When Ecuadorian diplomat Luis Gallegos first proposed a 鈥淏inding Treaty on Business and Human Rights,鈥� many countries and environmental activists welcomed the idea with open arms.
Backed by South Africa, Mr. Gallegos urged the 缅北禁地Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland, to immediately begin negotiations to end human rights violations and environmental damage by transnational corporations.
In October 2018, 94 countries drew up a draft text for the binding treaty, which could address the issue of the complex global supply chain that currently makes it difficult to determine who is responsible for environmental damage or human rights violations. It should also give victims access to justice.
For two decades, Mr. Gallegos鈥檚 birth place of Ecuador waged a court battle to hold Chevron (formerly Texaco), a US-based multinational, accountable for oil spills and for allegedly dumping
16 billion gallons of toxic waste into waterways and open pits in the country鈥檚 Amazon jun-gle, affecting 30,000 indigenous people and campesinos in the area. The South American country tried without success to seek redress in American, Ecuadorian, Brazilian and Canadian courts.
130 oil spills
in Nigeria鈥檚 Niger Delta in 2015 were reported by Amnesty International
Chevron in turn dragged Ecuador before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, for violating a 1997 bilateral investment treaty, and was awarded a hefty $112 million. A binding treaty on environmental damage might have prevented this kind of outcome.
Currently, there are voluntary guidelines for international businesses. One such set of guidelines is the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which instruct corporations to respect human rights but leaves en-forcement in the hands of states. In high-risk sectors such as agriculture, mining and the garment industry, most compa-nies disregard these principles, says Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, a newly established research initiative funded by the Dutch, British and Swiss governments.
Multinationals easily avoid prosecution because no international legal framework exists to hold them accountable, Mr. Gallegos argues. A majority of 缅北禁地member states and the African Union concur.
Ecuador is not the only country whose citizens or government is trying to keep multinationals in check. In 2016, some 40,000 Nigerian fishermen took Royal Dutch Shell, an oil company, to a British court over oil spillage in the Niger Delta region. But the court ruled that a conflict with the company鈥檚 Nigerian subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), could not be adjudicated in the United Kingdom.
Amnesty International reported in 2016 that SPDC鈥檚 operations in Nigeria鈥檚 Niger Delta region in 2015 alone had result-ed in about 130 oil spills.
鈥淭here are few places on the planet where the impact of multinational companies on the environment are more visible than in the Niger Delta,鈥� Nigerian diplomat Hashimu Abubakar told the Human Rights Council in Geneva.
After several rounds of consultations, the first draft of a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights was finally pre-sented to the Human Rights Council in July 2018, raising hopes of adoption.
鈥淏ig multinationals always use their legal and financial firepower at the cost of people who don鈥檛 have a lot of resources,鈥� Nigerian activist Esther Kiobel told Africa Renewal.
Ms. Kiobel is the widow of Dr. Barinem Kiobel, a former government official and one of the nine environmental cam-paigners executed by hanging in 1995 by Nigeria鈥檚 military government for protesting against oil pollution in the Niger Del-ta. She was a plaintiff in a landmark suit against the oil giant Shell.
鈥淎 new international treaty might give me the opportunity to get compensation and rehabilitate the name of my late husband,鈥� adds Ms. Kiobel.
After fleeing Nigeria and gaining US citizenship, Ms. Kiobel took Shell before an American federal court in 2002. After years of litigation, the court dismissed the case in 2013, claiming that a conflict between a Nigerian business, the SPDC, and Nigerian claimants cannot be heard in an American court.
Undeterred, Ms. Kiobel has now filed a civil case in a Dutch court. 鈥淎t this point we鈥檙e waiting for the Dutch court to set a date. Instead of facing me in court, they have been trying to prevent this case from even being heard before a judge,鈥� says Ms. Kiobel.
Although the idea of a treaty draws huge international support, bringing EU countries and others in the West on board may be difficult if not impossible. So far, both powerful players in international diplomacy have yet to back the effort.
European diplomats are concerned that binding obligations for international business could harm international trade, documents retrieved in Brussels through a Freedom of Information request reveal. 鈥淲e were a little surprised by the vigour of European resistance against this treaty,鈥� says Jane Nalunga of the Uganda-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) Southern and Eastern Africa Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI). SEATINI was established in 1996 to lobby policy makers and consult with western NGOs, the 缅北禁地and other international organisations to push an agenda of sus-tainable and inclusive development.
鈥淭he problem is that African governments鈥� fear that laws on human rights or the environment might chase away in-ternational investors,鈥� said Ms. Nalunga.
鈥淚n Uganda a foreign company needs to take an environmental assessment. But the outcome is not legally binding. In-ternational legislation could make these assessments mandatory on the international level, thus ending the dynamic of Af-rican states competing for investment and neglecting their human rights responsibilities.鈥�
The Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights will not immediately lead to the land of milk and honey, argues Lucas Roorda, a policy adviser at the College for Human Rights in Utrecht, the Netherlands. Mr. Roorda wrote a dissertation on the liability of multinational听 corporations.
鈥淎 set of international rules would of course directly impact cases like Kiobel versus Shell,鈥� he says. 鈥淏ut there鈥檚 also a lot of wishful thinking around this treaty. International rules can establish better access to justice for activists but wouldn鈥檛 solve the power discrepancy between multinationals and poor communities.鈥�
He doubts that a full-fledged human rights court will be realized through international negotiations. 鈥淪etting up an in-ternational tribunal for human rights abuses costs a lot of money, while rich countries in Europe and the US are opposed to such a tribunal.鈥�
Mr. Roorda prefers a treaty that lays out international norms that member states would then be obliged to legally adopt, adding, 鈥淭hat could actually make it easier to bring a case involving the Nigerian subsidiary of Shell before a Dutch court.鈥�
While Ecuador鈥檚 treaty would make rules binding on an international level (through a tribunal, fines or some other mechanism), Mr. Roorda would like member states to adopt international rules agreed upon in the treaty but not create an international court.
The long-term impact of international legislation goes beyond the establishment of a tribunal, explains Ms. Nalunga. 鈥淏esides adjusting the direct power imbalance between international investors and the poor communities in which they operate, this treaty could end the discrepancy between trade agreements and human rights.鈥�
Environmental and human rights activists and countries experiencing the impact of the activities of some multinationals may debate the best way to achieve the goal of holding multinationals accountable. What is not debatable is the need to end impunity. 听 听
