



UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE

Security Council Guiding Principles on Foreign Terrorist Fighters:

The 2015 Madrid Guiding Principles + 2018 Addendum



A practical tool for Member States
to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters



Security Council Guiding Principles on Foreign Terrorist Fighters:

The 2015 Madrid Guiding Principles + 2018 Addendum

S/2015/939 and S/2018/1177

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Preface

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Guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters

Introduction

Foreign terrorist fighters pose an acute and growing threat to international peace and security. Their activities can increase the intensity, duration, intractability and unpredictability of conflicts and pose a serious threat to their States of origin, the States through which they transit and the States to which they travel, as well as to States neighbouring zones of armed conflict in which those fighters are

Accordingly, on 28 July 2015, the Committee held a special meeting on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, which was preceded by a series of technical sessions organized by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. The meeting and technical sessions were hosted by the Government of Spain in Madrid and were attended by approximately 400 participants from Member States representing every region of the world, including those most affected by the threat of foreign terrorist fighters, relevant international and regional organizations, academia and civil society. In accordance with resolution 2178 (2014), the participants discussed the principal gaps in the capacities of Member States to implement resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), and what may hinder the abilities of Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

The participants also shared effective practices and approaches to stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, focusing on: (a) the detection of, intervention against and prevention of the incitement, recruitment and facilitation of foreign terrorist fighters; (b) the prevention of travel by foreign terrorist fighters; and (c) criminalization, prosecution, including prosecution strategies for returnees, international cooperation and the rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees.

The main outcomes of the special meeting and technical sessions, including specific effective practices and approaches, have been incorporated into the present set of guiding principles in an effort to assist Member States in their efforts to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. The principles are intended to complement the other materials prepared by the Executive Directorate to help States to strengthen their implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 2178 (2014).

The participants reaffirmed the need for States to ensure that all measures taken to counter the threat of foreign terrorist fighters were fully compliant with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, and noted that efforts to do so involved numerous and significant challenges.

In order to develop an effective strategy to counter the threat of foreign terrorist fighters, the Committee will continue to work closely with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and Member States to address the challenges identified in the present set of guiding principles.

I. Detection of, intervention against and prevention of the incitement, recruitment and facilitation of foreign terrorist fighters

The discussions on this topic focused on preventing the travel of aspiring foreign terrorist-fighters through the creation of strategic partnerships between governmental and non-governmental

Guiding Principle 2

Because local stakeholders often have the best understanding of the nature and sources of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, States should create space for civil society and develop

B. Community engagement and empowerment of local communities and civil society

Terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law-enforcement measures and intelligence operations alone. There is also a need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, in accordance with pillar I of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In this respect, participants in the special meeting welcomed the provisions of resolution 2178 (2014) encouraging Member States to engage with relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narratives that can incite terrorist acts, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders and all other concerned civil society groups. Greater efforts in this area can lead to increased success in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters at the community level.

Guiding Principle 7

Effective community engagement to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters requires action in a number of different fields. States should consider developing comprehensive strategies to counter and prevent violent extremism that include significant roles for youth, families, women, religious, cultural and educational leaders and other concerned civil society groups. Independent actors give actions to counter violent extremism a level of credibility and effectiveness that Governments generally cannot achieve alone. However, care should be exercised in delineating the respective roles of Governments and civil society actors.

