of nexus “watch points” (i.e., geography, social indicators, security, governance and corruption). The n