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The instigation of disciplinary charges against a staff member is the prerogative of the Organization, and it cannot, as such, be required to do so. In reviewing such a decision, the role of the Tribunal is not to determine whether the decision was correct but rather whether the Administration legally exercised its discretion. In examining the validity of the Administration’s exercise of discretion, the Dispute Tribunal’s scope of review is limited to determining whether the exercise of such discretion is legal, rational, reasonable and procedurally correct to avoid unfairness, unlawfulness and arbitrariness. The Dispute Tribunal can consider whether relevant matters have been ignored and irrelevant matters considered, and also examine whether the decision is absurd or perverse. But it is not the role of the Dispute Tribunal to consider the correctness of the choice made by the Secretary-General amongst the various courses of action open to him. Nor is it the role of the Tribunal to substitute its own decision for that of the Secretary-General. It is universally accepted that compensation for harm shall be supported by three elements: the harm itself an illegality and a nexus between both. It is not enough to demonstrate an illegality to obtain compensation the claimant bears the burden of proof to establish the existence of negative consequences, able to be considered damages, resulting from the illegality on a cause-effect lien. If one of these three elements is not established, compensation cannot be awarded. The harm must be shown to be directly caused by the administrative decision in question. A breach of staff member’s rights, despite its fundamental nature, is thus not sufficient to justify such an entitlement. There must indeed be proven harm stemming directly from the Administration’s illegal act or omission for compensation to be awarded. Generally speaking, a staff member’s testimony alone is not sufficient as evidence of harm warranting compensation under Article 10(5)(b) of the UNDT Statute. The testimony of an applicant in such circumstances needs the corroboration of independent evidence (expert or otherwise) to support the contention that nonpecuniary harm has occurred. Much will depend on the circumstances of the situation at hand, as the existence of moral damages shall be assessed on a case-bycase basis. The second kind of moral injury is that of harm, stress or anxiety caused to the employee which can be directly linked or reasonably attributed to a breach of his or her substantive or procedural rights. Harm of this nature is associated with the insult to dignitas but refers to injury of a particular kind as evidenced by the manifestation of mental distress or anguish. Its presence in the applicant may confirm the violation of personality rights, but in addition might justify a higher amount as compensation. Evidence of this kind of harm speaks to the degree of injury and the issue of aggravating factors. Many who are affronted in their dignity may be of a personality type better able to withstand it, others are more vulnerable. And delictual principles (the so-called “thin skull rule”) teach that we are obliged to take our victims as we find them. The best evidence of this kind of harm and the nature, degree and ongoing quality of its impact, will, of course, be expert medical or psychological evidence attesting to the nature and predictable impact of the harm and the causal factors sufficient to prove that the harm can be directly linked or is reasonably attributable to the breach or violation. But expert evidence, while being the best evidence of this kind of injury, is not the only permissible evidence. This Tribunal accepted as much in Asariotis when it explicitly stated that such harm can be proved by evidence produced. There is no absolute requirement in principle or in the rules of evidence that there must be independent or expert evidence. In somecircumstances, taking a common sense approach, the testimony of the applicant of his mental anguish supported by the facts of what actually happened might be sufficient.