Guiding Principle 8

Women, especially mothers, can play a crucial role as community leaders and role models in preventing radicalization and the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. States should make greater efforts to involve women in programmes and strategies to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters because their participation can have a major impact, in pl(r)-3 (u)-2.3 (c)4.1 (p)-5.5 (a)9.9 (e a m)1 (a)6 (jon /G(h)-3.5 (e)-1.5 8.5 (o)1

C. Community-policing and Internet-related law-enforcement initiatives

Law-enforcement measures are essential to stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. There is therefore a need to promote dialogue through methods that include engagement with communities and a commitment to transparency. One innovative approach adopted by an increasing number of States is the use of community-policing techniques. States should also pay close attention to com

II. Prevention of travel by foreign terrorist fighters, including through operational measures, the use of advance passenger information and measures to strengthen border security

In its resolution [2178 \(2014\)](#), the Council reaffirmed that all States shall prevent the movement of

3. Transmitting analysis and information on foreign terrorist fighters nationally and internationally

Information and related analyses on existing and potential foreign terrorist fighters should be shared across the security hierarchy nationally and with competent border authorities internationally through coordination and mechanisms for information exchange.

Guiding Principle 17

In order to ensure the availability of relevant information to front-line officers nationally and internationally, and thus enhance efforts to detect and prevent the cross-border movement of foreign terrorist fighters, States should consider:

- (a) Enacting legislation, if necessary, and implementing procedures to gather traveller information and use known traveller information, including advance passenger information, complemented by passenger name record data, if appropriate, to inform decisions about potential travel by foreign terrorist fighters;
- (b) Ensure that procedures are in place to make certain that information on known or suspected foreign terrorist fighters is transmitted to front-line border officials for their action prior to the departure or arrival of the traveller;
- (c) Establishing mechanisms for the provision of feedback on the validity and usability of the information, as well as on the results achieved;
- (d) Encouraging the bilateral and multilateral sharing of information and analysis related to foreign terrorist fighters;
- (e) Expanding access to, and the utilization of, the global information-sharing tools and resources of INTERPOL among the national law-enforcement, immigration and border security authorities of member countries.

4. Effective utilization of information related to foreign terrorist fighters at border points

5.

B. Practical measures to strengthen the overall security of borders

1. Coordinated border management

Many States have turned to coordinated border management to effectively manage their borders. Participants in the special meeting noted the need for cooperation and coordination by all

2. Addressing spaces between official border crossings

Spaces between official border crossings are difficult to control because they often include long and porous borders, open spaces and difficult terrain. They therefore present risks and vulnerabilities for the potential crossing by foreign terrorists.

Guiding Principle 21

In order to strengthen the overall security of their borders and thereby stem the flow of foreign terrorists, States should consider:

- (a) Identifying the most vulnerable border stretches and implementing mitigation measures;
- (b) Establishing controls at vulnerable locations;
- (c) Establishing mobile border-processing units and/or roving patrols on the basis of risk assessment and assessed needs, and supporting them with transportable screening systems such as the Mobile INTERPOL Network Database;
- (d) Extending areas of control adjacent to official border checkpoints;
- (e) Establishing, strengthening and acting upon bilateral agreements on cross-border matters;
- (f) Increasing cooperation, coordination and information exchange with neighbouring and other States;
- (g) Introducing appropriate legal measures to deter the unauthorized crossing of borders that are compliant with all relevant obligations under international law;
- (h) Making available adequate and trained human resources to conduct border operations;
- (i) Developing and deploying cost-effective detection technologies and infrastructure, such as integrated fixed towers and mobile technologies, as appropriate;
- (j)

B

C. Prosecution and rehabilitation strategies aimed at stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters

The employment of rigid prosecution policies and practices against foreign terrorist fighters can

D. International judicial cooperation in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters

There are numerous challenges associated with effective international cooperation in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, including delays in the provision of mutual legal assistance, the rigidity of procedures and lack of capacity.

Guiding Principle 33

Member States should consider reviewing national mutual legal assistance laws and mechanisms and updating them as necessary in order to strengthen their effectiveness, especially in the light of the substantial increase in the volume of requests for digital data. Member States, consistent with their national law and legal framework, should also consider establishing appropriate

Addendum to the guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters (2018)

I. Introduction

1. On 28 July 2015, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism held a special meeting on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Held in Madrid and hosted by the Government of Spain, the special meeting and the accompanying series of technical sessions organized by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate were attended by Member States of every region of the world, including those regions most affected by the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. Representatives of international and regional organizations, academia and civil society also attended. In accordance with resolution 2178 (2014), participants discussed principal gaps in the capacities of Member States to implement resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) that might hinder States' abilities to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Pursuant to their discussions, participants identified a set of 35 guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters (Madrid Guiding Principles) (S/2015/939, paras 10-34).

ghters; developing and implementing risk assessments on returning and relocating foreign terrorist ghters and their families; and prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration e orts, consistent with applicable international law (ibid.).

