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SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED  
PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1373 (2001)  
CONCERNING COUNTER-TERRORISM

S/AC.40/2016/NOTE.11  
22 January 2016

**Note by the Chair**

The Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism presents his compliments to the members of the Committee and has the honour to transmit, for their **information**, an outcome document on the

**Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)**

**Open meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Global  
Counter-Terrorism Research Network** ont3a50.002 Tc 0.058 TwibC(JTJ 0 TwwT(e)4

## Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)

their homes and are seeking ways to find purpose and significance). However, many ISIL volunteers are far from marginal in their societies.

7. ISIL's so-called caliphate is highly attractive to such individuals. It provides a purpose and a chance to liberate oneself from a world that offers merely a specious freedom of false and meaningless choices.

8. ISIL uses social media platforms, as well as peer-to-peer and gaming platforms. It uses sophisticated marketing technology to sift through hundreds of millions of social media messages in search of a few thousand users who are likely to support its cause. (Many of the conversations are encrypted to avoid detection by law enforcement. ISIL even offers an online encryption "help desk").

9. "Counter narrative" strategies developed by think tanks and used by Governments may be largely ineffective. ISIL may spend hundreds of hours enlisting individuals and their friends; empathizing instead of lecturing; and turning personal frustrations and grievances into moral outrage.

10. ISIL's target are well known. In social media, the messenger matters. Government voices lack authenticity and agility. Their policies and practices make them suspect. Fortunately, there is no shortage of credible actors, whether at the community level or from popular culture, who are ready to engage globally with potential recruits. Those voices include athletes, musicians, graffiti artists, hip hop activists, actors, comedians, imams,

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14. Because many potential FTFs play a marginal role in their host countries, Governments and NGOs believe that offering material advantages, such as jobs or education, may suffice to counter the lure of the “caliphate”. However, if such individuals are prepared to sacrifice their lives, it is unlikely that offers of material advantage will stop them. Such incentives may provide viable alternative life pathways at initial stages of radicalization, but fully radicalized individuals who are fused with a certain group and its values are not particularly susceptible to material incentives or disincentives (punishments, sanctions), which often backfire by increasing support for violence.

15. There is a “clash of traditional cultures”, not a “clash of civilizations”. The popular notion of the “clash of civilizations” between Islam and the West is misleading, even if it is an idea purposely promoted both by Al-Qaida and ISIL and by many who oppose them. Violent extremism represents not the resurgence of traditional cultures, but their collapse. It is perpetrated by young people who have become detached from millennial traditions and desperately seek a social identity that gives personal significance and glory. This is the dark side of globalization. Individuals radicalize in an effort to find a solid identity in a world that no longer makes sense to them. Vertical lines of communication between the generations are replaced by horizontal peer-to-peer attachments that can cut across the globe. In the absence of concerted intellectual effort, awareness-raising, and individual attention, little progress will be made against ISIL and similar groups, and force of arms (with all its unforeseen and unintended consequences, agony and suffering) may well be the only alternative. Even if ISIL is eventually defeated, its message may still appeal to future generations unless Governments, businesses, information and entertainment media, faith-based groups, and civic organizations work with others to actively engage and mobilize youth, earnestly consider their perceived grievances, listen and learn from their aspirations and dreams, and provide concrete pathways rather than mere promises for the realization of their hopes and a chance to “achieve a better world”.

16. Grassroots approaches are not alone sufficient. Local initiatives may deter individuals from committing political or religious violence, but will not challenge the broad attraction of ISIL for young people. There is a need to establish a platform from where lessons learned from local successes can be shared with Governments and ideas allowed to bubble up from youth to those in Government who can help refine and realize them. No such platform yet exists. The United Nations should (and is p(a)4(t)-2()1(n)-4rnot f14(e a )]TnaINI2.72 -1(n)-4 0.004 Twd yo





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37. It is important for research institutions to gain access to Government information sources, field sites, prisons, facilities, court records, etc., under appropriate arrangements, in order to strengthen their output.