�山����

Neither party has—rightly so—disputed the Appeals Tribunal’s findings in Al Shakour that the United Nations Secretary-General was bound by the General Assembly’s endorsement and adoption of the ICSC’s determination regarding post-adjustment for United Nations staff in Geneva. In doing so, the Tribunal further notes that, as relevant to the present case and following Al Shakour, the General Assembly provided no alternatives for the United Nations Secretary-General on how to compute the relevant post-adjustment payment than by following the ICSC’s determination. Accordingly, as relevant to the present case, a textual interpretation of WMO staff regulation 3.3 leads to the Tribunal to conclude that the reference to “United Nations post adjustment” (emphasis added) unmistakably equals the organization established as “the United Nations” as spelled out in its Charter. As relevant to the present case, the decision of the General Assembly to follow ICSC’s determination thereon, as determined by the Appeals Tribunal in Al Shakour, was therefore the relevant standard to be applied for the WMO Secretary-General in accordance with WMO staff regulation 3.3. This was, furthermore, also in line with the stipulations of WMO staff rule 133.1(c). Consequently, in application of WMO staff rule 133.1(c), the WMO Secretary-General therefore acted within his discretion when he decided to apply ICSC’s determination regarding the post-adjustment for United Nations staff in Geneva to WMO. Essentially, pursuant to WMO staff regulation 3.3 read together with Al Shakour, the WMO Secretary-General had no other choice. Pursuant to the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, the word “appropriate” essentially means “right or suited for some purpose or situation”. The question is then whether, as argued by the Applicants, the word attributed a discretion to the WMO Secretary-General in the present case, when it is stated that “[t]he basic salary rates for Professional category staff shall be adjusted by application of the appropriate United Nations post adjustments” (emphasis added) in WMO staff regulation 3.3. 37. The Tribunal does not find so. The Applicants’ argument would only make sense if the WMO Secretary-General had a choice between different alternative United Nations post-adjustment standards in which case s/he could decide which one would be best suited, or “appropriate”, one for WMO. This is, however, not the case, as already explained in the above Accordingly, based on the language of WMO staff regulation 3.3, the word “appropriate” means that the WMO Secretary-General was limited to this single standard for post-adjustment applied by the United Nations, which was the one the General Assembly adopted in accordance with the ICSC’s determination in accordance with Al Shakour. The Applicants’ references to WMO staff regulations 3.1 and 3.2 do not change this finding. WMO staff regulation 3.1 concerns the basic salaries of the WMO staff members—and not the additional payment for post-adjustment—and solely provides that these salaries shall be “determined” by the WMO SecretaryGeneral “in accordance with the grades and corresponding gross and net salary scales applicable to United Nations personnel”. WMO staff regulation 3.2 is about “assessment”—a general deduction from the salaries with no impact on the postadjustment remuneration. Such an assessment for WMO staff is simply determined in WMO staff regulation 3.2 to “be subject to an assessment as determined by the United Nations”. Neither provision therefore even as much as implies that the WMO Secretary-General should possess a discretion to depart from the standard “United Nations post adjustment” in accordance with WMO staff regulation 3.3, as promulgated by Congress. Similarly, the Agreement between the United Nations and WMO makes no difference to the Tribunal’s findings above. In art. IX(1) of this Agreement, it is merely stipulated that the United Nations and WMO “agree to develop as far as practicable common personnel standards, methods and arrangements designed to avoid serious discrepancies in terms and conditions of employment, to avoid competition in recruitment of personnel, and to facilitate any mutually desirable interchange of personnel in order to obtain the maximum benefit from their services”.This does in no possible manner affect the conclusion that in accordance with WMO staff regulation 3.3, the WMO Secretary-General was bound to follow the General Assembly’s decision as per Al Shakour. If anything, art. IX(1) rather affirms WMO’s general commitment to apply the United Nations standards as also done by Congress in WMO staff regulation 3.3. The decision for WMO to follow “the appropriate United Nations post adjustment”, and therefore also Al Shakour, was basically made by Congress when adopting WMO staff regulation 3.3. Thereafter, WMO was unconditionally bound to follow the applicable standard for the United Nations staff, and the WMO’s internal legal framework provided no discretion to the WMO Secretary-General when executing or administrating this provision for the WMO staff in Geneva. Al Shakour therefore also applies to the present case, because the Appeals Tribunal decided therein that for the United Nations staff in Geneva, the postadjustment payment was to be based on ICSC’s determination as endorsed by the General Assembly. Since Congress adopted WMO staff regulation 3.3, WMO’s “independence” or “sovereignty” from the United Nations was not affected by following the findings of the Appeals Tribunal in Al Shakour—only Congress, and no one else, made the decision to follow the United Nations standard for post-adjustment and did so without any further reservations. The WMO Secretary-General’s possible personal opinions and assurances in this regard are therefore irrelevant, because in accordance with the internal hierarchy of WMO, s/he must follow the directions given to her/him by Congress in the WMO Staff Regulations. Furthermore, WMO is under the jurisdiction of the Dispute Tribunal and not ILOAT, and ILOAT judgments are only of persuasive authority to the Dispute Tribunal, whereas it is bound by those of the Appeals Tribunal under the doctrine of stare decisis. Similarly, other judgments of the Dispute Tribunal, like the first instance judgment in Al Shakour are not binding, but simply persuasive, for this Tribunal. Accordingly, it falls outside the scope of the present case to reargue the Appeals Tribunal’s findings in Al-Shakour, which the Tribunal must therefore follow. Even if deviations exist between how the United Nations Secretariat and WMO administer certain “compensation schemes”, this does not affect the remuneration for post-adjustment in accordance with WMO staff regulation 3.3. Congress made that clear when adopting this provision and unreservedly refer to the “appropriate United Nations post adjustment”. Also, under WMO staff regulation 3.3, Congress did not contemplate that Congress or the Executive Council needed to endorse or otherwise approve any of the contested administrative decisions for them to be lawful. Had the Executive Council done so, it would have overstepped its authority within the internal hierarchy of WMO, since it was Congress that adopted WMO staff regulation 3.3. If Congress disagreed with the General Assembly’s decision to endorse ICSC’s determination on post-adjustment, the simple solution would be to amend WMO staff regulation 3.3, but it has not done so.