7. The present addendum is intended to provide further guidance for an e ective response to the evolving foreign terrorist ghter phenomenon, focusing on measures to be taken in the areas of bor

17. Appropriate information concerning the identity of existing, suspected or potential foreign terrorist fighters, without resorting to profiling based on any discriminator(d)4.d1orguo prhni0(t)5.7 (i)2.3 (t)10.1

Guiding Principle 36^a

In implementing their advance passenger information and passenger name record obligations, Member States should:

- (a) Ensure that national legislation clearly regulates the way in which States can collect, use, retain and transfer advance passenger information and passenger name record data, in accordance with ICAO standards and recommended practices and with domestic law and international obligations and in full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including by being consistent with article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
- (b) Ensure the availability of adequate resources and, if possible, support any capacity-building efforts, to effectively implement advance passenger information and passenger name record systems;
- (c) Obligate air carriers to transfer advance passenger information and passenger name record data to the relevant national authorities (single windows and passenger information units);
- (d) Establish and/or designate specific entities responsible for the collection, storage, processing and analysis of passenger name record data and advance passenger information received from air carriers (for example, through the establishment of passenger information units and capacity-building efforts). The passenger information units should compare passenger name record data and advance passenger information with data from relevant law enforcement databases and process them against predetermined criteria to identify persons that may

B. Developing watch lists and databases and sharing information through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms

24. In its resolution

Guiding Principle 37^a

In implementing their obligations to establish and maintain an integrated counter-terrorism watch list or database, Member States should:

C. Developing biometric systems and ensuring their responsible use

28. In its resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council decided that States should develop and implement systems to collect biometric data, which could include fingerprints, photographs, facial recognition and other relevant identifying biometric data, in order to responsibly and properly identify ter

Guiding Principle 38

In implementing their obligations to collect, use and share biometric data in order to properly and responsibly identify terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters, in compliance with domestic law and international human rights law, Member States should:

- (a) Counter the threat posed by the continual movement of suspected terrorists and foreign terrorist fighters across international borders by comparing the biometrics of individuals entering, departing or seeking residence in their country with data from other national and international biometric databases, including those of known and suspected foreign terrorist fighters;
- (b) Develop or increase their use of biometric systems in a responsible and proper manner in order to authenticate the identity of individuals and prevent them from presenting false-particulars or attempting to impersonate other people;
- (c) Ensure effective maintenance of biometric databases and data-sharing protocols;
- (d) Adopt clear human rights-based frameworks for the use of biometric technology that include the use of procedural safeguards for and effective oversight of its application, including by establishing appropriate oversight bodies, or expanding the remit of existing ones, to supervise the implementation of relevant legislation and the provision of effective remedies in case of violations in this regard. Those efforts could be supplemented by a review process that informs all national policy and decision-making regarding the use of biometrics for counter-terrorism purposes;
- (e) Take into consideration specific issues that may arise with respect to protecting and promoting the rights of the child in the context of biometrics, including when children's biometric data is collected for child-protection purposes, and further considering putting in place specific and appropriate legal frameworks and safeguards;
- (f) Conduct regular risk assessments of the end-to-end processes of their biometric applications in order to mitigate current or emerging threats, such as identity theft, the deletion and replacement of data and deliberate damage;
- (g) Ensure that actions taken by the authorities as a result of biometric matches are considered in the context of international law, including international human rights obligations and the need for a fully informed and lawful response;
- (h) Ensure that the systems operating biometric data and the legal frameworks associated with their use allow for interoperability between other national and international biometric data bases, including INTERPOL;
- (i) Maximize the use of the INTERPOL biometric databases (face, fingerprints and DNA).

