

Open briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on

United Nations Headquarters, New York, Wednesday, 17 May 2017

Session III: *Highlighting new risks and trends deriving from international arms trafficking via the Internet and across borders, including the consequences of terrorist and criminal access to, and use of, deactivated and reactivated weapons acquired from collectors, including online. Highlighting as well the need to implement proper international arms control standards and to fully utilize existing tools and resources*

Supporting the Application of International Standards to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons

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It is a great honour to join my distinguished colleagues in briefing the Committee on this important issue and I thank CTED for the invitation to do so. I coordinate the development and use by the UN of International Small Arms Control Standards, which derive from global agreements reached by Member States and which seek to provide practical guidance to States on effectively controlling the full life-cycle of small arms and light weapons — from handguns and rifles to mortars and man-portable air defence systems; from manufacture and marking to international transfer, stockpile management, collection and destruction.

My presentation will focus on the need to implement existing international standards and to fully utilize existing tools and resources in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons. The unfortunate fact is that that the tools, resources and standards that we currently have at hand to address this problem are not being used to the extent that they should be. This is leading to sub-optimum outcomes in many areas, including **export control, end-user verification, secure storage**, illegal **cross-border movements** of weapons,

terrorists. Allow me to focus on these five areas and to provide some recommendations on how the international community could do better in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons.

Export Control

Let me begin with export control. Terrorist organisations acquire a significant proportion of their weaponry by capturing them during offensive operations. Often, these weapons are supplied by third countries to government forces that are fighting terrorists. This is a reality of counter-terrorism operations; sometimes, tactical defeats happen and materiel is lost to terrorist organisations, who then incorporate it into their own arsenals. This underlines the importance of the risk calculations that third countries must make when considering arming government or irregular forces that are engaged in fighting terrorist organisations. If there is a high risk that weapons exported for this purpose will end up in the hands of the terrorists they are meant to defeat, either directly through capture or indirectly through diversion onto the black market, the export would risk being counter-productive.

By way of illustration, small arms ammunition recovered from Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria includes ammunition manufactured in 21 countries, some of it within the last 4 years.

where feasible, post-delivery monitoring to ensure that weapons are being securely stored and

closed. For weapons that have been illegally recycled from one conflict zone to another for many years, tracing may not be possible. But for many weapons, accurate tracing is possible if the proper procedures are followed. To assist with this, the UN has developed practical guidance