^a Executive Directorate, Technical Guide 64.

eld of countering terrorist narratives should be based on the Charter of the United Nations, including with respect to the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States.

Guiding Principle 39^a

In undertaking efforts to effectively counter the ways that ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities use their narratives to incite and recruit others to commit terrorist acts, Member States should:

- (a) Collaborate in the pursuit of developing and implementing effective strategies to counter-terrorist narratives, in particular in relation to foreign terrorist fighters, in a manner compliant with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, as applicable, while safeguarding the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association and the right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy;
- (b) Promote peaceful alternatives to the narratives espoused by foreign terrorist fighters, address underlying drivers and engage with a wide range of actors, including through the participation and leadership of young people and women, families, religious, cultural, education and local community leaders, other civil society actors, victims of terrorism, the media and private sector entities;
- (c) Tailor their counter-terrorism measures and programmes to the specific circumstances of different contexts at all levels in order to increase their effectiveness, aiming not only to rebut terrorists' messages, but also to amplify positive narratives, provide credible alternatives and address issues of concern to vulnerable audiences who are subject to terrorist narratives, both online and offline;
- (d) Take into account the gender dimension and age sensitivities and address specific concerns and vulnerabilities in their counter-narrative initiatives;
- (e) Consider facilitating counter-narrative measures and programmes, including by not only di

B. Risk assessments and intervention programmes

38. In its resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council called upon States to develop and implement risk assessment tools to identify individuals who demonstrate signs of radicalization to violence and to develop intervention programmes, including with a gender perspective, in compliance with applicable international and domestic law and without resorting to profiling based on any discriminatory grounds prohibited by international law.

Guiding Principle 40

In developing risk assessment tools to identify individuals who demonstrate signs of radicalization to violence and intervention programmes, Member States should:

- (a) Ensure that risk assessments do not lead to profiling based on any discriminatory grounds prohibited by international law;
- (b) Develop intervention programmes, including with a gender perspective, as appropriate, to prevent such individuals from committing acts of terrorism, in compliance with applicable international and domestic law and without resorting to profiling based on any discriminatory grounds prohibited by international law;
- (c) Consider ways to ensure that professionals involved in risk assessments have relevant expertise and access to continuous training, development and reevaluation;
- (d) Put in place effective oversight mechanisms to ensure the accountability of professionals involved in risk assessments;
- (e) Consider developing or supporting mechanisms to evaluate risk assessment tools and intervention programmes;
- (f) Consider sharing relevant experiences and expertise with other States, regional organizations, multilateral forums and civil society organizations.

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IV. Judicial measures and international cooperation



Guiding Principle 43 ^a

In undertaking efforts to ensure that the responsible authorities have the capacity, expertise and authority to handle intelligence threat data on foreign terrorist fighters and other individual terrorists and information collected by investigative agencies, and in creating procedures to convert such data and information, where possible, into admissible evidence, where appropriate and subject to the arrangements of its legal system, Member States should:

- (a) Consider ensuring that the use of special investigative techniques by investigative agencies is effectively supervised by judiciary and prosecution systems;
- (b) Put in place, where needed, special investigation and prosecution approaches that are gender-sensitive and, for cases involving children, take into account their rights;
- (c) Use existing good practices and standard operating procedures, including those of INTERPOL, for forensic science procedures, in order to ensure the reliability of forensic evidence in court and promote public confidence;
- (d) Ensure effective protection of witnesses.

^a See also guiding principle 25.

Guiding Principle 44 ^a

In undertaking efforts to gather digital data and evidence in cases relating to terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters, Member States should:

- (a) Implement provisions on the expedited preservation of digital data as a stand-alone measure in their procedural legislation and establish a specific legal regime for the search and seizure of digital data;
- (b) Consider encouraging private companies to establish round-the-clock mechanisms for cooperation with law enforcement and clear rules for the preservation of digital evidence and for emergency disclosure requests in accordance with applicable law;
- (c) Develop information and communications technology (ICT) and forensic capacities and expertise within criminal justice and law-enforcement agencies;
- (d) Use social media content relating to terrorism as digital evidence for investigation and prosecution, while respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, and consistent with their obligations under domestic and applicable international law.

Guiding Principle 45 ^a

In undertaking efforts to intensify and accelerate the timely exchange of relevant operational

- ^a See also guiding principles 30–32; and Executive Directorate, Technical Guide, pp. 50–52.
- ^b Guiding principle 32.
- ^c Guiding principle 30.
- ^d Resolution 2396 (2017), para. 31.
- ^e Ibid., para. 29.
- ^f Guiding principle 30.
- ^g Executive Directorate, Technical Guide, pp. 50–52.
- ^h Ibid., in particular, issue for consideration No. 13.
- ⁱ Ibid., in particular, issues for consideration No. 14.
- ^j Resolution 2396 (2017), para. 39.

Guiding Principle 47 ^a

In cases involving children, Member States should ensure that prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies:

- (a) Make the best interests of the child a primary consideration;
- (b) Are implemented in compliance with criminal legislation, taking into account the gravity of any crime that may have been committed, while considering the age of the child and recognizing that such child may also be a victim of terrorism;
- (c) Include access to health care, psychosocial support and education programmes that contribute to the well-being of children, and grant access to regular education whenever possible;
- (d) Are age- and gender-sensitive;
- (e) Enable the involvement of child-protection actors and the social sector, as well as their effective coordination with the justice sector.

^a See also guiding principles 30–32. See Executive Directorate, Technical Guide, p. 52, for a list of additional international instruments, standards and good practices that provide guidance in this area.

^b Resolution 2396 (2017), para. 36.

^c United Nations, “Guidance note of the Secretary-General: UN approach to justice for children”, September 2008.

D. Addressing the risks of terrorist radicalization and recruitment in prisons and ensuring that prisons can serve to rehabilitate and reintegrate

46. In its resolution 2396 (2017), the Security Council acknowledged that prisons could serve as potential incubators for radicalization to terrorism and terrorist recruitment and that proper assessment and monitoring of imprisoned foreign terrorist fighters, aimed at reducing opportunities for terrorists to attract new recruits, was therefore critical. In the same resolution, the Council recognized that prisons could also serve to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners, where appropriate, and that Member States might need to continue to engage with offenders after their release from prison in order to prevent recidivism, in accordance with relevant international law and taking into consideration, where appropriate, the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules), article 17.1 (t).¹⁰

E. International cooperation

48.

V. Protecting critical infrastructure, vulnerable or soft targets and tourism sites

49. In its resolution [2341 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council called upon States to consider developing or further improving their strategies for reducing risks to critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks, including by, inter alia, assessing and raising awareness of the relevant risks; taking preparedness measures, including implementing effective responses to such attacks and promoting better interoperability in security and consequence management; and facilitating effective interaction among all stakeholders involved.

50. In its resolution [2396 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council stressed the need for States to develop, review or amend national risk and threat assessments to take into account soft targets, in order to develop appropriate contingency and emergency-response plans for terrorist attacks. It also called upon States to establish or strengthen national, regional and international partnerships with p((Fble)-6.9 (l)2.4 (e)-1.5c)-4.3 (

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Guiding Principle 51^a

In their further efforts to protect critical infrastructure and soft targets from terrorist attacks, Member States, acting in cooperation with local authorities, should also consider:

- (a) Updating contingency planning, such as guidance, exercises and training for law enforcement, other relevant ministries and industry actors, in order to keep pace with actual threats, refine strategies and ensure that stakeholders adapt to evolving threats;
- (b) Putting in place national frameworks and mechanisms to support risk-based decision-making, information-sharing and public-private partnering for both Government and industry, including with a view to working together to determine priorities, and jointly developing relevant products and tools, such as general guidelines on surveillance or specific protective measures suggested for different types of facilities (for example, stadiums, hotels, malls or schools);
- (c) Establishing processes for the exchange of risk assessments between Government, industry and the private sector, to promote and increase situational awareness and strengthen soft target security and resilience;
- (d) Establishing processes for sharing relevant information with industry and private sector partners by, for example, issuing security clearances and increasing awareness;
- (e) Promoting public-private partnerships by developing cooperation mechanisms, supporting business owners and operators and infrastructure managers and by sharing plans, policies and procedures, as appropriate;
- (f) Assisting in the delivery of effective and targeted capacity development, training and other necessary resources, as well as technical assistance, where such delivery is needed to enable all States to develop appropriate capacity to implement contingency and response plans with

VI. Preventing and combating the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons

55. In May 2017, the Committee held an open briefing on the theme “Preventing Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons”, which enabled participants to analyse and discuss, among other things, the involvement of foreign fighters in the illicit trafficking of weapons. The outcomes of that event paved the way for the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of its resolution [2370 \(2017\)](#) which it recognized the need for Member States to take appropriate measures, consistent with international law, to address the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, in particular to terrorists, including by enhancing, where appropriate and consistent with their domestic legal frameworks, national systems for the collection and analysis of detailed data on the illicit trafficking of such weapons

Guiding Principle 52 ^a

In undertaking appropriate measures consistent with international law to address the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, in particular to terrorists, Member States should:

- (a) Maintain, develop or establish, and effectively implement, national laws, regulations and administrative procedures to ensure effective control over the production, export, import and transit of small arms and light weapons, including by establishing as a criminal offence their illicit manufacture, online trade or diversion to the illicit market through corruption;
- (b) Take all appropriate measures to prevent the diversion of small arms and light weapons when authorizing their international transfer, taking into consideration that, in accordance with the International Tracing Instrument, small arms and light weapons are considered illicit if they are transferred without a licence or authorization issued by a competent national authority;
- (c) Put in place and, as needed, strengthen certification processes and/or end user certificates, as well as effective legal and enforcement measures, and make every effort, in accordance with national laws and practices and without prejudice to the right of States to re-export small arms and light weapons that they had previously imported, to notify the original exporting State in accordance with their bilateral agreements before the retransfer of those weapons;
- (d) Provide national law-enforcement authorities with mandates and resources to assist them in preventing and combating the illicit import, export or transit of small arms and light weapons into, from or through their territories;
- (e) Redouble national efforts to provide for the safe, secure and effective management of stock piles of small arms and light weapons held by government armed and security forces, in particular in conflict and post-conflict situations, in accordance with the provisions of the Programme of Action;
- (f) Take effective measures to prevent and combat the illicit brokering of small arms and light weapons, making use of the recommendations contained in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 60/86, and consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons;
- (g) Exchange and, in accordance with national legal frameworks and security requirements, apply experiences, lessons learned and best practices relating to the control of the export, import and transit of small arms and light weapons, including certification processes and/or end user certificates.

^a See also [A/CONF.192/2018/R.C.1, annex](#).

^b [A/62/163](#) and



A practical tool to assist Member States in stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, the Madrid Guiding Principles were identified at a Special meeting of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee held in Madrid in July 2015. In light of important developments since, including the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 2396 (2017) that focuses on returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters, the Committee saw the need to update those principles. The addendum (S/2018/1177) to the Madrid Guiding Principles was adopted by the Committee and the Security Council in December 2018. Together with the original set of 35 guiding principles, the 17 additional guiding principles brings the total number of guiding principles on foreign terrorist fighters to 52.